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This dissertation employs experimental methods to investigate some of the non-material incentives that 
exacerbate and help groups resolve problems of collective action. It is composed of three studies that 
investigate what motivates individuals to contribute to public goods, what mechanisms can be used to 
encourage giving, and the aggregate collective action problem of dishonesty and corruption. Chapter 1 
provides an overview of each study. Chapter 2 presents work conducted with Kelsey Jack, which 
investigates leadership within the context of voluntary public good provision. We conduct a field 
experiment in 52 communities in rural Bolivia to investigate two questions: (1) Can leaders enhance 
voluntary public good provision by making a public donation before others?, and (2) If so, why? We 
explore whether leaders give more when they have the opportunity to influence others, and whether their 
behavior influences the contributions of others. Some of the mechanisms behind leadership influence are 
explored. Chapter 3 presents a study conducted with Arno Riedl and Lise Vesterlund, which investigates 
voluntary contributions to public goods in the laboratory. We conduct an experiment that varies the 
location of the unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies in piece-wise linear public good games 
and examine whether or not response time can be used to identify the intuitive action. The study gives 
particular attention to error, which manifests itself as generosity in the classic linear public good game, 
and may be negatively correlated with the time individuals take to make choices. Chapter 4 investigates a 
collective action problem of a different nature: dishonesty. It conducts two laboratory experiments to 
investigate whether or not dishonesty is contagious, and the role that tolerance plays in halting or 
facilitating the contagion of dishonest behavior.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation employs controlled laboratory and field experiments to investigate non-material 
incentives that exacerbate and help groups resolve problems of collective action. Two chapters examine 
how the social features of the environment in which individuals make decisions affect choices. One 
chapter examines a behavioral measure that has been recently used to make inferences about preferences, 
response time.    
 
Chapter 2, titled “Leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field evidence from 
Bolivia”, investigates the effect that democratically elected authorities have on voluntary public good 
provision when they make public contributions before others. Kelsey Jack and I conduct a controlled 
experiment in 52 communities in rural Bolivia that varies whether or not the elected local authority in a 
village makes a public voluntary contribution before others make private simultaneous contributions to 
environmental education books for the local school. The study compares contributions when an elected 
authority makes a public contribution first to two types of controls: one in which a randomly selected 
person contributes publicly first, and one in which all subjects make private simultaneous contributions. 
Results show that elected leaders increase public good provision by 20 percent when they lead by 
example. The effect is driven by two factors. First, elected authorities take advantage of leadership 
opportunities and give more than non-authorities when they give publicly first. Second, high leader 
contributions increase the probability that others follow. The chapter empirically identifies information 
signaling as a channel of leadership influence and explores the extent to which the observable 
characteristics of leaders matter. It contributes to the literature by showing that local authorities can 
influence voluntary public good provision in a development setting and by taking a first step towards 
bridging the gap that currently exists between field, theoretical, and laboratory work on sequential giving, 
which has never examined how actual leaders influence the voluntary contributions of the groups they 
lead.   
 
Chapter 3, titled “Intuitive generosity and error prone inference from response time”, investigates 
whether response time can be used to identify the intuitive action in public good settings. Lise Vesterlund, 
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Arno Riedl, and I follow up on the work of Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012), who document a negative 
correlation response time and giving in linear public good games and from this infer that cooperation is 
intuitive while greed is a calculated response. Noting that error is a strong confound in the standard linear 
public good game and may be correlated with the time individuals take to make choices, we conduct a 
laboratory experiment that identifies mistakes and generosity in two piece-wise linear public good games 
with unique interior Nash equilibria in dominant strategies. In one treatment subjects make contributions 
in a setting in which the equilibrium is located below the midpoint of the strategy space. In another 
treatment subjects make choices in a setting in which the equilibrium is located above the midpoint of the 
strategy space. The chapter shows that the correlation between response time and giving is sensitive to 
features of the strategic environment. We replicate existing findings that participants who make decisions 
quickly tend to be more cooperative when the Nash equilibrium is located below the midpoint of the 
strategy space, but find the reverse result when the Nash equilibrium is located above the midpoint of the 
strategy space. The chapter shows that response time cannot be used to identify intuitive responses. Fast 
decisions are associated with error and contributions that are scattered over the entire range of possible 
choices.  
 
Chapter 4, titled “Dishonesty, Tolerance, and Social Information”, conducts two experiments to 
investigate the effect that exposure to dishonest behavior has on the likelihood that individuals engage in 
and tolerate dishonesty. I construct a strategic setting that allows dishonesty to be studied in one-shot and 
repeated settings in the laboratory. Half of all participants in the study have the opportunity to engage in 
dishonesty and half are affected by the dishonest actions of others. Engaging in dishonesty implies lying 
and taking earnings from another equal participant who does not have the opportunity to engage in 
dishonest actions but who can punish dishonesty in a repeated setting at a cost. Treatments vary whether 
or not individuals receive information about the behavior of subjects in a previous session of the 
experiment and whether or not such information reflects honest or dishonest behavior. Results show that 
social information affects choices.  Exogenous social information reflecting dishonest behavior increases 
the likelihood that individuals are dishonest, while exposure to social information reflecting honest 
behavior has a weak effect on choices. Exogenous social information reflecting dishonest behavior 
weakly decreases the likelihood that individuals tolerate dishonesty. The chapter contributes to the 
literature by documenting a non-material strategic complementarity that makes dishonesty contagious and 
by showing that tolerance does not facilitate the contagion of dishonest behavior.  
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2.0  LEADERSHIP AND THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS:                         
FIELD EVIDENCE FROM BOLIVIA  (CO-AUTHOR: B. KELSEY JACK )  
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Leaders play a central role in the resolution of collective action problems. Existing evidence demonstrates 
that leaders affect growth at the aggregate level (Jones and Olken 2005) and influence the choice of 
public goods provided at the local level (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Most studies of leadership and 
public good provision focus on public goods that are provided by the government.1 In spite of the 
importance of voluntary contributions for the resolution of local-level collective action problems, less is 
known about the effect leaders have on the voluntary provision of public goods. Recent work has shown 
that leaders can affect voluntary contributions through informal taxation (Olken and Singhal 2011), 
sanction enforcement (Grossman and Baldassarri 2012), and reciprocity (Beekman, Bulte, and Nillesen 
2013). This paper examines another mechanism by which leaders may affect voluntary contributions to 
local public goods: leadership by example. 
 
In a voluntary contribution setting, leadership by example arises when individuals make 
sequential decisions, and the choice made by the first mover (the leader) influences the contributions of 
others. A substantial theoretical and experimental literature has shown that first movers can affect 
                                                
The authors thank Fundación Natura, the Sustainability Science Program at Harvard University, and the Agricultural 
Technology Adoption Initiative for support. Nigel Asquith, María Teresa Vargas and the rest of the staff at Natura 
provided invaluable support and guidance. Nava Ashraf, Lee Benham, Matthieu Chemin, Giovanna d'Adda, Sarah 
Jacobson, Margaret McConnell, Mushfiq Mobarak, Mary Shirley, Lise Vesterlund, Randy Walsh and audience 
members at Harvard, University of Wisconsin - Madison, University of Pittsburgh, Yale, AERE, SITE, ESA, NTA, 
NEUDC, CAGE, and ISNIE provided useful comments. We thank Blaine Pellicore and Filipe Miranda for research 
assistance. 
1 For example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) study the effect of female leadership on policy decisions in India; 
Reinikka and Svensson (2004) investigate the political capture of public education funds in Uganda; Humphreys, 
Masters, and Sandbu (2006) study leadership influence on public deliberations about future public resource use in 
São Tomé and Príncipe; and Besley, Pande and Rao (2012) analyze political influence in public resource allocation 
decisions in India.   
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voluntary contributions in sequential decision settings through free-riding (Varian 1994), information 
signaling (Hermalin 1998; Vesterlund 2003; Potters , Sefton, and Vesterlund 2005, 2007; Andreoni 2006; 
Hermalin 2007; Bag and Roy 2011), reciprocity (Andreoni, Brown, and Vesterlund 2002; Meidinger and 
Villeval 2002; Gächter, Nosenzo, Renner, and Sefton. 2010, 2012), and social status (Kumru and 
Vesterlund 2010; Eckel, Fatas, and Wilson 2010). Due perhaps to the challenge of empirical identification 
of leadership influence in field settings, no study has examined how the example set by individuals who 
occupy actual leadership positions affects the voluntary contributions of the groups they lead. Our paper 
begins to fill this gap in the literature by conducting a randomized field experiment in rural Bolivia that 
investigates two questions: (1) Do local leaders (authorities) affect voluntary public good provision 
through their example?, and (2) If so, why? Our experiment examines the effect of leadership on the 
contributions of both leaders and followers, and tests the role of information signaling about the quality of 
the public good as a causal mechanism of leadership influence. 
 
We implement a controlled field experiment in 52 socially and politically independent 
communities, each of which has its own elected local authority.2 In our experiment, a representative 
sample of community members pool resources to provide environmental education books for the local 
school.3 We employ a between-subject design that solicits voluntary contributions in a natural decision 
setting and compare public good provision when an authority makes an initial public voluntary 
contribution—and other group members make private voluntary contributions after observing the 
authority's choice—to two types of controls: one in which a randomly selected community member 
makes an initial public contribution and one in which all contributions are private. Two of the three 
treatments are implemented simultaneously in each community, facilitating the use of fixed effects to 
address unobservable community-level confounds.4 
 
Our results show that local authorities increase average voluntary public good provision when 
they give publicly before others. The effect is unique to authorities; randomly selected individuals have 
little effect on overall giving when they lead. We decompose treatment effects into leader and follower 
                                                
2 We refer to the elected local leader as the “authority” to differentiate the leadership role assigned in the experiment 
from the formal authority position elected local leaders occupy at the community level. 
3 Environmental education books provided through the experiment are accessible to all community members (non-
excludable), but exhibit rivalry. We consider them a pure public good from the donor’s perspective. That is, because 
contributions impose a positive externality that is non-rival and non-excludable on anyone who cares about the 
provision of education material in the local school. 
4 Community fixed effects remove any spurious correlation between first and subsequent mover decisions which 
could be otherwise incorrectly interpreted as leadership influence. 
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responses to leadership. Our results show that authorities not only contribute more than non-authorities 
when they give publicly before others, they also influence follower contributions. Followers of authorities 
are more likely to make a low contribution after observing a low leader contribution, and the probability 
that their contribution is high is significantly greater after observing a high leader contribution. Randomly 
selected leaders do not exert the same level of influence. 
 
We offer two pieces of evidence on why leaders affect voluntary public good provision in our 
setting. First, our study is designed to identify information signaling as a mechanism through which 
leaders influence followers. We exogenously vary whether or not participants receive information about 
the quality of the public good. Informed participants are less responsive than uninformed participants to 
the example set by randomly selected leaders, but not to the example set by community authorities. This 
result suggests that other mechanisms such as social status or reciprocity may also contribute to the 
observed authority leader effects. Second, we examine the relative importance of the authority's formal 
leadership position in the community and his or her observable characteristics. In our study, community 
members randomly selected to lead who are similar to local authorities on observable characteristics both 
make higher contributions to the public good and have a greater influence over the contribution decisions 
of others, i.e. they have the same effect on provision as authorities in a leadership role. This finding 
provides suggestive evidence that authorities are influential because of the types of individuals they are, 
not just the formal position they hold. The effect of authority contributions on followers can be thus 
attributed to a combination of authority status, observable characteristics, and the fact that authority 
leaders contribute more than do random individuals given the opportunity to lead. 
 
Our study is the first to examine how local authorities affect voluntary public good provision 
without the use of sanctions or coercion and thus makes several contributions to the literature. First, we 
empirically identify leadership by example as a mechanism through which local authorities can affect real 
voluntary contributions in a development setting. Second, we show that the leadership influence of local 
authorities on aggregate public good provision is explained both by their own contribution and the effect 
that they have on the contribution decisions of others. Third, we offer novel support for one of the most 
studied channels underlying leadership by example—information signaling—but show that its empirical 
relevance depends on who is in the leadership role. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that 
authorities are influential because of their formal leadership position, their elevated contributions when 
placed in a leadership role, and their observable characteristics; traits such as education and wealth, which 
are correlated with several potential mechanisms of authority influence, matter. 
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Our study relates to a small but growing number of controlled field studies that examine the 
relationship between leaders and voluntary contributions in developing countries. Using public good 
games in the field, Grossman and Baldassari (2012) find that individuals elected within the experiment—
who are not local authorities—are more effective at sanctioning low voluntary contributions, while 
Beekman et al. (2013) show that voluntary contributions are lower in communities that have corrupt 
officials. More similar to our study, d'Adda (2012) conducts an artefactual field experiment in 6 villages 
in rural Colombia that investigates how social information interacts with social status, defined 
endogenously along leadership dimensions, in a repeated voluntary contribution setting. Her results show 
that high status individuals (leaders elected within the experiment) are more likely to make high 
contributions and are less influenced by the contribution decisions of others. Our study is unique in this 
literature in that we study actual authorities, vary leadership exogenously, and use a one-shot setting in 
which voluntary contributions acquire an actual public good and in which both leaders and followers can 
react to leadership opportunities. 
 
In trading off the control of the laboratory with the realism of the field, our study encounters 
some limitations. First, in order to investigate both leader and follower responses to leadership we allow 
leader contributions to arise endogenously in our experiment. This design feature reveals whether or not 
authorities take advantage of leadership opportunities, but prevents us from cleanly separating the effect 
of leader contributions from leader characteristics and leader type when analyzing follower responses. 
Second, a small number of communities could not comply with treatment randomization for idiosyncratic 
reasons. Our findings are robust to correcting for any resulting selection bias. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 offers a conceptual framework for leadership in 
public good provision. Section 2.3 describes the experimental context and design. Section 2.4 describes 
the main results, treatment heterogeneities, and robustness checks. Section 2.5 concludes our work 
2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Early theoretical literature on sequential giving showed that leadership by example is weakly detrimental 
for voluntary public good provision when information is perfect and individuals are solely motivated by 
altruism (Varian 1994). This result emerges because the positive externalities generated by voluntary 
contributions introduce a free-riding incentive that induces first movers, leaders, to make low initial 
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public contributions that force followers to provide the public good. Subsequent theoretical and empirical 
studies have, nevertheless, shown that sequential giving can be beneficial for public good provision. 
Three primary classes of mechanisms underlie these positive results: (1) information signaling, (2) social 
preferences, and (3) social status. Our empirical design only facilitates the empirical identification of 
information signaling as a causal mechanism of leadership influence, but to help interpret our results, we 
describe all the mechanisms by which actual leaders may affect overall giving below. 
 
First, models of information signaling have shown that sequential giving can have beneficial 
effects on voluntary public good provision when at least one of two types of informational asymmetries 
are present: (1) uncertainty about the common value of the public good, and/or (2) uncertainty about 
private valuations of the public good. If the common value of the public good is uncertain and the leader 
has an informational advantage over others, he or she may signal such information through his or her 
contribution decision (Hermalin 1998; Vesterlund 2003; Potters et al. 2005, 2007; Andreoni 2006; 
Hermalin 2007).5 The leader can signal if a public good is of high (low) value by making a high (low) 
contribution that induces others to follow. Although level predictions are conditional on the underlying 
information in the hands of the leader, information signaling is always welfare enhancing in this setting. 
If individuals have independent private valuations for the public good and such information is not 
common knowledge, then leadership by example can, theoretically, positively affect provision through 
the resolution of the underlying strategic uncertainty (Bag and Roy 2011). 
 
Second, sequential giving can positively affect public good provision when individuals have 
social preferences that include reciprocity, equity, and fairness concerns (Meidinger and Villeval 2002; 
Huck and Rey-Biel 2006; Potters et al. 2005, 2007). Leaders who make high contributions crowd-in the 
contributions of subsequent movers. They cannot use their first mover advantage to free-ride (as in Varian 
1994) because reciprocal followers punish free-riding at a cost.6 Social preferences could even transform 
                                                
5 Field studies that have investigated information signaling within the context of voluntary contributions include 
Karlan and List (2012) and Smith, Windmeijer, and Wright (2014). While Karlan and List (2012) examine 
information signaling within the context of matching grants in charitable giving, Smith et al. (2014) investigate peer 
effects in charity fundraising conducted by individuals on-line. The form of leadership we study differs from these 
field studies in that we require the leaders to set an example by making a one-time costly and unrecoverable 
contribution before others; the leader does not observe the decisions of others and cannot make contributions at a 
later time.   
6 Andreoni et al. (2002) and Gächter et al. (2010) compare simultaneous and sequential giving with induced 
preferences in the laboratory when information is perfect and show that although leaders try to free-ride off of 
followers, followers punish free-riding by giving less than their best response function predicts. 
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the social dilemma into a coordination problem (Bicchieri 2006). Sequential giving can be beneficial for 
coordination because it improves equilibrium selection in groups. 
 
Third, social status can affect public good provision when individuals with high social status lead 
and followers like to be associated with high status others (Kumru and Vesterlund 2010) or want to 
acquire status (Bracha et al. 2009).7 Status can also be modeled as the location individuals occupy in a 
social network (center vs. periphery), and explain leadership influence on voluntary contributions through 
the number of agents that observe the leader's choice (Eckel et al. 2010).8 
 
What is the effect of leadership by example on public good provision in the field, when a local 
authority assumes the role of first mover? Do Varian's (1994) free-riding predictions hold or are effects 
consistent with one or more of the channels underlying positive leadership by example effects? Each of 
the mechanisms that allow leadership to positively influence public good provision may be active when 
any individual leads by example, but the existing literature suggests that effects should be amplified when 
a local authority leads. 
 
For example, authorities may possess superior information about the value of the public good. 
They may have been elected precisely because of this informational advantage, or may have acquired 
such information through their formal leadership role.9 Authorities may generate more reciprocity among 
community members due to their authority position and may even cause a reduction in strategic 
uncertainty when coordination incentives are present. Authorities may have higher social status than the 
average community member. They may be wealthier, more educated, and even possess higher social 
status as a direct result of the formal leadership position they occupy in the community. Finally, other 
factors such as legitimacy and motives unrelated to leadership influence, may also affect local authorities' 
ability to lead.10 Among motives that are unrelated to leadership, authorities could give more because they 
                                                
7 Related to this literature is also the empirical work on prestige and visibility motives for giving. See, for example, 
Harbaugh (1998), Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) and Karlan and McConnell (2012). 
8 Several laboratory experiments have investigated the importance of networks within the context of coordination 
games (Eckel and Wilson 2007) and have shown that high status leaders affect equilibrium selection. 
9 Formal authorities in our study setting attend workshops and meetings organized exclusively for local leaders and 
have experience making decisions on behalf of the community. Miller and Mobarak (2014) study this informational 
channel of leadership influence within the context of opinion leader influence on technology adoption decisions in 
Bangladesh. They show that when opinion leaders (including formal authorities) unanimously decide to adopt a new 
technology, the likelihood of adoption by other community members increases. 
10 A small number of papers have shown that legitimacy increases leadership influence and voluntary public good 
provision in laboratory settings. See, for example, Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) and Levy et al. (2011). 
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are more imaged concerned (Bénabou and Tirole 2006) than non-authorities, and/or could value the 
public good more by virtue of the position they occupy in the social network (Nielson and Wichmann 
2013). The described mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Our empirical identification of information 
signaling does not rule out the relevance of other drivers of leadership effects in the field. 
2.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We employ a between-subject design with three treatments that (a) identifies the effect authorities have 
on voluntary public good provision when they lead by example, (b) distinguishes the influence of the 
example set by authorities and non-authorities in the community, and (c) isolates the importance of one of 
the most studied mechanisms behind leadership influence: information signaling about the quality of the 
public good. Before turning to the details of the experiment and its implementation, we describe the study 
setting, which informs our design. 
2.3.1 Study setting 
The experiment was conducted in 52 communities located in the Rio Grande-Valles Cruceños region of 
Bolivia, in collaboration with a non-governmental organization, Fundación Natura. The setting is useful 
for the study of leadership by example in public good provision for three reasons. First, decentralization 
in Bolivia extends all the way to community-level administrative units called Organizaciones Territoriales 
de Base (OTBs).11 OTBs are independent social and political units; in our study setting they are small in 
size, meet regularly as a group, and are poorly integrated with outside markets. Each OTB has an elected 
representative (OTB president) who serves as the formal authority in the community. OTB presidents are 
elected in public meetings through majority vote. They are in charge of requesting funds from the 
municipal government, of developing local projects, of interacting with outsiders, and of organizing 
collective work. The fact that these authorities exist in all communities allows us to analyze the behavior 
of OTB presidents both in and out of a contribution leadership role. 
 
                                                
11 We use the term OTB and community interchangeably in the remainder of the paper because each community in 
our study is considered a separate OTB. Communities in the study sample contained an average of 26 households. 
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Second, a detailed census of 130 communities was conducted in the area by Fundación Natura in 
2010. The census includes household and community level information that facilitated the randomization 
of communities and households into treatment, and provides us with the controls used in our analysis of 
experimental results. 
 
Third, political parties and organizations have little presence in the area.12 Anecdotal evidence 
indicates that OTB presidents do not actively seek office and have no intention of pursuing a political 
career. They accept the authority position when selected by their peers, but find the responsibility costly 
in terms of the effort and time. We consider this beneficial for our study because it mitigates political 
factors that might confound our experimental design.13 
 
The experimental design uses a naturally occurring decision setting—a community meeting—to 
solicit contributions to environmental education books for the local school.14 Environmental education 
books were chosen as the public good in our experiment for several reasons. First, all communities in our 
study have a local primary school. Second, 40 percent of households in our study site identified 
environmental protection as one of the top values that should be taught to children in the community. All 
communities are located inside a watershed that was declared protected in 2007 due to severe soil erosion 
caused by agricultural practices. Environmental issues such as trash, water pollution, and soil erosion are 
thus very salient in the area. Third, although environmental education books are not a pure public good, 
they exhibit several relevant characteristics: books are non-excludable,15 and generate social spillovers. 
Furthermore, books can be viewed as a pure public good from the donor’s perspective. That is, because 
contributions generate a positive externality that is non-rival and non-excludable on anyone who cares 
about the provision of environmental education material in the local school. 
                                                
12 Sixty percent of households in our study (located in 51 communities) indicated in the 2010 census that political 
syndicates do not exist at the OTB level. Six out of 41 local authorities indicated that they attend political syndicate 
meetings, but none indicated that they have occupied authority positions at the syndicate level in the past. Only 4 out 
of the 580 individuals who participated in our study indicated that they had held authority positions at the syndicate 
level. 
13 It also may increase the likelihood of observing leadership by example effects in our setting. Given the lack of 
evidence on leadership by example in the field, establishing its empirical relevance is best done in a setting where it 
is likely to affect public good provision. 
14 Community meetings occur regularly in our study setting, and are organized through local authorities to address 
community business or at the request of outside individuals or organizations. We followed the standard approach to 
organizing a meeting, and therefore consider it a natural decision setting. 
15 All community members can have access to the education material available in the local school. Teachers are 
present in the school during weekdays and can grant school access. Community authorities and members of the 
parent-teacher association also have keys to grant school access when teachers or school administrators are not 
present. 
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From a practical perspective, books made it possible for us to examine voluntary contributions to 
a local public good in a setting in which even small contributions could ensure positive levels of 
provision. They also minimized trust confounds by allowing us to deliver the public good on site at the 
end of the experiment. The books used in the experiment were purchased from a non-government 
organization that specializes in producing environmental education material in Bolivia. Seven different 
books were available, and were sold at a zero-profit price of 10 Bs. per book. 
2.3.2 Treatments 
Our experiment employs a between-subject design with three treatments. In each treatment, subjects 
complete a survey in exchange for money and are subsequently given the opportunity to make a voluntary 
contribution to environmental education books for the local school. 
The treatments vary the way in which community members make voluntary contributions. In a 
No Leader Treatment (NL), individuals make private simultaneous contributions to the local public good. 
In a Random Leader Treatment (RL), a randomly selected individual is asked to make his or her voluntary 
contribution publicly before others. In an Authority Leader Treatment (AL), the formal community 
authority is asked to make his or her voluntary contribution publicly first. In both the RL and AL 
treatments, other participants make private voluntary contribution decisions after observing the 
contribution leader's public choice.16 
The NL treatment establishes a benchmark scenario that we use as control in our experiment. 
Comparison of NL and AL determines if local authorities affect voluntary public good provision through 
their example. Comparison of the RL and AL treatments determines whether AL treatment effects are 
specific to authority leaders or are a generic response to leadership. We conduct two simultaneous 
treatments per community and use fixed effects to control for community characteristics that may affect 
both leader and follower contributions. 
16 We use the term contribution leader to refer to the first mover: the randomly selected individual in the RL
treatment, and the authority in the AL treatment. 
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The design introduces an information manipulation in all treatments that gives half of all 
participants, and always the contribution leader, the opportunity to inspect the public good before making 
a voluntary contribution decision.17 The information manipulation identifies the extent to which 
information signaling about the quality of the public good explains leadership influence in this setting. If 
the leader's contribution conveys information about the value or quality of the public good then 
uninformed follower contributions should move in the direction of the leader's contribution (Vesterlund 
2003; Potters et al. 2005, 2007; Andreoni 2006). The effect should be muted or reversed for informed 
followers, who do not need to rely on the leader's contribution to update their beliefs about the quality of 
the public good.18 Comparison of uninformed and informed follower decisions within treatment tell us 
whether information signaling about the quality of the public good drives the effect that leaders have on 
follower contributions. Comparison across treatments informs us about the differential importance that 
information signaling has for each type of contribution leader. While several mechanisms discussed in 
Section 2.2 generate similar predictions across leadership treatments, none other than information 
signaling result in a differential follower response by information condition. 
2.3.3 Randomization 
We used household and OTB level data from the 2010 census of study communities to balance treatment 
assignment. OTBs included in the census but missing OTB-level information or without a local primary 
school were excluded from our study, as were communities smaller than 15 or greater than 80 households 
in size. The final eligible sample consisted of 52 OTBs. 
 
 OTBs were randomly assigned to one of three possible pairwise combinations of the NL, RL and 
AL treatments and 12 households from each community were randomly sampled for participation. The 
randomization balance for OTB and household variables was tested for each of 1000 draws and the draw 
with the minimum maximum t-statistic for any single variable was used as the final study sample (Bruhn 
                                                
17 The information manipulation was implemented in such a way that informed agents knew who else was able to 
inspect the public good, but uninformed agents had no knowledge of the informational advantage possessed by 
others. 
18 Of course, visual inspection may not resolve all uncertainty about the quality of the public good, in which case, 
informed followers will look more like uninformed followers in their response to leader contributions. A negative 
correlation between leader and follower contributions should arise when all informational asymmetries are 
eliminated, social preferences are absent, and free-riding incentives dominate (Varian 1994). 
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and McKenzie 2009).19 The largest resulting t-statistic associated with treatment assignment was 1.50, 
associated with balance by municipality. The randomization process delivered both balanced 
characteristics across treatment and a representative sample of households for participation in the study. 
2.3.4 Implementation 
The study team visited each community 4 to 7 days prior to the intervention. The team met with 
community leaders, scheduled the experiment, and delivered invitations to a “meeting organized by 
researchers from Universities in the United States.”20 Written invitations were delivered in person to the 
heads of the 12 households selected through the randomization process in each community, which always 
included the OTB president.21 At the time of invitation, individuals were told that they could earn up to 45 
Bs. for attending the meeting and that only one person per household could attend.22 On the day of the 
experiment, invited households were reminded of the time and location of the meeting. If households 
informed the study staff that they would not attend, a new household identified from the list of alternates 
generated through randomization was invited to participate.23 
 
 Two types of attrition affect the final study sample. The first is selection into the study, which 
occurred before the experimental session was conducted and does not affect the internal validity of our 
results. Appendix Table A1 provides a description of how the sample of households selected through 
randomization differs from the final sample of participants. The second is selection into treatment, which 
occurred in 6 sessions assigned to the Authority Leader treatment (AL), where the authority was not 
                                                
19 Randomization was balanced at the household level on: the number of rooms in a house, the education of the 
household head, the number of children under 16 per household, a stated preference for instilling environmental 
values in children, perceptions of community cooperation and decision-making, attitudes toward outsiders and 
participation in past community meetings. The distance to market, the number of households in the community, and 
the municipality were all balanced at the community level. We use the balancing variables as controls in most cases. 
In the analysis, a few variables are replaced with superior measures of the underlying characteristic of interest, such 
as the use of assets instead of number of rooms as a proxy for wealth. 
20 Community meetings in the study area are always organized with community leaders. We did not use the word 
experiment and deliberately called sessions meetings to minimize potential experimenter demand effects. 
21 Attrition could occur at the invitation stage if a household selected through randomization could not be located 
for invitation delivery. A household selected for participation required a substitute at the invitation stage if it had 
moved from the community or if no adult representative was available. A list of randomly chosen substitute 
households was used to identify replacements. 
22 45 Bs. is approximately 6.50 US dollars and is equal to the daily wage for agricultural work in the study setting. 
23 In select cases, no alternates from the list were available and substitutions were based on convenience. 
Convenience replacements were made in 19 cases. 
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present on the day of the experiment.24 These sessions were run with either the NL or RL treatment 
(whichever was not assigned to the other concurrent session in the same community). In four cases, to 
preserve balance in the number of sessions across treatments, the next available community scheduled to 
receive a combination of RL and NL treatments received an unplanned AL treatment. These incidents are 
documented in Appendix Table A.2. 
 
 Selection into treatment is potentially problematic for our empirical strategy.25 Authority 
absences, however, seem to have been idiosyncratic. Authorities were not present the day of the 
experiment because they had to attend classes in the municipal capital, had to take care of medical 
emergencies, or were away harvesting crops. No systematic differences between sessions selected into 
and out of treatment are detected in our data (see Appendix Table A.2). We show balance on the 
characteristics of participants for the final experimental sample in Appendix Table A.3 The Authority 
Leader treatment has fewer females, and participants in the No Leader treatment have slightly fewer 
assets. These results persist when community fixed effects are included and are partly driven by the fact 
that authorities differ from other community members on a number of observable characteristics, and are 
more often present in the AL treatment (See Appendix Table A.4). We control for these and other 
observable characteristics throughout our analysis of experimental results. 
 
 Each experimental session consisted of three parts and took place at the local school or in another 
centrally located community building. Throughout the implementation, efforts were made to keep the 
process similar to a typical community meeting. 
 
 In Part 1 of the meeting, individuals arrived to the designated meeting place, registered, received 
an envelope, an ID number, and consent forms. IDs ranging from 0 to 11 were distributed at random to 
participants with the exception of ID 0, which was always given to the OTB authority.26 Subjects were 
then informed that they would earn 35 Bs. by completing a questionnaire and 10 Bs. by attending the full 
meeting. At the time of soliciting consent, subjects knew that they would be asked survey questions but 
                                                
24 In 5 communities the authority was not present in the community to participate in the experiment. In one 
community the authority refused to participate. 
25 Specifically, the types of communities in which authorities were absent are systematically less likely to appear in 
the within-community comparisons of AL and the other treatments, while the RL-NL comparison is more likely to 
occur. 
26 The subject that was randomly assigned ID 6 acted as contribution leader in the RL treatment. Like the authority, 
the subject with ID 6 was not aware that he or she would have a special role in the experiment. 
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were not aware that they would be asked to make a voluntary contribution. Part 1 of the experiment took 
approximately 20 minutes. 
 
 In Part 2, subjects were split into two groups based on their ID number, which allowed more 
seating space for each of the participants while also facilitating the implementation of two simultaneous 
treatments. The experimenter and assistant were rotated to ensure balance across treatments. In each 
group, subjects completed a survey containing questions unrelated to the study in exchange for their 
experimental earnings.27 Questions were read out loud to participants, who answered using paper and 
pencil. 
 
 Regardless of the answers provided, all subjects were given 35 Bs. in 5 Bs. coins upon 
completion of the survey. Participants with even ID numbers were then asked to step out of the room; 
contribution leaders always had even ID numbers. Even numbered subjects were shown the 
environmental education books and were given the opportunity to inspect them, but were not told how the 
books would be used in the session. Subjects with odd ID numbers were not told the purpose of this 
interruption, but were asked to answer one additional survey question to pass the time.28 Participants with 
even IDs returned to the room after 5 minutes. 
 
 Following the information manipulation, the contribution decision was presented to subjects. 
Subjects were told that the money earned by completing the survey was theirs to keep and that they could 
contribute as much or as little as they wanted to environmental education books for the local school. 
Books were displayed in front of the room and subjects were given general information about their cost 
and content. They were informed that for every 10 Bs. contributed by all community members (in both 
sessions of the experiment) the school would receive one book.29 Participants knew that 7 different 
volumes of the books were available and that they would be delivered on-site at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
                                                
27 The 17 survey questions covered topics such as place of birth, places they visit to access markets, seek medical 
attention, and make legal transactions. 
28 The additional survey question asked participants to indicate the communities they had visited the previous year. 
None of the 580 participants questioned the purpose of the interruption. 
29 Participants were additionally informed that contributions would be rounded up if the total amount contributed by 
all participants was not a multiple of 10. This ensured that we never kept any of the contributions made by subjects. 
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 To make their voluntary contributions, subjects were asked to place the money they wished to 
contribute in an envelope that had their ID number marked on the inside. Contribution decisions were 
done in private behind a cardboard partition. If the session was assigned the Random Leader or the 
Authority Leader treatment, the contribution leader—referred to by his or her ID number—was asked to 
demonstrate the process to others and to publicly announce the amount of his or her contribution as it was 
placed in the envelope. All other participants were called one by one to make their private voluntary 
contribution in the back of the room.30 The order by which subjects were called upon to make their 
contributions depended on the seating arrangement. Participants were not allowed to talk while 
contribution decisions were being made. 
 
 After all participants made their contributions, subjects were asked to complete a survey with 6 
questions on household socio-demographics and perceptions of teaching quality in the local school.31 
Once the final survey was completed, subjects received a 10 Bs. show up fee. This marked the conclusion 
of Part 2, which took approximately 60 minutes. 
 
 Part 3 of the experiment started once both experimental sessions were over. All participants 
returned to the same room and the total amount contributed by subjects was announced. The 
environmental education books were counted in public and given to the community authority or school 
representative in front of all subjects. The final part of the experiment took approximately 10 minutes. 
The entire session lasted between 90 and 120 minutes. 
2.4 RESULTS 
We observe the decisions of 580 subjects in 104 sessions of the experiment, which were conducted 
between May and July 2011. Each session included between 4 and 6 subjects; a total of 9 to 12 
individuals participated in the experiment in each of the 52 communities included in our sample. 
                                                
30 All subjects knew at the time they were making their contribution decisions that their contributions would not be 
revealed to anyone, including the local authority. This was done to ensure that contributions would not be affected 
by anticipated sanctioning. 
31 The purpose of these questions was to collect individual-level information that was not available through the 
census or was outdated. The census was conducted almost a year before the experiment and asked questions only to 





































































Figure 2.1: Histogram of contributions by participant type and treatment 
Notes: Figures represent histograms of contributions in bins of 5 Bs. Each of the 
figures describes contributions for different samples of participants: all (top), 
contribution leaders only (middle), and followers only (including the NL 
treatment, bottom). The shading describes each of the three experimental 




Figure 2.1 shows histograms of contribution decisions by participant type and experimental 
treatment.32 Panel (a) combines all participants and shows that 5 and 10 Bs. constitute the most common 
contribution levels across treatments. A contribution of 5 Bs. is the median contribution in the study 
population and the minimum non-zero contribution level. Ten Bs, on the other hand, is the smallest 
contribution that has a direct impact on the provision of the public good.33 The AL treatment shows first 
order stochastic dominance over the RL treatment, which in turn dominates the NL treatment.34 Panels (b) 
and (c) break contributions down by participant type. This presentation of raw data suggests that authority 
leaders give more than individuals randomly selected to lead by example (Panel b), and that contribution 
leaders make higher contributions than do followers (Panel b vs. c).35 
 
Although the raw data suggests that public good provision increases in the presence of a leader, 
these results are informative only of aggregate outcomes. Observable and unobservable factors that drive 
both leader and follower contributions need to be accounted for. To quantify treatment effects 
parametrically we regress contributions on the experimental treatments and a vector of individual- and 
session-level controls. All regressions include community fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the 
community level. Community fixed effects address any spurious correlation between leader and follower 
giving, driven by unobservable community-level factors. Even with fixed effects, controlling for 
individual- and session-level characteristics is important given the imbalance discussed in Section 2.3. 
 
We estimate treatment effects using three different specifications, which we describe generally 
here and in detail immediately preceding each set of results. First, to examine changes in mean 
contributions, we consider a continuous measure of contributions and estimate treatment effects using 
ordinary least squares. Second, we take into account that the experiment was implemented using 5 Bs. 
coins and implement an ordered logit model in which each 5 Bs. interval constitutes a separate categorical 
                                                
32 Contributions are classified in 5 Bs. bins that reflect the monetary unit used to pay subjects in the experiment. A 
small number of subjects made contributions using their own coins. These are rounded to the closest 5 Bs. interval in 
Figure 2.1 but not in the remainder of the analysis. 
33 Ten Bs. is also the value of the show-up fee, which could induce artificially high focal contributions of 10 Bs. 
The modal contribution of 5 Bs. in the No Leader treatment implies that this is highly unlikely. 
34 Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests reject the null hypothesis that the contributions of all participants in AL 
and NL or RL and NL were drawn from the same underlying distribution (p<0.01 and p<0.10 respectively). 
Differences between AL and RL are not statistically significant; but the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test has 
a p-value <0.15. 
35 Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests provide p-values <0.05 and <0.01 respectively. 
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giving bin.36 Third, given that the greatest mass of contributions occurs at 5 and 10 Bs. (see Figure 2.1) 
treatment effects may be concentrated around the median level of giving. We therefore estimate treatment 
effects on the probability of giving above the median (≥10 Bs). We revert to OLS for the median 
regressions. However, our results are qualitatively similar if we use a conditional logit model with fixed 
effects. 
 
 In our main analyses, we assume that the selection documented in the implementation section is 
idiosyncratic. Robustness checks that address selection into treatment, including an instrumental variables 
correction and a sample restriction to the compliant sub-sample of communities, are presented in Section 
2.4.3. They are consistent with our main results. 
2.4.1 Main results 
We begin by analyzing the effect of leadership by example on total and individual contributions, then 
split the analysis to focus on the behavior of leaders and on the response of followers. We explore 
treatment heterogeneities that help to explain the mechanisms underlying the main results next and 
conclude our analysis with a series of robustness checks. All tables show OLS and ordered logit 
estimates, include fixed effects, and show results with and without controls, though we focus on the 




We begin by estimating:    
yic =α +β1ALic +β2RLic +ΓXic +ηc +εic             (1) 
 
                                                
36 To accommodate community-level fixed effects in the ordered logit specification, we use Baetschmann et al.'s 
(2011) “blow up and cluster” (BUC) approach, which generates dichotomous outcomes at each of k thresholds and 
estimates each binary outcome using conditional maximum likelihood. The method relies on the restriction that the 
log odds associated with each threshold is the same, but is shown to be robust to outcome categories with few 
observations. In our data, the dependent variable acquires values k ∈{0,5,10,15,20} when contributions fall 
respectively in [0,5), [5,10), [10,15), [15,20), and [20,40]. Contributions of 20 Bs. or more are grouped together 
because few observations exceed the value of 20, and no random leader makes contributions in excess of this 
amount (see Figure 2.1). 
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where yic  represents the contribution made by individual i in community c, AL denotes the Authority 
Leader treatment, RL the Random Leader treatment, Xic  is the vector of individual- and session-level 
controls shown in the balance table, ηc  is a community fixed effect, and εic  is an error term clustered at 
the community level. 
 
 Results are shown in Table 2.1. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates aggregated at the session level, 
where i indexes the experimental session and Xic  is a vector of average session-level characteristics. 
Having an authority lead by example increases the total contributions in an experimental session by 9.11 
Bs. (s.e. 4.92), or approximately one environmental education book (column 2). Columns 4 and 6 show 
that this translates to an average individual-level increase of 1.07 Bs. (s.e. 0.69) or a 0.50 (s.e. 0.28) 
increase in the log odds of contributing an additional 5 Bs. coin. The median regressions in columns 7 and 
8 indicate that the likelihood that a contribution exceeds the median increases by 15 percent (s.e. 0.07) 
when a local authority leads (column 8). 
 





 Continuous  Continuous  Ordered logit  ≥ 10 Bs. 
  ( 1 ) ( 2 )   ( 3 ) ( 4 )   ( 5 ) ( 6 )   ( 7 ) ( 8 ) 
























N 104 104   580 580  580 580  580 580 
















Dep. Variable mean, NL 42.947   7.767  7.649  0.378 
 
Notes: N=104 in columns 1 and 2, N=580 in columns 3-6. Columns 1 and 2 show OLS estimates of treatment 
effects on total session contributions. Columns 3-4 and 7-8 show OLS estimates of treatment effects on 
individual contributions. Columns 5-6 show log odds ratios from an ordered logit regression. See text for 
details. RL refers to the Random Leader treatment; AL to the Authority Leader treatment. The omitted category 
is the No Leader (NL) treatment. All specifications include community fixed effects and standard errors 
clustered at the community level. Controls refer to the full set of individual- and session-level controls shown in 
the balance table. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 Treatment effects differ by the type of contribution leader. Community members randomly 
selected to lead by example do not affect total contributions to the public good (columns 1 through 6). 
Random leaders do, however, increase the probability that contributions exceed the median by 
approximately 9 percent (s.e. 0.06, column 8). As shown by the p-value for a test of the equality, the RL 
and AL coefficients are statistically significantly different from each other in all but the linear probability 
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model of giving 10 Bs. or more (columns 7 and 8). Leadership by example therefore has a consistent and 




To examine how authority and randomly selected contribution leaders adjust their behavior when 
leading by example, we compare each type of leader's contribution behavior when they lead and when 
they give in private. We restrict our analysis to leaders in the RL and AL treatments and to individuals in 
the NL treatment, which includes elected authorities. The NL participants thus form a counterfactual for 
leader behavior, when contribution decisions are private. We regress contribution decisions on leadership 
treatment and authority status: 
 
yic =α +δAuthorityic +β1ALic +β2RLic +ΓXic +ηc +εic           (2)  
 
where Authorityic  represents an indicator for whether individual i in community c is the elected 
authority, and all other variables use the same notation described in equation 1. The coefficient on 
Authorityic  captures any difference in contribution behavior between authorities and other community 
members when they give in private. The coefficients on the RLic  and ALic  treatment indicators reflect 
the change in contribution behavior displayed by random individuals and authorities when they give in 
public relative to non-authorities who give in private in the No Leader treatment. The regression is 
analogous to a difference in difference set up that includes leadership position and authority status, where 
AL represents the total effect for an authority in a contribution leadership position. The regression does 
not describe differences in the contribution behavior of authorities across treatments because community 
fixed effects are used and authorities are always present in either the NL or AL treatment. With this 
caveat in mind, the test for Authority public = private reported in the last row of Table 2.2 tests whether 
authority contributions are significantly different when they are made in public in the AL treatment from 
when they are made in private in the NL treatment. 
 
 Table 2.2 shows that both authorities and non-authorities increase their contributions when they 
lead by example. Authorities give 6.09 Bs. (s.e. 2.35) more when they lead by example than the average 
individual in the NL treatment (Columns 1 and 2). Randomly selected contribution leaders, on the other 
hand, give an additional 1.64 Bs. (s.e. 1.39). In all specifications, the coefficient on AL ( β1 ) is larger in 
magnitude than the coefficient on RL (β2 ). The difference between authority and non-authority leader 
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contributions is marginally significant in some specifications, which suggests that part of the total 
increase in public good provision generated by the AL treatment is explained by the direct effect of the 
contribution of authorities who give publicly first. 
 
Table 2.2: Leader contributions 
 Continuous   Ordered Logit   ≥ 10 Bs. 
  ( 1 ) ( 2 )   ( 3 ) ( 4 )   ( 5 ) ( 6 ) 



































Dep. Variable Mean, No Leader treatment 7.751  7.701  0.372 
 
Tests (p-values) 











Notes: N=258. The sample consists of individuals who led by example in RL and AL treatments and all subjects 
in the NL treatment. Authority refers OTB presidents in NL. Columns 1-2 and 5-6 present OLS estimates. 
Columns 3 and 4 show log odds ratios from an ordered logit regression (see text for details). All regressions 
include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of 
individual- and session-level controls shown in the balance table. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 Interestingly, the differences between authority and non-authority giving arise solely in response 
to leadership. The coefficient on the authority status indicator (δ) is small and imprecisely estimated, 
indicating that authority contributions are not different from the contributions of other community 
members when they contribute privately in the NL treatment. The final row of Table 2.2 shows that the 





Now we turn to the behavior of followers to test whether they respond to the contribution decisions of 
leaders, and whether the response differs by leader type. We exclude contribution leaders from the 
                                                
37 It is important to note that we only observe 8 authorities giving in the NL treatment, so the authority status 
indicator variable is identified off of a very small number of observations, resulting in large standard errors.   
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analysis and compare the contribution behavior of followers in RL and AL treatment to individuals who 
contribute privately in NL.38 The estimating equation is: 
 𝑦!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝐴𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝑅𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐴𝐿!"×𝑦!!" + 𝛽!𝑅𝐿!"×𝑦!!" + Γ𝑋!" + 𝜂! + 𝜀!"  (3) 
 
where 𝑦!" represents the contribution made by follower i in community c, and 𝑦!! for T ∈ {AL,RL} 
represents the contribution made by the contribution leader in treatment T. The effect of the different 
leader types cannot be completely separated from the fact that leader type (RL or AL) is correlated with 
leader contribution decisions and leader characteristics in our experimental setting (as shown in Appendix 
Table A.4). Thus, treatment effects on followers should be interpreted as the combined effect of the leader 
type, leader characteristics, and an endogenous leader contribution.39 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3 show OLS estimates of equation (3) with a continuous measure of 
leader contribution on the right hand side. The linear effect of continuous leader contributions on follower 
giving is statistically insignificant for both authority leaders (AL × leader contribution) and randomly 
selected leaders (RL × leader contribution), as are the level effects of the leadership treatments (AL and 
RL). The specification is restrictive in that it estimates the average effect of an increase in leader 
contributions on follower responses linearly. Potential theories underlying a leadership by example effect 
require neither monotonicity nor linearity in the best response function of followers. Before turning to the 
categorical measures of leader giving used in the rest of Table 2.3, we examine the less parametric 
analyses presented in Figure 2.2, which shows the marginal effects of leader contributions on follower 
giving, including a quadratic term. The relationship is imprecisely estimated in Panel (a), where follower 
response is continuous, but is similar and more precise when follower response is binary in Panel (b).
                                                
38 As noted in the preceding analysis of leader contribution decisions, some NL treatments included local 
authorities. Controlling for the presence of an authority not in the contribution leader role does not substantially 
change any of the results. 
39 We chose not to exogenously vary the amount authorities and non-authorities give when they lead by example 
because doing so would require letting subjects know that the leader is not freely choosing the amount they wish to 
contribute (in order to avoid using deception). This may generate a different response to leadership by example and 
would not be able to capture the leader response to leadership opportunities that we analyze in the previous sub-
section. 
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Table 2.3: Follower contributions 
Continuous Ordered Logit ≥ 10 Bs. (OLS) 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) 
Random leader (RL) -0.388 -0.364 -0.896 -0.775 -0.441 -0.374 -0.086 -0.085 
 
(2.411) (2.421) (0.834) (0.903) (0.470) (0.469) (0.100) (0.103) 
Authority leader (AL) -0.010 0.352 -1.512*** -1.124 -1.113*** -1.077*** -0.208*** -0.189** 
 
(1.023) (1.164) (0.361) (0.882) (0.201) (0.387) (0.049) (0.080) 
RL x leader contribution -0.027 -0.034 
 
(0.238) (0.235) 
AL x leader contribution 0.005 -0.022 
 
(0.078) (0.084) 
      RL x leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 0.448 0.228 0.492 0.405 0.212* 0.206* 
 
(1.117) (1.117) (0.507) (0.497) (0.112) (0.111) 
AL x leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 1.856* 1.379 1.420*** 1.336*** 0.372*** 0.343*** 
(0.968) (1.282) (0.374) (0.516) (0.085) (0.104) 
RL total effect: Leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. -0.448 -0.547 0.051 0.031 0.126** 0.121** 
 
(0.791) (0.769) (0.269) (0.270) (0.062) (0.060) 
AL total effect: Leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 0.344 0.255 0.307 0.258 0.164** 0.154** 
(0.898) (0.880) (0.315) (0.327) (0.070) (0.069) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dep. Variable mean, NL treatment 0.489  7.728 0.378 
 
Tests (p-values) 
RL=AL 0.891 0.797 0.501 0.787 0.188 0.253 0.279 0.444 
RL x leader contrib. = AL x leader contrib. 0.912 0.966 0.420 0.556 0.177 0.227 0.284 0.408 
RL total effect = AL total effect  0.489 0.443 0.450 0.480 0.619 0.653 
Notes: N = 510. Columns 1-4 and 7-8 show OLS estimates. Columns 5 and 6 show log odds ratios from an ordered logit regression with 
fixed effects (see text for a details). All specifications include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. 
Controls refer to the full set of individual- and session-level controls shown in the balance table. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Figure 2.2: Leader influence over followers 
Notes: Figures represent the marginal effects of regression coefficients for 
random and authority leader contributions. See text for a description of 
regressions. We present estimates for leader contributions up to 20 Bs. 
because this is the region of common support. 
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Specifically, Figure 2 suggests that authority leader contributions have a positive and approximately 
linear effect on the probability that followers give above the median (≥10 Bs.), while random leader 
contributions have a concave effect that is increasing up to 10 Bs. To accommodate these non-linearities 
the remainder of Table 2.3 tests for asymmetries in the response to high and low leader contribution, with 
the split at 10 Bs. 
 
 We examine the effect of high and low leader contributions on continuous follower contributions 
in columns 3 and 4 and categorical giving levels in columns 5 through 8. Authority leaders who give less 
than 10 Bs. (coefficient on AL) insignificantly decrease follower giving by approximately 1.12 Bs. (s.e. 
0.88, column 4) relative to the NL treatment. They significantly decrease the log odds that followers give 
an additional coin by 1.08 (s.e. 0.39, column 6), and significantly reduce the probability that follower 
contributions exceed the median by 19 percent (s.e. 0.08, column 8). Relative to a lower authority leader 
contribution, a high AL contribution has a positive and significant effect on follower contributions. 
Specifically, a follower of an authority who gives above the median gives 1.4 more Bs. (insignificant, 
column 4), has a significant 1.3 greater log odds of giving an additional coin and is 34 percent more likely 
to also give above the median than is a follower who observes an authority leader contribute below the 
median. 
 
 Is the influence of authorities on followers different than that of randomly selected community 
members who lead by example? In general, the coefficients on the random leader treatment variables in 
Table 2.3 are of the same sign, smaller magnitude and less precisely estimated than the corresponding 
authority leader effects. Column 8 shows that a random leader who gives at least 10 Bs. increases the 
probability that followers give at least 10 Bs. by 12.1 percent (s.e. 0.06), which is the only specification in 
which random leaders can be seen to have a significant influence over follower contributions. In spite of 
the relatively more consistent influence of authority leaders, the differences between the random and 
authority leader effects are statistically indistinguishable; p-values from the relevant t-tests are reported in 
the table. In neither case is the response of followers consistent with free riding: both authority and 
random leaders show some evidence of positively affecting follower contributions. 
2.4.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects 
We turn next to the question of why leadership affects voluntary contributions in our setting, by exploring 
treatment heterogeneities in both leader and follower contribution decisions. First, we test whether 
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followers' response to the leader's example differs based on their exposure to information. Second, we 
examine heterogeneities in leader influence based on the observable characteristics of leaders. 
 
Followers: Information signaling 
 
Recall that the information manipulation generated exogenous variation in the information available to 
study participants about the quality of the public good in all treatments. If leadership by example serves as 
an information signal, then the contribution decision of session leaders should influence informed and 
uninformed followers differently. Specifically, the contributions of uninformed followers should 
demonstrate a more positive correlation with the contribution decisions of the leader, because uninformed 
followers are more dependent on the quality information conveyed by the leader's decision than are 
informed followers. Table 2.4 replicates the analysis conducted in columns 3 to 8 of Table 2.3, but adds 
an additional interaction to differentiate between followers who did and did not have the opportunity to 
inspect the public good. We break the results out by information condition and show total effects for 
uninformed and informed followers relative to the contribution decisions of uninformed followers in the 
No Leader treatment. Note that informed and uninformed followers in the NL treatment make statistically 
indistinguishable contributions. In Table 2.4, the treatment effects are followed by a series of p-values, 
shown at the bottom of the table, from tests of the equality of coefficients across information conditions 
and by leader type. 
 
 Beginning with uninformed followers, the top panel of Table 2.4 shows that an authority leader 
who makes a low initial contribution (less than 10 Bs.) insignificantly decreases the average contributions 
made by uninformed followers by 1.04 Bs. (s.e. 1.17), significantly lowers the log odds that follower 
contributions fall in the next categorical giving bin by 1.44 (s.e. 0.77) and significantly decreases the 
probability that followers give at least 10 Bs. by 29.3 percent (s.e. 0.16). An authority who makes a high 
initial contribution, on the other hand, insignificantly increases average uninformed follower 
contributions and the log odds that followers contribute an additional coin, but significantly increases the 
probability of giving above the median by 14.4 percent (s.e. 0.08). Authorities therefore influence 
uninformed follower contribution decisions. They decrease follower giving when they set a negative 
example as leader, but also increase the probability that followers give above the median when their 
contributions are high. Random leaders do not affect the contributions of uninformed followers when they 
make low contributions, but are just as influential as authorities when they make initial contributions of 
10 Bs. or more. 
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Table 2.4: Heterogeneous treatment effects – information 
  Continuous   Ordered logit   ≥ 10 Bs. 
  ( 1 ) ( 2 )   ( 3 ) ( 4 )   ( 5 ) ( 6 ) 
Uninformed follower 



















































































  (0.933) (0.965)   (0.351) (0.382)   (0.087) (0.089) 







Dependent Variable mean, excluded category 7.351  7.728  0.360 
 
Tests (p-values) 



































Informed, leader contrib. ≥10Bs: RL = AL 0.491 0.351   0.464 0.359   0.437 0.300 
 
Notes: N = 510. Columns 1-2 and 5-6 show OLS estimates. Columns 3-4 show log odds ratios from ordered logit 
estimates. See text for details. The excluded category is uninformed subjects in NL. All specifications include 
community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of individual- 
and session-level controls shown in the balance table. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
 As shown in the middle panel, the effects on informed followers are rather different. The negative 
effect of low authority leader contributions becomes statistically insignificant. High authority leader 
contributions, however, continue to affect the probability that followers give above the median, with a 
similar magnitude and statistical significance as in the case of uniformed followers. AL treatment effects 
are not significantly different across informed and uninformed followers. For random leaders, the results 
are reversed. While uninformed followers were unresponsive to low leader contributions, informed 
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followers make significantly lower contributions when the leader makes a low contribution.40 High 
contributions from random leaders do not increase the contributions of informed followers, as they did for 
uninformed followers, though the difference in the coefficient is significant only in one specification. 
 
 Overall, the analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects on the basis of information shows four 
things. First, the leadership influence exerted by random leaders is consistent with information signaling: 
random leaders who make high contributions increase the likelihood that uninformed but not informed 
followers make contributions that exceed the median. Second, the patterns of authority influence cannot 
be fully explained by information signaling. While the negative influence of a low authority contribution 
appears to be mitigated by exogenous information provision, high authority contributions increase the 
contributions of even informed followers.41 The first two results can be seen in the t-tests for the 
difference in the effects on uninformed and informed followers, which are significant in a number of 
specifications for random leaders but never for authority leaders. Third, while uninformed followers are 
marginally more likely to be influenced by a low authority leader contribution than by a low random 
leader contribution, informed followers are not differentially responsive to leaders of different types. 
These differences disappear when contributions are high; random leaders who contribute 10 Bs. or more 
are just as likely to influence followers as are authorities. Generally, these tests take us to the edge of 
what the study is powered to investigate, and we interpret the differences as suggestive evidence of a role 
of information signaling in leadership by example, which appears more prevalent among random leaders 
than among authority leaders. 
 
Leaders: Individual characteristics 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3, authorities differ from the average community member on a number of 
dimensions, including gender, education, assets, and community participation (see Appendix Table A.4). 
As a result, the influence of authority leaders may be driven not by the position that they hold in the 
community but by their observable characteristics. Some relevant traits, such as education and wealth, 
may allow leaders to generate better information signals, trigger more reciprocity, and have stronger 
                                                
40 The effect that random leaders who make low contributions have on informed followers is inconsistent with the 
predictions of information signaling about the quality of the public good, but could be explained by normative 
component of information signaling or non-information channels such as reciprocity and conformism. 
41 The persistent influence of authority leaders over even informed followers could be explained by a superior 
information signal, for which inspecting the books is not a good substitute. We therefore cannot rule out that 
information signaling fully explains the results, though the nature of the signal offered by random and authority 
leaders must differ. 
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social influence regardless of their status as elected authorities. Holding an authority position may, on the 
other hand, convey an additional influence that extends beyond the observable characteristics of the 
leader. 
 
 Though our study is not designed to explicitly investigate how the observable characteristics of 
leaders explain leadership influence, we take advantage of the fact that randomly selected contribution 
leaders vary in the degree to which they resemble the average elected authority. We construct an 
“authority propensity score” using a probit regression of authority status on the five characteristics where 
authorities significantly differ from the rest of the community: gender, education, wealth, participation in 
community meetings, and trust in NGOs.42 Each contribution leader is assigned an authority propensity 
score between 0 and 1, which describes the resemblance of each contribution leader to the average 
authority in the study. 
 
 The top panel of Figure 2.3 shows how leader contributions vary with leader characteristics and 
types by plotting the marginal effects from a regression of leader contributions on authority propensity 
score interacted with leader treatment that includes community fixed effects and standard errors clustered 
at the community level. The figure shows that random leaders give less than authority leaders in general, 
with contributions that are increasing in their authority propensity score. The slope of the random leader 
regression is positive but statistically insignificant. The giving gap between authority leaders and random 
leaders, however, narrows as the authority propensity scores increases, suggesting that the positive 
influence random leaders exert when their contributions are high (see Table 2.3) may be coming both 
from their observable characteristics and the amount they contribute as leaders. Since the authority 
propensity score was generated from the sample of authority leaders included in the regression, we plot 
the authority leader results only to provide a basis for comparison. The slope of the authority leader 
regression is negative, but statistically insignificant.43 
 
                                                
42 Note that authorities differ from the rest of the population on several participation-related characteristics, 
including participation in OTB meetings and projects, and agreement with OTB decisions. We focus on one of these 
to avoid redundancy. Each of the covariates used in the probit regression is balanced after imposing common 
supports. We implement the propensity score matching using the algorithm developed by Becker and Ichino (2002). 
43 The negative and insignificant slope could indicate that authorities compensate for looking less like a leader by 
contributing more. 
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Figure 2.3: Authority characteristics vs. size of leader contributions 
Note: Figures represent the marginal effects of regression coefficients for 
random and authority contribution leaders. See text of a description of the 
regressions. We do not report results for authority propensity scores beyond 0.6 
because differences are not statistically significant across treatments. 
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 To more directly examine the relationship between leader characteristics and leader influence, we 
construct a new outcome variable: the absolute difference between leader and follower contributions. The 
lower panel of Figure 2.3 shows the marginal effects from a regression of this measure of leader influence 
on an interaction of authority propensity score and leadership treatment, controlling for the leader 
contribution amount, individual- and session-level characteristics and community fixed effects, and with 
standard errors clustered at the community level. The figure shows that random leaders are more 
influential the more they look like the typical authority in the study. The slope of the authority propensity 
score among random leaders is marginally significant (p=0.102). Together, the results in Figure 2.3 
highlight two factors underlying leadership by example in our setting. First, random leaders are more 
influential if they resemble authorities, both because they give more as leaders and because of their 
characteristics. Second, at least some of the influence that authorities have when they lead by example is 
driven by their observable characteristics. This last point may indicate that communities choose their 
leaders based, in part, on observable characteristics that are correlated with influential leadership. 
2.4.3 Robustness checks 
We use two types of robustness checks to address possible selection bias resulting from non-compliance 
with the assigned treatment in some communities. First, we present two stage least square estimates of 
treatment effects that use treatment assignment to the AL treatment as an instrument for administered AL 
treatment, as follows: 
 
yic = δ1RLic +δ2ALˆic +ΓXic +ηc +εic           (3) 
 
The fitted values of ALˆic  are obtained from the first stage regression 
 
ALic =θDic +ΓXic +εic           (4) 
 
where Dic  is an indicator for assignment to the AL treatment for individual i in community c. Second, we 
restrict our analysis to the sample of communities that complied with treatment assignment and estimate 
treatment effects directly as in our main specifications.  
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 Appendix Table A.5 presents revised estimates of treatment effects on total contributions. 
Overall, the results look similar to the main specifications, and are stronger under the instrumental 
variables specification in most cases. This strengthening of the results under the IV specification is due to 
the relatively low contributions among the four replacement authority leaders. The limited sample 
analysis sometimes lacks statistical power because of the loss of sample size. The same robustness 
specifications are carried out for the leader and follower results. These are presented in Appendix Tables 
A.6 and A.7 respectively, and are also consistent with our main results. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Local authorities in developing countries often wield substantial power, and some evidence shows large 
authority fixed-effects in community development outcomes, including the provision of public goods 
(Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Miguel and Gugerty 2005). What role do local authorities play? Do they 
help communities overcome collective action problems and sustain higher levels of voluntary public good 
provision? If so, how? A number of channels present themselves: sanctioning or rule enforcement, moral 
suasion, liaison with outside resources, reciprocity, and leadership by example. Our study offers novel 
evidence on the latter mechanism. 
 
We implement small group experiments in 52 communities in rural Bolivia to examine the role 
that locally elected authorities play in the voluntary provision of public goods when they lead by example. 
In our setting, authorities exert a significant influence over voluntary public good provision even without 
the ability to monitor, sanction or coerce. On average, provision increases by approximately 20 percent 
when the group is led by an elected authority who makes an initial public contribution. In our setting, 
authorities significantly increase their contributions when they lead by example relative to when they give 
in a private, simultaneous decision setting where their contributions do not differ from those of the 
average community member. Authorities also influence the contribution decisions of followers, to a 
marginally greater extent than do random individuals who lead by example. 
 
Our design explores one of the best-studied mechanisms underlying a positive effect of leadership 
by example on public good provision: information signaling. We find that the predictions of information 
signaling are consistent with the influence that randomly selected contribution leaders have on their 
followers, but do little to explain the influence of elected authorities. The additional influence of local 
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authorities who lead by example suggests an information signal that goes above and beyond the 
information manipulation offered in the experiment, and with other channels such as reciprocity, 
legitimacy, and social influence. Further research is needed to identify other mechanisms by which 
leadership by example affects voluntary public good provision in field settings and to investigate how the 
observable characteristics of individuals correlate with channels of leadership influence. We generate 
suggestive evidence in this direction by showing that leader characteristics play an important role in 
determining their influence over followers. Our results highlight the multiple facets of the differential 
influence that authorities wield. In addition to the formal position that they hold within the community, 
authorities also make higher contributions when given the opportunity to lead and have different 
observable characteristics than the average community member. 
 
Methodologically, our study offers an innovative approach to studying endogenously arising 
behavior within groups in field settings. The inclusion of community fixed effects allows us to address 
many of concerns associated with unobservable similarities between leaders and their followers within 
communities. We also employ best practices in a number of other design features, including precise 
measurement of selection in to the study, using a voluntary contribution mechanism with earned money 
rather than house money, and making contributions to an actual public good. Combining the rigor and 
insights of laboratory studies with the complexities of social interactions in the field offers a promising 
direction for future research. Particularly where leadership is concerned, stepping outside of the 
laboratory can generate insights about how actual leaders influence their followers and how the 
characteristics of individuals and groups interact. 
 
While taking the study of leadership by example to the field offers a number of benefits, it also 
has some drawbacks. Most notably for our study, some communities were unable to comply with 
treatment assignment. The differences between the OLS results and the IV robustness checks suggest 
potential selection associated with the experimental treatments. We choose to lead with the OLS results 
given that treatment non-compliance appears idiosyncratic and the IV strategy strengthens our findings in 
most cases. Another area where the study gives up some control is the endogeneity of leader 
contributions. While the use of community fixed effects eliminates endogeneity concerns at the 
community level, they may still exist at the session level. We test for session level correlates of leader 
contributions and find only one significant explanatory variable out of 13 tested.44 
                                                
44 Specifically, we see that out of the full set of individual- and session-level controls, only average session-level 
assets is associated with leader contributions, which confirms that leaders are not systematically adjusting their 
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Like all field studies, we generate evidence for a particular area of Bolivia at a particular point in 
time. By testing specific causal mechanisms, nevertheless, we identify what may be more generalizable 
results. In other settings, with less decentralization or with more corrupt leaders, other actors within the 
community may be relatively more influential. Our results hold constant other means of influence that 
authorities have at their disposal, such as sanctioning power, which may be relatively more or less 
important than leadership by example in sustaining the voluntary public provision in different settings. 
While other studies have described the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and local public good 
provision (e.g. Miguel and Gugerty 2005), our study is relatively homogeneous, making issues such as 
ethnic tensions less relevant. Leader characteristics, which play a role in shaping influence in our setting, 
may be even more important in settings with greater heterogeneity. 
                                                                                                                                                       
behavior based on the random group of followers to which they were assigned. The full table of results is available 
on request. 
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3.0   INTUITIVE GENEROSITY AND ERROR PRONE INFERENCE FROM RESPONSE TIME             
(CO-AUTHORS: ARNO RIEDL AND LISE VESTERLUND) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 Models of dual selves and dual process reasoning are increasingly being used in economics and 
psychology to explain decision making (see e.g., Evans 2008; Kahneman 2003, 2011; Shefrin and Thaler 
1988; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2004; Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Bernheim and Rangel 2004; 
Fudenberg and Levine 2006, 2012). While the precise characterizations of these models differ, central to 
the framework is the premise that decisions are influenced by an intuitive system which is responsible for 
fast, impulsive, emotional, and rule-based choices, and by a deliberative system, through which slow, 
calculated, cognitive, and controlled decisions are made.  
Dual-self models have been used to explain choices over a large range of domains (e.g., time and 
risk) and researchers have recently begun to apply this framework to the study of charitable giving (see 
e.g., Martinsson, Myrseth, and, Wollbrant 2012; Kocher, Martinsson, and Wollbrant 2012; Kinnunen and
Windmann 2013; Kessler and Meier 2014). Of key interest has been the question of whether individuals 
intuitively are generous or selfish. Is it a fast, impulsive, emotional response to throw a dollar in a 
panhandler’s hat? Or, does giving require a slow, calculated, and cognitive decision?45 Understanding 
whether our generosity is intuitive or calculated is important from a theoretical and practical perspective 
because different predictions and policy prescriptions arise depending on the action that constitutes the 
intuitive response. 
The authors thank seminar participants at SITE (Stanford), SPI (University of Chicago), ESA, ASSA, and the 
University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments  
45 Indeed an alternative interpretation of recent evidence that individuals donate due to social pressure is that they 
are tempted to do good, e.g., Vesterlund (2012) argues that temptation can help explain why individual’s give more 
when there is an option to opt out of giving in DellaVigna, List and Malmendier (2010). 
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The question of whether individuals are predisposed toward generosity or selfishness is 
intriguing, but it is far from clear how we as researchers can find an answer. Existing evidence is scarce 
and contradictory. Using methods from psychology and neuroscience some studies suggest that 
generosity is intuitive (Sanfey, Rilling, and Aronson 2003; Ruff, Ugazio, Fehr 2013, Kinnunen and 
Windmann 2013) while others find evidence in favor of the deliberate generosity hypothesis (Knoch et al. 
2006, Martinsson et al. 2012, Kocher et al. 2012, Strang et al. 2013). In a recent study Rand, Greene, 
Nowak (2012) propose the use of response time to identify whether individuals are intuitively generous. 
Examining transfers in a linear public good game they find that participants who quickly decide how 
much to give are significantly more generous than those who spend more time making their decisions. 
From this negative correlation between response time and giving they conclude that cooperation is 
spontaneous and intuitive while greed is a calculated response.46  
 
The use of response time to infer whether individuals are intuitively generous or selfish is 
tempting as it is cheaply and easily gathered in controlled experiments. An obvious concern with it, 
however, is that confusion or mistakes may also be correlated with response time.47 Such concerns are 
particularly relevant in the linear public good game where mistakes can be erroneously identified as other 
regarding behavior. In the classic linear public good game n individuals form a group and each allocate an 
endowment between a private and a group account. While a unit allocation to the private account 
generates a private payoff of 1, a unit contribution to the group account secures a payoff of r to each 
group member, where 1/n < r < 1. Thus, from a selfish perspective, it is a dominant strategy to place the 
endowment in the private account.48 An unfortunate consequence of this setting is that the core of the 
strategy space constitutes the entire range of available choices. Any (erroneous) deviation from the 
dominant strategy can therefore be seen as consistent with other-regarding preferences.49 When using 
response time to draw inference on innate preferences we thus need to account for the correlation between 
response time and error. Given the comparative static we have to be particularly weary of the possibility 
that error prone participants make fast decisions, as quick mistakes can attribute to (if not account for) the 
negative correlation between giving and response time that has been documented in the literature. 
 
                                                
46The negative correlation between response time and contributions in the linear public good game has been 
replicated by Lotito, Migheli, and Ortona (2012) and Nielsen, Tyran, and Wengström (2013). 
47 For evidence on the negative correlation between response time and error in the beauty contest game see Kocher 
and Sutter (2006), Rubinstein (2007), Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman (2012). 
48 Throughout the paper we use the term 'dominant strategy' to refer to payoff maximizing choices from a selfish 
perspective. 
49 Another issue in the linear public good game is that the efficient outcome requires full contribution. Therefore, it 
is impossible to determine whether positive donations result from error or generosity.  
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To explore whether error may confound the inference on intuitive generosity we conduct a 
laboratory experiment consisting of two public good games with an interior equilibrium in dominant 
strategies. In one game, the equilibrium is below the midpoint of the strategy space and relatively far 
away from the group welfare maximizing strategy, and in the other game it is above the midpoint of the 
strategy space and relatively close to the group welfare maximizing strategy. We refer to the first game as 
the “Low” treatment and the second game as the “High” treatment.  
 
Relying on a between-subject design, we replicate the Rand et al. result in the Low treatment. 
When it is a dominant strategy to contribute an amount below the midpoint of the strategy space, fast 
decisions are correlated with higher contributions. However, the correlation between time and 
contributions is reversed in the High treatment. When the equilibrium is located above the midpoint of the 
strategy space, fast decision makers are shown to be less generous than those who take time to decide. 
 
Intriguingly, comparing the Low and High treatments we find no significant differences in the 
contributions made by fast decision makers, but find significant treatment differences among slow 
decision makers. That is, the different payoff structures in the Low and High treatments only affect the 
behavior of slow decision makers. Importantly, in both treatments, fast decision makers are more likely to 
select contributions that are dominated and to contribute an inefficiently large amount. By contrast, slow 
decision makers are more likely to make the equilibrium contribution and to contribute an amount that 
falls inside the core of the strategy space. 
 
In both treatments fast contributions are spread over the whole range of possible choices. This 
characteristic and the similarity of contributions by fast decision makers in both treatments suggest that 
fast decision makers are insensitive to the payoffs presented in the Low and High treatments. The pattern 
of contributions is consistent with fast decision makers being more prone to error. Whether these choices 
result from mistakes, inattention, or indifference to the incentives, the insensitivity to treatment suggests 
that choices made by fast decision makers unlikely reflect preferences over payoffs. Consequently, if 
payoff insensitive behavior correlates negatively with response time, then response time is likely to be a 
poor, or at least imprecise, measure of preferences over payoffs. In particular, a negative correlation 
between response time and generosity need not reflect that giving is spontaneous, but rather that 




3.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
Economists have just recently begun to use response time to study individual decision making. Wilcox 
(1993) analyzed choices in risky environments and viewed response time as a proxy for decision cost. 
Rubinstein (2007) used response time to study the deliberation process employed by individuals. He put 
forward the idea that fast responses are intuitive and examined the correlation between non-incentivized 
choices and response time in seven different strategic environments. While his work often is cited as 
showing that intuitive responses are emotion-based, a large variation in the types of choices associated 
with fast responses is documented across strategic environments.50 
 
The use of response time to identify the intuitive choice in pro-social settings started with the 
work of Rand et al. (2012). In a series of studies that use linear public good games (and prisoner dilemma 
games), Rand et al. find that fast choices are generous while slow choices are more selfish. They 
document a negative correlation between response time and giving and infer from this correlation and a 
study that primes either intuition or deliberation that cooperation is the intuitive response. The negative 
correlation between response time and contributions in the linear public good game has been replicated by 
Lotito, Migheli, and Ortona (2012) and, Nielsen, Tyran, and Wengström (2014).51  
 
To infer causality between response time and contributions Rand et al. (2012) also vary whether 
or not subjects make decisions under time pressure. The results suggest that time pressure increases 
contributions in the linear public good game. Tinghög et al. (2013), however, note that the analysis 
presented in the paper is problematic because half of the observations in the time pressure treatment are 
excluded from the sample. They conduct a series of binary public good experiments in three different 
countries to reexamine the effect of time pressure on cooperation, but do not find a robust relationship. 
Rand et al. (2013a) reanalyze data from 15 experiments that manipulate time pressure and show that the 
effect of time pressure is only sometimes positive and statistically significant. However, they also note 
that time pressure is never found to have a statistically significant negative effect on giving. 
                                                
50 In Rubinstein (2007) fast decisions are associated with fair outcomes in some settings, with equilibrium and 
efficiency maximizing choices in others, and even with the use of strictly dominated choices in other environments. 
In many of the strategic settings investigated, however, focal choices coincide with fair, equilibrium, efficiency 
maximizing, and strictly dominated strategies. It is thus unclear what constitutes the fast or intuitive response. 
51 Nielsen et al. (2014) use the strategy method to classify subjects as free-riders, conditional cooperators, and other 
cooperator types. They show that free riders make slower choices than other cooperator types. Their results could be 
driven by error if confused participants make fast choices that are ‘arbitrarily coherent’ and increase with the 




In examining both the negative correlation between response time and giving, as well as the 
response to time pressure, the literature has ignored the role that error may play in these settings. This is 
of particular concern in the public good game where deviations from the dominant strategy will benefit 
others and therefore can be seen as generous. If errors are uncorrelated with response time this is, of 
course, not an issue. However, it becomes an important confound if error is negatively correlated with 
response time. If fast decision makers more frequently are confused or inattentive, then response time will 
be a poor measure of preferences.52  
 
Although no work in economics has analyzed the correlation between response time and mistakes 
specifically, several studies have shown that a lower frequency of dominated choices is associated with 
larger response times. Sutter, Kocher, and Strauß (2003), for example, show that forcing subjects to make 
decisions quickly increases the rates of rejection in the first round of a repeated ultimatum game. Kocher 
and Sutter (2006) show that guesses in the beauty contest game increase with time pressure. Rubinstein 
(2007) shows that choices equal to or above the midpoint of the strategy space in the 2/3 beauty contest 
game are associated with faster response times than any other strategy. Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman 
(2012) use a strategy-type method that maps out individual choices over response time in the 2/3 beauty 
contest game and show that while the guesses of strategic players decrease with response time, non-
strategic players make average guesses that coincide with the midpoint of the strategy space and do not 
change with time. Related to this work is also the psychology literature developed after Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974), which has shown that intuitive thinking and heuristics are often times associated with 
error.53 
 
Our study contributes to the literature by analyzing whether response time can be used to identify the 
intuitive action. While we do this in the context of public good games, our results are informative of 
inference from response time in more general settings. 
                                                
52 For a discussion of confusion and other-regarding behavior see Andreoni (1995) and Houser and Kruzban (2002).  
53 See for example Kahneman (2011). 
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3.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In the classic linear public good game (aka voluntary contribution mechanism, VCM) an individual’s 
private monetary payoff is maximized by contributing nothing irrespective of others contributions. In 
contrast, the efficient outcome is secured when all group members contribute their entire endowment. A 
problematic feature of the VCM is that any deviation from equilibrium increases the payoffs of the other 
group members, which makes it difficult to determine whether an individual's positive contribution is 
made in error or due to non-selfish inclinations. If we want to draw inference on preferences from the 
correlation between response time and giving, it is therefore essential to account for the possible 
correlation between error and response time.  
 
To better disentangle errors from innate generosity we design a public good game where both the 
equilibrium and the efficient outcome are in the interior of the strategy space. Similar to many classic 
VCM experiments we examine 4-person groups and secure the Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. 
However, in contrast to the classic setting the core is a subset of the strategy space. That is, there are 
contributions that simultaneously lower the payoffs of the individual and the group, and are therefore 
dominated from an individual as well as group payoff maximizing perspective.  
 
In addition to modifying the public good game to allow for individually and socially dominated 
contributions, we also compare public good games with different payoff structures to assess first whether 
the difference in payoff structures affects the finding that fast decision are more generous, and second to 
determine whether error is responsible for the documented negative correlation between response time 
and generosity. 
3.3.1 Payoffs 
To secure an interior equilibrium we rely on a piece-wise linear payoff structure. Specifically we extend 
the two-person framework of Bracha, Menietti, and Vesterlund (2010) to a 4-person group. Participants 
are given a $10 endowment, which they can contribute in $1 increments to a group account. Contributions 
to the group account generate a constant and equal benefit to the other group members. The private 
benefit of contributing, however, is concave using a linear approximation. The participant’s payoffs are 
given by the following function: 
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𝜋! 𝑔! ,𝐺!! = 10 + 𝛼𝑔! + 𝜎𝐺!!                      𝑖𝑓              0 ≤ 𝑔! ≤ 𝑔!10 + 𝛼𝑔! + 𝛽 𝑔! − 𝑔! + 𝜎𝐺!!                          𝑖𝑓        𝑔! < 𝑔! ≤ 𝑔!10 + 𝛼𝑔! + 𝛽 𝑔! − 𝑔! + 𝛾 𝑔! − 𝑔! + 𝜎𝐺!!      𝑖𝑓        𝑔! < 𝑔! ≤ 𝑔!10 + 𝛼𝑔! + 𝛽 𝑔! − 𝑔! + 𝛾 𝑔! − 𝑔! + 𝛿 𝑔! − 𝑔! + 𝜎𝐺!!             𝑖𝑓        𝑔! < 𝑔!   ≤ 10      (1)  
where 𝜋𝑖 denotes the payoff individual 𝑖 receives from his or her contribution 𝑔𝑖 to the group account and 
the sum of contributions 𝐺−𝑖  made by the three other group members. Threshold contributions 𝑔𝐿, 𝑔𝐻,  and 𝑔𝑃 denote respectively the individual equilibrium contribution in the Low and High treatments, and the 
individual contribution associated with the unique group welfare maximizing outcome. Parameter 𝜎 
remains constant across treatments, while 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, and 𝛿 vary. That is, across treatments we hold constant 
the benefit to other group members from contributing while varying the individual return from giving.54 
Table 3.1 shows the specific parameters used in each treatment. 
Table 3.1: Payoff function parameters by treatment 
Treatment 
Parameter 
α β γ δ σ gL gH gP 
Low 1.45 -0.25 -0.5 -3.25 0.25 3 7 9 
High 0.116 0.25 -0.5 -1.25 0.25 3 7 9 
Parameters were chosen to secure that the strategic settings fulfilled four requirements. First, 
there is a unique interior Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies, which varies by treatment. In our Low 
treatment the equilibrium contribution is $3, and, thus, located below the midpoint of the strategy space. 
In our High treatment the equilibrium contribution is $7, and, thus, located above the midpoint of the 
strategy space. Second, there is a unique interior group welfare maximizing contribution of $9, which is 
the same across treatments. Third, equilibrium payoffs as well as the boundary payoffs associated with 
contributing $0 and $10 are held constant across treatments. Payoffs on the boundary are chosen such that 
contributions in the core range from $3 to $10 in the Low treatment, and from $7 to $10 in the High 
treatment. Fourth, the cost of deviating from the equilibrium contribution toward the middle of the 
strategy space (between $3 and $7) is held constant in the two treatments. The strategic environments thus 
separate equilibrium contributions from the boundaries and midpoint of the strategy space, while holding 
constant across treatments key features of the environment.  
54 We also conduct a robustness check that changes 𝜎 for 𝑔!   > 9. See section 3.4.5. 
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This set-up allows us within each treatment to assess whether fast deciding participants more 
frequently make choices outside of the core of the strategy space; that is, make choices that decrease both 
the payoffs of the decision maker and of the other group members. Moreover, by comparing the pattern of 
contributions of fast and slow decision makers between treatments we can assess whether fast decisions 
are always more generous or whether the correlation between contributions and response time depends on 
the strategic environment. If mistakes are more frequently made by fast decision makers and if these 
mistakes on average result in contributions in the middle of the strategy space, then we would expect to 
find a negative correlation between contributions and response time in the Low treatment, and to find the 
reverse correlation in the High treatment. 
 
Building on Rand et al. (2012), we are primarily interested in documenting behavior in one-shot 
interaction. To assess stability and possible convergence, however, we also examine the results of 
repeated interaction. Therefore, the decision making phase of our study consists of two parts. Participants 
are in Part 1 matched in groups of four. Each group member makes a one-time contribution decision in a 
public good game. In Part 2 participants are informed that they are to play the same public good game for 
an additional ten periods, and that they will be randomly re-matched after every period (with the 
stipulation that they could not be matched with the same participants twice in a row). Participants were at 
the beginning of the experiment informed that there would be two parts of the study and that they would 
be paid for only one part of the experiment. They were only informed of the content of each part 
immediately before reaching that part of the decision phase. That is, while contributing in Part 1, 
participants did not know that Part 2 would be a repeated version of Part 1.  
3.3.2 Experimental procedures 
The experiment was conducted in April 2013 at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory 
(PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh. Using a between-subject design we conducted four sessions of 
each of the two treatments. With 20 subjects per session a total of 160 undergraduate students participated 
in the study. Each session lasted approximately 45 minutes with average payments being $22.50 per 
subject (including a $6 show up fee).  
 
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated in a pre-marked cubicle, and were asked to 
provide informed consent to participate in the study. We then distributed instructions and read them out 
loud. The instructions provided a general description of the strategic setting. Participants were informed 
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that there would be two parts of the experiment and that one would count for payment. They were given 
no information on what Part 2 would entail.  
 
For Part 1 they were told that they would be matched in groups of four and that they would each 
be given an endowment of $10 that they could invest in $1 increments in a group account. Participants 
were told that investment decisions would affect their payoffs and the payoffs of other group members, 
but were given no details on the actual payoff structure. They were told that payoff information would be 
presented to them via payoff tables displayed on the computer screen. The instructions explained to 
participants how they should read the payoff table and informed them that they would have to complete a 
tutorial before proceeding with Part 1. Subjects were also informed in the instructions that they would 
receive feedback on their choices and the choices made by other group members.55  
 
After completion of the instructions participants proceeded with the tutorial. Interfaces for the 
tutorial and for the decision making part of the experiment were programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). The tutorial used a payoff table in which subjects had two investment options. The payoffs in each 
cell were denoted using matrix notation. That is, no monetary payoffs were presented but rather 
combinations of letters and numbers (e.g., $A11). Participants had to answer six questions in the tutorial, 
which asked subjects to identify the payoffs associated with different investment choices made by all 
group members. The tutorial allowed subjects to enter incorrect answers, but presented solutions to ensure 
proper understanding.  
 
Having completed the tutorial, Part 1 of the decision making phase began. Participants were 
anonymously matched in groups of four and were shown individual computer screens, which displayed 
the payoff table and asked participants to make a contribution decision.56 For a given average 
contribution made by the other three group members, the payoff table listed the individual’s payoff of 
contributing between $0 and $10 and the average payoffs of the other group members. Time was recorded 
as the number of seconds it took participants to make a decision after seeing the payoff table and was not 
presented in the decision screen. Once all contribution decisions had been made participants were shown 
a payoff screen informing them of the total amount contributed by all group members. Subjects received 
specific feedback on their contribution, the total and average contribution made by other group members, 
their payoff and the average payoff of the other group members. 
                                                
55 For the instructions see the Appendix. 
56 The payoff tables used in the experiment are presented in Appendix Table B.1 and B.2. 
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Having completed Part 1, participants received instructions for Part 2. They were informed that 
Part 2 consisted of 10 periods of the same decision scenario as in Part 1. They were also informed of the 
random re-matching procedure and were told that if Part 2 was selected for payment only one randomly 
selected period would be paid. At the end of each period participants received the same feedback as in 
Part 1. 
 
At the completion of the decision phase all participants were given a brief demographic 
questionnaire to determine their age, gender, nationality, year in college, and college major.   
3.4 RESULTS 
In reporting the results of the experiment we begin by examining behavior in Part 1. For this part of the 
study we have a precise measure of response time. We then proceed to a brief discussion of Part 2, where 
we check the stability and convergence of the behavior observed in Part 1. 
3.4.1 Part 1: Contributions 
We have clear evidence that on average participants responded to the different incentives in the Low and 
High treatment. Figure 3.1 presents a histogram of contributions by treatment. It shows that the modal 
contribution in each treatment is precisely the equilibrium prediction. 35 percent of participants in the 
Low treatment contribute $3 and 36 percent of participants in the High treatment contribute $7.57   
 
                                                
57 Of the 80 participants in each treatment the number of participants selecting the payoff maximizing strategy 
equaled 28 in the Low treatment and 29 in the High treatment. The frequency of equilibrium play is greater than that 
typically documented in the linear VCM, suggesting that our setting is not too difficult for subjects to understand, 
but is also lower than the frequency of equilibrium play documented in Bracha et al. (2012) who use a piece-wise 
linear VCM similar to the one used in our experiment but with groups of 2 rather than 4 participants. Bracha et al. 
document a frequency of equilibrium play of 60 percent across 14 rounds of a comparable treatment. Isaac, Walker, 
and Thomas (1984) document a frequency of equilibrium play of 30 percent (across 10 rounds) in a linear VMC 
with various group sizes and various marginal per capita returns (19 percent in the first round of play when group 




Figure 3.1: Histogram of contributions by treatment, Part 1 
 
In the Low treatment the average contribution exceeds the equilibrium prediction of $3 (mean = 
$5.06, one-sample t-test p<0.01), whereas in the High treatment it falls short of the equilibrium prediction 
of $7 (mean = $6.57, one-sample t-test p<0.10). Thus, relative to the equilibrium prediction, participants 
overcontribute in the Low treatment and undercontribute in the High treatment. Participants in the Low 
treatment contribute, on average, less than participants in the High treatment (one-sample t-test p<0.01).58 
 
Importantly, many participants in both the Low and High treatment make dominated 
contributions. That is, they contribute an amount that lowers both individual and group payoffs. 
Furthermore, we see contributions that exceed the Pareto efficient contribution of $9. While benefitting 
the recipients, the individual cost of giving $10 rather than $9 is so large that the group’s aggregate payoff 
decreases. Interestingly, looking solely at non-equilibrium play the contribution distributions appear to be 
rather insensitive to treatment.  
 
In fact, absent contributions of $3 and $7 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average of 
the remaining contributions are the same across treatments (the mean contribution in the Low treatment is 
$6.10 and the mean contribution in the High treatment is $6.47; two-sample t-test p=0.479). Nor can we 
reject the null hypothesis that (absent contributions of $3 and $7) the two samples come from the same 
                                                
58 A Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test provides p<0.01. We also find statistically significant differences in the 





















underlying distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=0.714). This similarity in contributions is particularly 
striking when considering contributions of $4, $5, and $6. These contributions lie in the core of the 
strategy space in the Low treatment, but are outside of the core of the strategy space in the High 
treatment. The incentives associated with these contributions, therefore, differ substantially by treatment. 
 
 The frequency of contributions that cannot be justified by altruistically inclined participants, and 
the similarity in contributions across treatments suggest that some choices may not be reflective of 
individual preferences over (own and others’) payoffs. Combined with the finding that non-equilibrium 
play results in overcontributions in the Low treatment and undercontributions in the High treatment, this 
suggests that we need to examine how non-equilibrium play correlates with response time.   
3.4.2 Part 1: Response time and contributions 
The time it takes participants to make a decision varies substantially. Some participants spend as little as 4 
seconds making a decision whereas others spend more than 3 minutes deciding. There is, however, no 
evidence that response time differs by treatment (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=0.49). The mean and median 
response times of 50.61 and 41 seconds in the Low treatment and of 46.78 and 42.5 seconds in the High 
treatment do not differ statistically significantly between treatments (two-sample t-test p=0.497; 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test z=0.753, p=0.452).  
 
To test the hypothesis that response time is negatively correlated with contribution we regress 
contributions on response time using OLS.59 Column 1 of Table 3.2 shows the results of the regression for 
participants in the Low treatment. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on response time is 
consistent with the existing findings (Rand et al. 2012). When the equilibrium is located below the 
midpoint of the strategy space fast decision makers contribute more than slow decision makers. Although 
the size of the coefficient appears small, it indicates that participants who delay their decision by 1 minute 
on average contribute $1.14 less than those who make a contribution decision right away. 
 
The correlation between generosity and response time is, however, sensitive to treatment. Column 
2 of Table 3.2 shows that in the High treatment the correlation is positive and statistically significant. 
While of opposite sign, the coefficient on response time is of similar magnitude as that estimated in the 
                                                
59 Tobit regressions that take into account the censoring at $0 and $10 are presented in the Appendix and provide 
similar results. 
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Low treatment. A participant who delays the decision by 1 minute will, on average, contribute $0.96 more 
than someone who makes a contribution right away. Column 3 of Table 2 pools the data from the two 
treatments to test whether treatment effects are statistically significant. Using a difference-in-difference 
regression of contributions on response time and treatment column 3 shows two things. First, the mean 
treatment effect is not significantly different from zero. Second, the correlation between contribution and 
response time differs significantly by treatment. The coefficient on the interaction of treatment High and 
response time is positive and statistically significant. The differences in contributions documented in 
Figure 3.1 thus result with increases in response time. 
  
Table 3.2: OLS regression of contributions on response time, Part 1 
Dep. Var.: Contribution to group account Treatments 
Low High All 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
Response time -0.019** 0.016** -0.019*** 
 




   
(0.732) 
High x response time 
  
0.035*** 
   
(0.001) 
Constant 6.024*** 5.819*** 6.024*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total effect response time: High 
  
0.016** 
   
(0.023) 
N 80 80 160 
 
Note: P-values reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 
The results reported in Table 3.2 demonstrate that the strategic environment influences whether 
fast decision makers are found to be more or less generous than slow decision makers. Looking at 
contributions by response time it becomes clear why the comparative static reverses with treatment. 
Figure 3.2 presents a scatterplot of response time and contributions by treatment. The solid vertical line 
indicates the location of the equilibrium contribution ($3 and $7 in the Low and High treatment 
respectively) and the dashed vertical line indicates the location of the efficiency maximizing contribution 
($9 in both treatments). The horizontal line indicates the median response time of the pooled sample (41.5 
seconds). For the remainder of the analysis we refer to participants who used less than the median 
response time to make a decision as being fast decision makers, and we refer to participants who used 
more than the median response time to make a decision as being slow decision makers. 
 
 The two panels of Figure 3.2 mirror each other and show that fast decision makers choose 
contributions that are scattered over the entire range of possible choices. In particular, contributions that 
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are dominated from a selfish as well as social perspective are associated with fast response times in both 
treatments. That is, fast decision makers are more likely to contribute below the Nash equilibrium and 
above the group welfare maximizing contribution of $9. By contrast slow decision makers are more likely 
to select a contribution at or close to the equilibrium prediction. Slow decision makers also account for 
almost all of the efficiency maximizing contributions. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Scatterplot of contributions and response time by treatment, Part 1 
Note: The solid vertical line indicates the Nash contribution, the dashed vertical line 
indicates the efficiency maximizing contribution, and the solid horizontal line 
indicates the median response time of the pooled sample (41.5 seconds).  
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the information contained in Figure 3.2. Defining mistakes as choices that 
are outside the core, i.e., contributions that simultaneously lower both the individual’s and the group’s 
payoffs, we see in both treatments that a large majority (> 70%) of such choices are made by fast decision 
makers. Hence, we reject the null hypothesis that slow and fast decision makers are equally likely to make 
mistakes (1-sided Fisher’s exact test p<0.01 in the pooled sample; p=0.327 in the Low treatment and 
p<0.01 in the High treatment). By contrast, the observed equilibrium contributions are more likely to be 
made by slow decision makers (1-sided Fisher’s exact test p<0.10 in the Low treatment and p<0.01 in the 











































are dominated from a group welfare maximizing perspective, are also associated with fast responses (1-
sided Fisher’s exact test p<0.05 in both treatments).60 
 








n (% fast)   n (% fast)   n (% fast) 
Mistakes 4 (0.75) 
 
29  (0.72) 
 
33  (0.72) 





Above Nash & below welfare max. 38  (0.53) 
 
10  (0.50) 
 
48 (0.52) 
Welfare maximizing  4 (0.25) 
 
4  (0.00) 
 
8 (0.13) 





Midpoint of strategy space 13  (0.46)   12 (0.33)   25  (0.56) 
All 80.00 (0.51)   80.00 (0.49)   160.00 (0.50) 
 
Note: Fast indicates that contribution decisions were made in less than the median response time. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Mean contribution share by fast and slow decision makers, Part 1 
Note: Fast indicates that choices were made in less than the median response time 
(41.5 seconds), and slow indicates that choices were made in more than the median 
response time.  
 
Figure 3.3 presents the mean contributions made by fast and slow decision makers in each 
treatment. Looking for treatment effects we note that while there are no differences in the average 
                                                
60 Additional sessions of the experiment conducted as a robustness check examine whether $10 choices truly 














contributions made by fast decision makers (Mean Low = $5.54, Mean High = $6.08, one-sided t-test 
p=0.380), there are substantial differences in the average contributions made by slow decision makers 
(Mean Low = $4.56, Mean High = $7.05, one-sided t-test p<0.01). Consistent with the results presented 
in Table 3.2 we find in the Low treatment that slow decision makers contribute less than fast decision 
makers, but that the reverse holds true in the High treatment (one-sided t-test p=0.072 and 0.042 in each 
treatment respectively). We also note that in both treatments standard errors are smaller for slow decision 
makers. Tests of differences in the standard deviation of contributions by response time category reject 
the null hypothesis that the variance of the contributions is the same for fast and slow decision makers 
(Brown - Forsythe robust test p<0.05 in both treatments).  
 
Are the results reported so far robust with respect to adding other explanatory variables? We 
examine whether age, gender, the number of tutorial questions answered correctly, training in economics, 
and experience with laboratory experiments affect response time and contributions in Table B.4 of the 
Appendix. Results show a non-systematic correlation between variables. Answering a higher number of 
tutorial questions correctly seems to increase response time in both treatments, but coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. Importantly, the difference in correlation between response time and 
contribution documented in Table 3.2 is robust to controlling for all of these variables as well as to 
excluding outlier observations.61  
 
Part 1 has shown that the correlation between response time and giving is sensitive to treatment. 
Despite the vastly different payoff structures, we find that fast decision makers contribute essentially the 
same amounts in the High and Low treatments. From this we draw two conclusions. First, fast decision 
makers are more likely to make mistakes. Second, they are not necessarily more generous. To further 
investigate the potential role of error we next examine the choices participants make when the game is 
repeated in Part 2 of the experiment.   
3.4.3 Part 2: Contributions 
At the completion of Part 1 participants were informed that Part 2 would be a ten period version of Part 1. 
Behavior in this setting helps determine the robustness of the results documented in Part 1 and the extent 
                                                
61 We define outlier observations as the choices made by participants who took more than 150 seconds to decide. 
The coefficients on response time reported in Table 3.2 do not change when outlier observations are excluded 
regardless of whether or not the full set of additional controls are included in the regressions. 
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to which behavior converges in our strategic setting. Response time in Part 2, however, is no longer the 
only variable capturing the time individuals have had to deliberate about their choices. The period of play, 





Figure 3.4: Frequency of equilibrium contributions by treatment 
( Low 𝑔! = 3, High 𝑔! = 7) 
 
Note: Period 0 denotes Part 1 
 
We begin by examining how contributions change over the course of the experiment. Figure 3.4 
illustrates the share of equilibrium contributions seen in each of the two treatments. Period 0 refers to 
contributions in Part 1, and period 1 through 10 refer to the ten contribution decisions made in Part 2. 
Strikingly, we see the frequency of equilibrium contributions doubling from one third in Part 1, to more 
than two thirds by period 10 of Part 2.   
 
Convergence to equilibrium is also seen in Figure 3.5, where we show the mean and median 
contribution by period and treatment. Starting in Part 1, participants overcontribute in the Low treatment 
and undercontribute in the High treatment. However, with repeated play we see mean contributions 
converging to the equilibrium prediction from above in the Low treatment and from below in the High 
treatment. While undercontributions are on average eliminated in the High treatment, overcontributions 
persist in the Low treatment. By period 4, however, the median contribution of each of the two treatments 

















justified by other-regarding preferences, there is no such justification for the convergence from below in 
the High treatment. No selfish or altruistically inclined participant should contribute below the 
equilibrium prediction in the High treatment.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Mean and median contribution by period and treatment 
Note: 90% confidence interval of mean session contribution shown in 
graph. Period 0 denotes Part 1. 
3.4.4 Part 2: Response time and contributions 
In moving from Part 1 to Part 2 we no longer have proper control over deliberation and response time. 
Nonetheless, we ask if individual response time in any given period of Part 2 correlates with the amount 
contributed in that period. As response time decreases with repetition the definition of what it means to be 
a fast and slow decision maker, however, changes over the course of the experiment. Figure 3.6 
demonstrates how the median response time changes by period, with the largest decrease being from Part 
1 to Part 2 (i.e., between period 0 and 1).62  
 
                                                
62 The decrease in response time between Part 1 and 2 is similar in magnitude and statistically significant in both 
treatments (session-level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test p<0.05 in each treatment). Response time in 
period 1 of Part 2 is not statistically different between treatments when session-level tests are conducted (Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney rank-sum test p=0.753). Differences are marginally significant when subject-level tests are 
performed, which do not take into account the potential correlation introduced by feedback (Wilcoxon Mann-























Figure 3.6: Median response time by period and treatment 
Note: Period 0 denotes Part 1. 
 
Using Part 2 data we examine the correlation between response time in a particular period and the 
amount given in that period. Regressing contributions on response time and period and clustering the 
standard errors at the session level, we secure the OLS regression reported in Table 3.4. The coefficients 
on response time reveal that neither in the Low nor in the High treatment does per period response time 
affect per period contributions. Reflective of convergence from the middle the coefficient on period 
reveals that contributions decrease with each repetition of the Low treatment, and that contributions 
increase with each repetition of the High treatment. Column 3 of Table 3.4 includes the relevant 
interaction terms and demonstrates that by the beginning of Part 2 contributions are significantly larger in 
the High treatment than in the Low treatment and that the differential response to repetition is 
significant.63  
                                                
63 Appendix Table B.5 shows regressions of response time and contribution decisions that include history of play 
variables, comprehension questions, socio-demographic characteristics, training in economics, and experience with 
laboratory experiments. Estimates of the correlation between response time and contribution do not change when 





















Table 3.4: OLS regression of contributions on response time, Part 2 
  Treatment 
  Low High All 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
Response time 0.014 0.022 0.014 
 
(0.340) (0.278) (0.261) 
Period -0.068** 0.047* -0.068*** 
 




   
(0.003) 
High NE x Response time 
  
0.009 
   
(0.668) 
High NE x period 
  
0.115*** 
   
(0.002) 
Constant 4.082*** 6.225*** 4.082*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Total effect response time: High NE     0.022 
   
(0.196) 
Total effect period: High NE 
  
0.047** 
   
(0.012) 
N 800 800 1600 
 
Note: P-values reported in parentheses.*p<0.10,**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
  
The results reveal that the within period correlation between response time and giving is 
eliminated when participants repeatedly make the same contribution decision. The more important 
question is, however, whether the classification of participants as slow and fast decision makers in Part 1 
helps predict behavior in Part 2. If making a fast decision is reflective of individual preferences over 
payoff distributions then we may anticipate that fast and slow decision makers in Part 1 also differ in their 
behavior in Part 2. We see in Figures 3.7 and 3.8 that in the Low treatment the initial difference in 
response time and contributions is eliminated by period 1 of Part 2. This suggests that if response time is 
reflective of the individual’s type then such differences are eliminated after a short period of reflection. 
The insensitivity to the initial classification as a fast or slow decision maker in Part 1 of the Low 
treatment holds when looking at response time as well as mean and median contributions in Part 2.  
 
Looking at the High treatment we see that the differences between fast and slow decision makers 
decrease with repetition, but some differences persist for the duration of Part 2. Fast decision makers 
continue to make fast decisions and to make lower mean contributions than slow decision makers. The 
median contribution is, however, not sensitive to the response-time classification from Part 1. Combined 
with the convergence toward equilibrium from the middle that we observed in Part 2, we see Part 1 









Figure 3.8: Mean and median contribution by fast and slow decision makers in Part 1 
 
Note: Fast and slow denote decision maker type in Part 1. Period	  0	  denotes	  Part	  1.	  
3.4.5 Robustness checks 
While response time plays a limited role in repeated interaction, our results from Part 1 demonstrate 
significant and substantial differences in contribution behavior across fast and slow decision makers. 
Examining public good games with interior dominant strategy equilibria we replicate the Rand et al. 
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opposite correlation when the equilibrium is located above the midpoint of the strategy space. Fast 
decision makers are less generous than slow decision makers when the equilibrium is above the midpoint. 
Despite the substantial differences in payoffs between the Low and High treatments, we are for fast 
decision makers unable to distinguish contribution distributions by treatment. We also find that fast 
decision makers are more likely to make contributions outside the core of the strategy space, and that they 
account for the vast majority of $10 contributions (which decrease the group’s aggregate payoffs). Based 
on these findings we conclude that the correlation between response time and contributions may not 
reflect `spontaneous giving´, but rather the fact that confused participants quickly select a contribution 
that lies, on average, in the middle of the strategy space. 
 
An argument, however, can be made to oppose the claim that our results shed light on the 
negative correlation between response time and giving uncovered by Rand et al. (2012). Although the 
interior dominant strategy equilibrium and interior Pareto efficient outcome we employ make it easier to 
draw inference on what motivates individuals to contribute, the resulting payoff structure is more 
complicated than that seen in the linear VCM examined by Rand et al. This more complicated payoff 
structure may, in and off itself, have confused participants. The reversal of the correlation between 
response time and giving may not arise in simpler and more transparent settings similar to the linear 
VCM. 
 
We investigated behavior in Low and High versions of the linear VCM to determine whether the 
reversal of the correlation between response time and giving in the Low and High treatment arises with a 
simpler payoff structure. That is, we replaced the piece-wise linear payoff structures described in Section 
3.3.1 with Low and High versions of the standard 4-person linear VCM. To secure a payoff range 
comparable to our earlier study we provided each participant with an $8 endowment. Following past 
VCM procedures the payoffs were characterized without the use of a payoff table. Incentives in the Low-
VCM were identical to those employed in Rand et al. (2012), every dollar contributed to the group 
account was doubled and split equally between group members. With a marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) of $0.50, the unique dominant strategy equilibrium contribution in the Low-VCM is on the 
lower boundary of the strategy space (contribution of $0). The incentives in the High-VCM instead placed 
the unique dominant strategy equilibrium contribution on the upper boundary of the strategy space 
(contribution of $8). Participants in the High-VCM were informed that every dollar contributed to the 
group account would be doubled and split equally between group members, and that any individual who 
contributed a dollar would get an additional individual bonus of 60 cents. Hence the MPCR in High-VCM 
remained $0.50, with an added individual bonus for contributing of 60 cents. Payoffs ensured that the 
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welfare maximizing choice, $8, and the marginal benefit to others form contributing, $0.50, was kept 
constant cross treatments.64 
 
Relative to our piece-wise linear payoff structure, the linear payoffs of the Low-VCM and the 
High-VCM make it more difficult to infer what motivates a contribution. In the Low-VCM deviations 
from the dominant strategy may result from mistakes or concern for others; contributions outside the core 
of the strategy space cannot arise. In the High-VCM deviations from the dominant strategy lie outside the 
core, while the dominant strategy simultaneously maximizes individual and group payoffs. In the Low-
VCM treatment it is thus not possible to separately identify mistakes and generosity, while in the High-
VCM treatment it is not possible to separately identify generosity and payoff maximizing behavior. 
 
We conducted six sessions of the linear VCM, two sessions of the Low-VCM treatment and four 
sessions of the High-VCM treatment.65 112 individuals participated in the linear VCM sessions. The 
results corroborate our findings. Fast responses in Part 1 continue to be associated with contributions that 
are scattered over the entire range of possible choices. Furthermore, we also find that mean contributions 
by fast decision makers are not distinguishable across treatments (Mean Low-VCM = $3.53, Mean High-
VCM = $3.81, two-sample t-test p=0.70). By contrast, we can distinguish the mean contributions made by 
slow decision makers by treatment (Mean Low-VCM = $4.05, Mean High-VCM = $5.71, two-sided t-test 
p=0.03). As in our piece-wise linear High treatment, we find in the High-VCM that slow decision makers 
contribute more than fast decision makers. In the Low-VCM we do not find that response time decreases 
giving. While not consistent with Rand et al.’s finding, this is consistent with the results from our piece-
wise linear treatments where slow decision makers are more likely to select both the equilibrium and 
group welfare maximizing choices.67 The results from the linear VCM are thus consistent with our 
findings in the initial piece-wise linear treatments. Fast decision makers, on average, make choices in the 
middle of the strategy space while slow decision makers are more likely to make contributions that are 
                                                
64 The exact instructions and payoff descriptions employed in the linear VCM treatments are included in the 
Appendix. As in our main design payoff descriptions were provided on the screen used to make contribution 
decisions. Response time was measured from the moment the decision screen was displayed to subjects.  
65 Two of the High-VCM sessions presented the bonus as an individualized 60 cent bonus for contributing, and two 
of the High-VCM sessions added the comment that the return from contributing was $1.10. While average 
contributions are slightly higher in the second High-VCM treatment (Mean High-VCM 1 = $.4.19, Mean High-
VCM 2 = $5.29, t-test p-value = 0.09) the general insights from the two treatments are the same. For the purposes of 
this discussion we therefore pool the data for the two High-VCM treatments. 
67 Only 38 percent of Nash and welfare maximizing choices were made by fast decision makers in the Low-VCM 
treatment, while 33 percent of choices were made by fast decision makers in the High-VCM treatment. 
 59 
reflective of preferences over payoffs. Rather than revealing less confusion than in our piece-wise linear 
treatment, behavior in the linear VCM experiments suggest limited convergence to equilibrium.68 
 
In analyzing the results form Part 1 of our piece-wise linear treatment we noted that contributions 
of $10 were predominantly made by fast decision makers. Noting that the individual cost of contributing 
$10 rather than $9 was substantial and only resulted in a limited increase in earnings for others, we argued 
that these group payoff-reducing contributions may be seen as mistakes.69 However, the $10 contributions 
may be justified for someone who values payoffs to others much more than payoff to self. To further 
determine whether $10 contributions should be seen as mistakes we modified the payoff structure of the 
original experiment to secure that individuals in increasing their contributions from $9 to $10 not only 
lowered their own payoff but also lowered the payoff of every other member of the group. That is, we 
made the marginal benefit of contributing $10 negative for both the individual and each of the other group 
members.70 This change in payoffs places the core entirely in the interior of the strategy space in both 
treatments and makes it possible to determine whether $10 contributions reflect altruistic preferences or 
mistakes. Four sessions were conducted with this alternative payoff structure, two with the new-Low and 
two with the new-High treatment (40 individuals participated in each treatment). All other parameters and 
experimental procedures were unchanged relative to our original piece-wise linear design.  
 
Results from the new-Low and new-High treatments confirm the fact that $10 contributions 
constitute mistakes, not altruistic choices. Out of 40 individuals observed in Part 1 in each of the new 
treatments, 10 percent contributed $10 in the new-Low treatment and 15 percent contributed $10 in the 
new-High treatment. As in the original experiments we find that $10 contributions are made primarily by 
                                                
68 Results from Part 2 of the linear VCM treatments show convergence to equilibrium from above in the Low 
treatment but no convergence to equilibrium in the High treatment. Participants in the High treatment contribute on 
average, between $4 and $5 across all periods of Part 2. The lack of convergence in the High treatment seems to be 
driven by the fact that confused participants never learn the payoff maximizing choice while participants who 
understand the payoff structure get frustrated and preemptively punish free-riding at a cost. Using Part 1 response 
time and measures of payoff understanding to analyze Part 2 choices supports this conjecture. Fast decision makers 
in Part 1 make choices that are closer to the middle of the strategy space in Part 2 as do participants who did not 
understand the payoff maximizing choice. Two measures of payoff understanding were used to analyze Part 2 
behavior: past equilibrium play, and answers to post-decision questionnaires. Participants who did not understand 
the equilibrium gave between $4 and $5 throughout Part 2, while participants who understood the payoff structure 
gave between $5 and $8. 
69 In the original treatments (with piece-wise linear payoff structures) the marginal cost of giving $10 rather than $9 
was $2.25 in the Low treatment and $1.25 the High treatment. The marginal benefit to others from contributing was 
$0.75, $0.25 per group member. Contributions of $10 rather than $9 thus decreased total group payoffs by $1.50 and 
$0.50 in the Low and High treatments respectively.  
70 The payoff tables used in these additional sessions of the experiment are reported in Appendix Table B.6 and B.7. 
They changed δ to -2.25 and -0.25 in the new-Low and new-High treatments respectively and made σ=-0.15 in both 
treatments when 𝑔! > 9.  
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fast decision makers. Fast decisions are associated with 75 percent and 83 percent of the $10 
contributions in the new-Low and new-High treatment respectively.71  
 
The results of both of our robustness checks reveal behavior consistent with our interpretation of 
the data in our piece-wise linear design. Fast decision makers are more likely to select contributions that 
lie, on average, in the middle of the strategy space, and the characteristics of these fast decisions are such 
that it is difficult to see them as reflective of preferences over payoffs to self and to others.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
Our study questions whether response time can be used to identify the intuitive choice in pro-social 
settings. Building on Rand et al. (2012) we investigate whether the correlation between response time and 
giving is sensitive to the strategic environment. Examining contributions in two public good games with 
interior equilibria, we show that the correlation between response time and giving changes with the 
location of the equilibrium. The correlation is negative when the equilibrium is located below the 
midpoint of the strategy space, and positive when the equilibrium is located above the midpoint of the 
strategy space. Our setting allows us to identify mistakes as choices that lower both individual and group 
payoffs. We show that the frequency of mistakes decreases with response time. This suggests that fast 
responses, rather than being reflective of an intuitive action, result from fast decision makers quickly 
selecting contributions that lie, on average, in the middle of the strategy space. 
 
Our study offers a possible explanation for the mixed relationship between response time and 
generosity that has been documented in other strategic settings. In particular, it may help explain why the 
correlation between giving and response time is positive in simple environments such as the dictator game 
                                                
71 The modification of the payoffs resulting from a $10 contribution does not alter the direction of the documented 
comparative statics. With the smaller sample size some results are, however, not statistically significant. The 
correlation between response time and contributions in Part 1 is negative in the new-Low treatment and positive in 
the new-High treatment. The mean contributions made by fast and slow decision makers show that fast decision 
makers make undistinguishable choices (Mean new-Low = $6.22, Mean new-High = $6.00, one-sided t-test 
p=0.599), while slow decision makers make contributions that are statistically significantly different (Mean new-
Low = $5.00, Mean new-High = $6.88, one-sided t-test p<0.01). Differences within treatment show that 
contributions move in the direction of the Nash prediction but are marginally insignificant in the new-High 
treatment (one-sided t-test p=0.053 and p=0.133 in the new-Low and new-High treatments respectively). Part 2 
results show the same convergence documented in section 3.4.3. Contributions of $10 are scarce in Part 2, and 
disappear after period 8 in both treatments. 
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(Piovesan and Wengström, 2008; Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklish and Dickhert, 2013)72 but negative in more 
complex environments such as the linear public good game (Rand et al. 2012, Lotito et al. 2012, Nielsen 
et al. 2013) and the ultimatum game (Brañas-Garza, Meloso, and Miller 2012).73  
 
The results of our paper extend beyond the study of response time and intuitive choices in the 
pro-social setting. In particular, it suggests that independent of the environment caution is warranted when 
trying to draw inferences about preferences from response time. Our results demonstrate that fast decision 
makers are rather insensitive to the payoffs associated with their choices. Absent a model of error, the 
choices made by slow decision makers may therefore be a better indicator of the types of preferences we 
should expect in environments where individuals have had experience and time to decide. 
                                                
72 Fiedler et al. (2013) also document a positive correlation between response time and giving in the linear public 
good game. They use eye-tracking technology to inspect information search patterns and show that pro-social types 
take longer times to make decisions and search more information than selfish types in both the modified dictator 
game and the linear public good game. 
73 Rubinstein’s (2007) analysis of response time and ultimatum game offers shows a negative correlation between 
response time and offers only when offers above the 50-50 threshold are excluded. Offers in excess of 60 percent of 
the endowment are associated with fast response times, while offers between 50 and 60 percent of the endowment 
are associated with long response times. 
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4.0  DISHONESTY, TOLERANCE, AND SOCIAL INFORMATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Dishonesty is a complex collective action problem that affects all cultures. It originates at the individual 
level, with the decision to engage in dishonesty but has severe aggregate consequences that affect social, 
political, and economic life. Even though dishonesty is disapproved by society and typically condemned 
through laws, the prevalence of this type of behavior suggests that for some individuals the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Standard economics has given attention to the material costs and benefits that 
influence decisions in this setting. Only recently have authors recognized that non-material rewards 
matter and that they can also affect the individual decision to engage in dishonesty.74 This paper 
investigates dishonesty from the latter perspective. It conducts two experiments to investigate: (1) 
whether individuals are more likely to engage in dishonest behavior when they observe others engage in 
dishonesty, and (2) whether individuals are more likely to tolerate dishonest behavior when they observe 
others engage in dishonesty. The primary goal of this study is to investigate the role of tolerance in 
halting or possibly facilitating the contagion of dishonest behavior.  
 
The strategic setting employed has subjects play a modified investment game in pairs. A first 
mover first decides whether or not to invest an endowment earned earlier in the experiment with a second 
mover. Investment with the second mover is always beneficial for the first mover and can generate either 
a high or a low return on the investment. The second mover observes the return on the investment, when 
the first mover invests with the second mover, and announces a return to the first mover. Truthful 
announcements split the net profit equally between players. Untruthful announcements allow the second 
mover to take an unequal share of earnings. The probability that the return observed by the second mover 
is high is common knowledge among participants. The first mover, however, only learns the return 
                                                
I thank Lise Vesterlund for supporting this study, and seminar participants at the UCSD Deception, Incentives, and 
Behavior Symposium , NYU International ESA meeting, and the University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments. 
74 See, for example, Gneezy (2005), Mazar, Amir, Ariely (2008), and Gino, Ariely, and Ayal (2009). 
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announced by the second mover. Tolerance is studied through the behavior of first movers, who can make 
inferences about the honesty of second movers and forego investment in a repeated setting at a cost. 
 
Treatments vary whether or not subjects observe the returns announced by four second movers in 
one phase of a previous session of the experiment. In an Honest Information Treatment (HIT) subjects 
observe information reflecting honest behavior. In a Dishonest Information Treatment (DIT) subjects 
observe information reflecting dishonest behavior. Experiments vary the return to the outside option 
available for the first mover and how transparent implementation procedures make it for participants to 
know that dishonesty is permitted in the experiment. Participants in Experiment 1 need to recognize that 
they can engage in dishonesty and decide on their own whether or not they want to do so. Experiment 2 
uses instructions and comprehension questions that go over the payoffs associated with all possible 
announcement scenarios to rule out learning and confusion as a possible explanation of treatment effects. 
It does so at the expense of priming selfishness, which can affect the moral conflict associated with 
engaging in dishonest behavior. 
 
Results show that social information about the prevalence of dishonest behavior affects the 
likelihood that individuals engage in and tolerate dishonesty. In Experiment 1, exposure to social 
information reflecting dishonest behavior increases the likelihood that individuals engage in dishonesty, 
while exposure to social information reflecting honest behavior has a weak effect on behavior. 
Experiment 2 seems to hit a lower bound in the rate of honesty that can be observed in the experiment, 
and does not show any treatment effects generated by social information. A subset of individuals can, 
nevertheless, be identified in Experiment 2 who become more likely to engage dishonesty when they 
observe others engage in dishonesty. The behavior of these movers cannot be explained by confusion or 
learning given that the implementation procedures used in Experiment 2 ensure that subjects understand 
not only that dishonesty is permitted in the experiment but also the consequences associated with 
engaging in dishonest behavior. Results on first mover behavior suggest that tolerance does not facilitate 
the contagion of dishonesty. First movers become more likely to forego investment with the second 
mover (and thus punish dishonesty) when they are exposed to social information reflecting dishonest 
behavior. Tolerance results are robust in Experiment 2, where punishing dishonesty is less costly, but 
weak in Experiment 1 where exposure to dishonesty causes first movers to invest more in initially but 
invest less subsequently in the experiment. 
 
This paper makes several contributions to literature. First, it constructs a strategic setting suitable 
for the study of dishonesty in one-shot and repeated settings in the laboratory. Subjects can inherently 
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recognize the dishonest nature of their actions and inflict a direct negative externality on another equal 
participant by engaging in dishonest behavior. Second, this paper extends the set of conditions under 
which dishonesty has been found to be contagious. Previous studies in psychology (Gino, Ayal, Ariely 
2009) and economics (Innes and Mitra 2013) have studied whether or not dishonesty is contagious in one-
shot settings that include cheating on performance tests and truth telling in sender-receiver games. This 
paper investigates the contagion of dishonesty in setting designed to encompass a larger class of social 
dilemmas, such as theft and corruption, where dishonesty has direct harmful consequences on other equal 
participants. Third, the paper investigates for the first time the role that tolerance plays in halting or 
possibly facilitating the contagion of dishonest behavior. To the best of my knowledge no study has ever 
investigated the effect that social information has on tolerance, which can attenuate or exacerbate the 
effect that social information has on the likelihood that individuals engage in dishonesty. 
 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 4.2 describes the existing literature. Section 
4.3 presents the experimental design. Section 4.4 discusses the results, and section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
The experimental economics literature on dishonesty and corruption is fairly recent. It emerged in 2000 
with the work of Frank and Schulze (2000) who used a hypothetical question to study dishonesty. The 
work that developed thereafter has primarily used modified versions of the trust game of Berg et al. 
(1995) to study corruption. Abbink et al. (2002) were the pioneers in this approach and used the trust 
game to study bribing in the laboratory. In their experiment a firm decides whether or not to bribe a public 
official. The public official decides whether or not to accept a bribe and whether or not to grant a favor to 
the bribee. The original experiment used neutral instructions where actions did not have the negative 
connotations implied by corruption. Subsequent papers tested this implication by assigning subjects 
hypothetical roles. Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) showed no statistically significant differences in 
behavior generated by role assignment. Barr and Serra (2009), however, showed that in a petty corruption 
experiment where subjects were assigned the more familiar role of citizens instead of firms, loaded 
instructions matter. The experiment I conduct overcomes the challenges encountered by this early 
literature by employing a modified trust game in which the nature of dishonesty can be inherently 
recognized by subjects and where there is no need to assign hypothetical roles.  
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Although an array of issues within bribery have been investigated using modifications of Abbink 
et al. (2002), related to this study are the papers that focus on the role of social norms and culture. 
Cameron et al. (2009) studied the propensity to engage in bribery and to punish it using a modified trust 
game with role assignment in four different countries: Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore.75 The 
study documented no clear and robust relationship between the prevalence of corruption in a country and 
subject's behavior in the experiment. Barr and Serra (2010) conducted a bribery experiment using another 
modified trust game with role assignment in the United Kingdom. They recruited subjects from different 
nationalities and found that that the individual likelihood to engage in bribery correlates with the 
prevalence of corruption in subjects' home countries.76 The same type of correlation between the 
prevalence of corruption in a nation and socially undesired behavior was found by Fisman and Miguel 
(2007), who examined the parking behavior of UN officials protected by diplomatic immunity in New 
York City. Unlike these papers, which investigate social norms through the broad definition of culture, I 
manipulate the perceived social norm of honesty exogenously in the laboratory. 
 
Other popular settings that have been used to study dishonesty in the laboratory include truth 
telling in sender-receiver games (Gneezy 2005) and cheating when self-reporting scores on performance 
tests (Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008). The deception game of Gneezy (2005) has a sender inform a 
receiver which of two options yields a higher payoff. The receiver takes an action that determines the 
payoffs of both players but has no knowledge about the structure of incentives. The sender can thus tell 
the truth or lie; the receiver has to choose whether or not to believe the message sent by the sender before 
making a choice. The strategic setting employed in this paper is superior to that of Gneezy (2005) because 
it eliminates any moral wiggle room by which subjects may justify their behavior as honest. In Gneezy 
(2005) lying can be rationalized as other-regarding if the sender believes that the receiver will not believe 
the message. Independent of beliefs, the choices made by the potential victims of dishonesty determine 
the final payoffs. Engaging in dishonesty by lying thus does not directly inflict a negative externality on 
another participant. In Mazar et al. (2008) subjects self-report scores on a performance test. Scores 
determine payoffs; and subjects can cheat to earn more money by inflating scores. The setting employed 
in this paper is superior to Mazar et al. (2008) because engaging in dishonesty implies lying and taking 
money from another equal participant rather than from the experimenter. Dishonesty can be rationalized 
                                                
75 They used a three-player one-shot bribery game where a firm chooses whether or not to bribe a public official, the 
official chooses whether or not to accept the bribe, and subsequently a third party affected by the bribery exchange 
decides whether or not to punish the briber and bribee.  
76 This correlation, however, is only statistically significant among undergraduates. The authors argue that 
socialization and time spent in another country changes the norms that individuals use to guide their behavior. 
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as welfare enhancing in Mazar et al. (2008) if participants care only about the total money earned by 
subjects in the experiment.  
 
The two papers that have investigated whether dishonesty is contagious have used the strategic 
settings of Gneezy (2005) and Mazar et al. (2008). Gino et al. (2009) have subjects self-report scores on a 
performance test and manipulate the perceived social norm of honesty in the laboratory exogenously by 
hiring an actor who cheats bluntly in front of participants. Results show that observing a group member 
cheat increases the prevalence of cheating but observing an outsider do so decreases it. Interestingly, 
observing someone cheat without the group identity element increases honesty in the experiment.77 Innes 
and Mitra (2013) study whether lying is contagious. They conduct an experiment in Arizona and India 
where subjects play the deception game of Gneezy (2005) and are given information about the percentage 
of players that sent untruthful messages in a previous session of the experiment. Their results show that 
the prevalence of truth telling decreases when subjects in the Arizona experiment are told that 85 percent 
of subjects in another session were untruthful (does not change when that percentage is 15, 40 or 60) and 
increases in India when subjects are told that 85 percent of subjects were truthful. Additional sessions of 
the experiment that allowed subjects to draw messages from a box containing all messages sent in 
previous sessions of the experiment show that observing 3 of 5 participants be untruthful makes 
individuals more likely to lie. This is not driven by an effect of social information on preferences over 
allocations.  
 
Unlike the existing studies on contagion, the present study does not use deception or loaded terms 
in the instructions. Subjects are presented with the sequence of choices made by other participants in a 
previous session of the experiment and have to individually interpret such information. More importantly, 
the present study investigates contagion in a repeated setting for the first time, which allows tolerance to 
halt or facilitate the contagion of dishonest behavior.78  
                                                
77 The authors argue that this results from the fact that observing someone else cheat increases attention to 
standards, which increases honesty. 
78 Related to this study is also work on social influence and social information conducted within the context of 
socially desired and undesired behavior (e.g., Cason and Mui 1998; Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren 1990, 2000; 
Cialdini et al. 2006; Cialdini 2007; Croson and Shang 2008; Duffy and Kornienko 2010). 
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4.3 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This study employs a between subject design that varies whether or not subjects are exposed to social 
information about the behavior of other participants and whether or not such information reflects honest 
or dishonest behavior. It conducts two experiments, each of which employs the same session structure and 
basic experimental design. In Phase 1 subjects perform the real effort task of Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007) to secure an endowment for subsequent phases. The task consists of adding as many sets of five 
two-digit numbers as possible in five minutes. Participants secure $0.50 in endowment for every problem 
they solve correctly. Additionally, they receive an additional fixed sum of $2.00 that is independent of 
performance. Subjects know before performing the real effort task that the endowment they secure 
determines the earnings that they can receive in the experiment. They are not informed in Phase 1 about 
the activities that will be carried out in Phases 2 and 3 and are not aware of how their endowment will 
affect the earnings that they can receive in the experiment.   
 
Instructions for Phases 2 and 3 are distributed after the completion of Phase 1. At the beginning 
of Phase 2 participants are randomly assigned roles as first and second movers. They are then matched 
with a participant of the opposite role. Phase 2 has subjects play an investment game repeatedly with the 
same participant ten times. Phase 3 rematches subjects with a different participant and has them play the 
same investment game repeatedly ten additional times. Roles are maintained throughout the duration of 
the session and no participant is matched with the same person twice. The re-matching is done in such a 
way that the number of independent observations (subgroups) within each session is maximized. Subjects 
are informed at the beginning of Phase 2 that one of the 20 decision rounds that make up Phases 2 and 3 
will be randomly selected to count for payment. They are given a quiz to check their understanding and 
are subsequently provided a solution key that is read out loud by the experimenter. The quiz and solutions 
are given to participants before any decisions are made.  
4.3.1 Investment game 
The investment game played repeatedly by subjects in Phases 2 and 3 is depicted in Figure 4.1. A first 
mover (I) first decides whether or not to invest with a second mover (II) the endowment (𝑥!) earned in 
Phase 1. Foregoing investment with the first mover provides a constant return on the investment (𝑦) that 
is kept entirely by the first mover. Investment with the second mover generates a return on the investment 
that is shared between movers and can be either low or high. A low return doubles investment and 
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generates a net profit equal to the invested endowment. A high return triples investment and generates a 
net profit equal to twice the invested endowment. When the first mover invests with the second mover, 
the second mover observes the return on the investment and announces it to the first mover. The second 
mover can tell the truth or lie. Truthful announcements provide an equal split of the net profit between 
movers. Untruthful announcements allow the second mover to take a larger share of the earnings when 
return is high, and to give up earnings when return is low. The return observed by the second mover is 
randomly selected by the computer and acquires a high value 3/4 of the time. The likelihood that the 
return selected by the computer is high is common knowledge among participants. The second mover, 
however, is the only participant who observes the actual return on the investment. The first mover thus 
never learns if the second mover told the truth or lied.  
Figure 4.1: Investment game 
The Nash equilibrium of the investment game depicted in Figure 4.1 is unique if y<0.5, which is 
secured by the parameterization employed in the experiments. It consists of the first mover investing with 
the second mover and of the second mover always announcing a low return on the investment. The unique 
Nash and subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated game is for first movers to always invest 
with the second mover and for second movers to always announce a low return on the investment. 
Deviations from the Nash prediction can emerge in the stage game if second movers value 
honesty, or alternatively care about payoff differentials. Two features of the design minimize the last 
channel. First, subjects earn their endowment in Phase 1. Second, honest announcements provide an equal 
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split of net profits.79 Second movers valuing honesty can be modeled by letting individuals have 
preferences denoted by 𝑈(𝑥!, 𝑥!) = 𝑚(𝑥!, 𝑥!) − 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑥!, 𝑥!), where 𝑚(𝑥!, 𝑥!) is the material payoff of 
the stage game and 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑥!, 𝑥!) is the cost of engaging in dishonesty. Parameter 𝜃 captures the strength of 
the social norm of honesty and can be interpreted as the prevalence of honest behavior in a reference 
group or in society. Suppose that 𝑐(𝜃, 𝑥!, 𝑥!) is positive and increasing in 𝜃 when lying inflicts a negative 
externality on another equal participant. Then second movers should engage in dishonesty when return is 
high only if 1.5𝑥! + 𝑥! − 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑥!, 𝑥! ≥ 𝑥! + 𝑥!. Since 𝜃 is not perfectly known by participants, subjects 
will engage in dishonesty when 𝑥! ≥ 2𝐸 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑥!, 𝑥! . Social information provides information about 𝜃 
to participants, and thus predicts that honesty should increase with the prevalence of honesty reflected in 
the social information.  
 
First mover behavior in the stage game can be affected by social information about 𝜃 directly and 
indirectly. A direct effect may be present if first movers experience a disutility from being the victims of 
dishonesty that is increasing in the prevalence of honesty in society. Indirectly, information about 𝜃 may 
affect the beliefs that first movers have about the behavior of second movers and thus their investment.  
 
The finitely repeated game introduces strategic considerations that can mute or exacerbate the 
direct effects of social information on first and second mover behavior. For example, social information 
reflecting dishonest behavior may decrease 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑥!, 𝑥!  making dishonesty more permissible for second 
movers, but may also affect the likelihood that first movers punish dishonesty. If first movers become 
more likely to punish dishonesty when dishonesty is prevalent, then this may counteract the incentive to 
engage in dishonesty that is generated by the fall in 𝑐 𝜃, 𝑥!, 𝑥! . If first movers become less likely to 
punish dishonesty when exposed to dishonest others, then this may further increase the likelihood that 
individuals engage in dishonest behavior. 
4.3.2 Treatments 
Treatments in each experiment vary whether or not subjects observe the behavior of other participants in a 
previous session of the experiment and whether or not such information reflects honest or dishonest 
behavior. In a No Information Treatment (NIT) subjects are not presented with any social information. In 
                                                
79 Individuals would need to be extremely inequality averse to justify dishonesty through fairness or equality 
considerations 
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an Honest Information Treatment (HIT) subjects are shown the sequence of returns announced by four 
second movers who behaved honestly in one phase of a previous session of the experiment. In a 
Dishonest Information Treatment (DIT) subjects are shown the sequence of returns announced by four 
second movers who behaved dishonestly in one phase of a previous session of the experiment. The 
sequences of returns presented to subjects in each of the treatments are displayed in Appendix Tables C.1 
and C.2. A Computer Treatment (CT) has subjects play the investment game as second movers against the 
computer. This treatment seeks to rule out confusion as a possible explanation for the honesty observed in 
the experiment and does not provide subjects any social information. 
 
Experiments vary the payoff associated with the first mover's outside option and some 
implementation procedures. In Experiment 1 the return on the outside option was 0 and thus provided no 
additional earnings. Subjects were only quizzed in Experiment 1 about the payoffs associated with 
truthful announcements. Considerable efforts were made not to prime dishonesty in Experiment 1 for two 
reasons. First, to let subjects realize on their own that they could lie and take earnings from the second 
mover; and second, not to affect the moral conflict associated with engaging in dishonesty. In Experiment 
2, the return to the outside option was increased to 0.4 percent to give tolerance a superior chance of 
playing a role. The strategy method was also employed in Experiment 2 to avoid losing observations 
when first movers chose not to invest with the second mover. Experiment 2 also used instructions and 
comprehension questions that went over the payoffs associated with all possible announcement scenarios. 
This was done to rule out confusion as a possible explanation of the treatment effects documented in 
Experiment 1, but may have primed selfishness and possibly affected the moral conflict associated with 
engaging in dishonesty.  
 
The specific treatments conducted in each experiment are depicted in Table 4.1. The information 
presented to subjects is the same across experiments within treatment; it was collected during pilot phases 
of the study. Experiment 1 presented the social information to subjects once at the beginning of Phase 2. 
Experiment 2 also gave participants a handout with the social information that could be consulted any 
time throughout the duration of Phases 2 and 3. Incentivized questionnaires conducted at the end of 
Experiment 2 validate the social information presented to subjects.81 
 
                                                
81 Subjects correctly assess that the sequence of investment returns shown to participants in HIT and DIT reflects 
honest and dishonest behavior respectively. 
 71 
Table 4.1: Experimental design 
Treatments Experiment 1 Experiment 2 y=0 y=0.4 
No Information (NIT) X 
Honest Information (HIT) X X 
Dishonest Information (DIT) X X 
Computer (CT) X 
4.4 RESULTS 
A total of 216 individuals participated in 18 sessions of the study conducted at the Pittsburgh 
Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL) at the University of Pittsburgh. 108 individuals participated 
in the 9 sessions that make up Experiment 1 and 216 individuals participated in the 9 sessions that make 
up Experiment 2. Experiment 1 conducted 3 sessions per treatment while Experiment 2 conducted 4 
sessions per Information Treatment and 1 session of the Computer Treatment. Each session included 12 
participants. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).  
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics by experiment and treatment. Half of all participants in each 
of the Information Treatments were assigned the role of first movers and half were assigned the role of 
second movers. Gender was balanced within sessions but not across roles. Participants solved an average 
of 11.23 problems correctly in Phase 1 and earned an average endowment of $7.60. Interestingly, the 
number of problems solved correctly in Experiment 2 was higher than in Experiment 1 (Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney rank-sum z=1.861, p=0.02).82 Individuals made on average $18.50 dollars for participating in 
one session of the study, which lasted approximately 1 hour.83 
82 Differences may have emerged as a result of unwanted changes in the implementation, but are not statistically
different across treatments within each of the experiments. Experiment 1 was conducted in the Fall of 2011 while 
Experiment 2 was conducted in between April 2012 and October 2013. 
83 Earnings were higher in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 (subject-level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum
test z=-1.503 ,p<0.15, subgroup-level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test z=-1.973 p=0.049), in large part due 
to the high earnings made by individuals in the computer treatment. Pairwise comparisons across treatments in 
experiment 2 show that subjects in the Computer Treatment earn more than subjects who participated in the other 
two treatments (subgroup-level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests provide z=2.022, p=0.043 and z=1.906, 
p=0.057 in the honest and Dishonest Information Treatments respectively). 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics by experiment and treatment 
Variable 
Experiment 1   Experiment 2   
Total NIT HIT DIT All   CT HIT DIT All   
N sessions 3 3 3 9 
 
1 4 4 9 
 
18 
N subjects 36 36 36 108 
 
12 48 48 108 
 
216 
% female 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
0.42 0.44 0.46 0.44 
 
0.47 
% first movers 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
0.00 0.50 0.50 0.45 
 
0.47 
% second movers 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
1.00 0.50 0.50 0.56 
 
0.53 
n problems correct ph 1 10.31 10.25 11.36 10.64 
 
11.17 11.08 12.71 11.82 
 
11.23 
(sd) (3.91) (4.26) (3.42) (3.88) 
 
(2.62) (4.52) (5.27) (4.74) 
 
(4.36) 
endowment 7.15 7.13 7.68 7.32 
 
7.58 7.54 8.35 7.91 
 
7.61 
(sd) (1.96) (2.13) (1.71) (1.94) 
 
(1.31) (2.26) (2.63) (2.37) 
 
(2.18) 
total earnings 17.61 17.74 18.40 17.92 
 
21.92 18.34 19.21 19.13 
 
18.52 
(sd) (3.92) (3.94) (3.66) (3.82) 
 
(4.46) (4.70) (5.48) (5.11)  (4.54) 
 
4.4.1 Aggregate results 
Figure 4.2 shows the aggregate rate of first mover investment and second mover announcements of high 
returns by round and treatment. Panel (a) shows the results of Experiment 1 and panel (b) shows the 
results of Experiment 2. Experiment 1 shows that first movers almost never chose to forego investment 
with the second mover; they invested with the second mover 96 percent of the time. Deviations from the 
subgame perfect prediction of always investing with the second mover are, nevertheless, statistically 
significant (subgroup-level sign tests p<0.05 in each treatment). First movers, thus, did not invest with the 
second mover 100 percent of the time in Experiment 1. No differences in the aggregate rate of investment 
can be detected in Experiment 1 across treatments.  
 
Experiment 2 shows that first movers are less likely to invest with the second mover when the 
return to the outside option is larger (subgroup-level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sum tests p<0.01 
across experiments within each of treatments). In fact, first movers invest with second movers only 83 
percent of the time. Deviations from the subgame perfect prediction of full investment with the second 
mover are also statistically significant (subgroup-level sign tests p<0.01 within each of the treatments). 
Differences in the rate of investment across treatments show a lower rate of investment in the Dishonest 
Information Treatment than in the Honest Information Treatment but are not statistically significant.  
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Figure 4.2: First and second mover behavior by experiment and treatment 
Note: Investment in the Computer Treatment is included as a reference. All subjects in CT were assigned the 
role of second movers and played against a computer that was programmed to always invest with the second 
mover.	  	  
Second movers in Experiment 1 announce high returns 44 percent of the time. Deviations from 
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of no high announcements are statistically significant 
(subgroup-level sign test p<0.01 in each of the treatments). Differences in the rate of high announcements 
across treatments suggest that announcements move in the direction of social information, but are not 
statistically significant when non-parametric tests are employed. The insignificant differences in behavior 
across treatments may be a product of the size of the subtle treatment effects, which may require more 
statistical power, but may also reflect the fact that strategic considerations need to be controlled for. 
 
Experiment 2 shows that the rate of high announcements observed in Experiment 1 is not a 
product of confusion. Subjects continue to announce high returns (24 percent of the time) when they play 
against a human participant even when dishonesty is primed. They play the subgame perfect equilibrium 
of the game when matched against the computer. Deviations from the subgame perfect prediction of no 
high announcements are statistically significant in both of the Information Treatments (subgroup-level 
sign tests p<0.05 within each treatment) but not in the Computer Treatment (subgroup-level sign test 
p=0.25). Differences in the rate of high announcements are statistically significant across treatments in 
Experiment 2 (subgroup-level Kruskal-Wallis Χ!=19.593, p<0.01) due to the zero rate of high 
announcements made by subjects in the Computer Treatment.84 Second mover behavior, however, does 
                                                
84 Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests of differences in behavior across treatments show that the rate of high 
announcements is lower in the Computer Treatment than in the Honest and Dishonest Information Treatments (z=-
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not vary across Information Treatments. The lack of treatment differences generated by the nature of the 
social information presented to subjects in Experiment 2 may reflect the fact that priming dishonesty may 
have caused behavior to hit a lower bound in the aggregate rate of honesty that can be observed in the 
experiment, which prevents social information from moving average behavior. 
 
Comparison of second mover behavior across experiments shows that the rate of high 
announcements is different across experiments within the Honest Information Treatment (subgroup-level 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum z=2.775, p=0.006) but not the Dishonest Information Treatment. 
High announcements are not even statistically significantly different between the Dishonest Information 
Treatment in Experiment 1 and the Honest Information Treatment in Experiment 2. That is, social 
information reflecting dishonest behavior in Experiment 1 has the same effect on behavior as the 
implementation procedures employed in Experiment 2. The lack of aggregate differences across 
treatments in Experiment 2 may also be interpreted as evidence that confusion or learning explains the 
differences in behavior documented in Experiment 1 across treatments. Further analysis of second mover 
behavior presented in section 4.4.3 will show that this is unlikely the case.  	  
The aggregate rate of first mover investment and second mover announcements of high returns 
presented so far does not take into account the strategic considerations present in the experiment or any 
heterogeneity in individual behavior. The next subsections address these issues by providing an in-depth 
analysis of behavior by mover type. 
4.4.2 First movers 
Table 4.3 shows investment statistics of first movers by treatment. Although subjects chose to invest with 
second movers 98 percent of the time in Experiment 1, only 65 percent of participants (n=35) chose to 
always invest with the second mover and thus played the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. That 
is, 35 percent of participants (n=19) chose to forego investment with the second mover at least once. 
Foregone investment cannot be explained by confusion because 20 percent of participants (n=11) chose to 
forego investment with the second mover more than once. A much lower fraction of participants (27 
percent, n=13) played the subgame perfect equilibrium game in Experiment 2. Out of the 35 participants 
who chose to forego investment with the second mover in Experiment 2, 28 did so more than once. 
Differences in the proportion of players who chose to always invest with the second mover are 
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statistically significant across experiments within treatment (subgroup level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney 
rank sum tests provide p<0.05) but not across treatments within each of the experiments. 
 
Table 4.3: First mover behavior by experiment and treatment 
  Experiment 1   Experiment 2   
Total   NIT HIT DIT All   HIT DIT All   
Aggregate behavior           % investment with the second mover 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.96 	   0.88 0.78 0.83 	   0.90 Strategies employed           % who play the SPE 0.56 0.67 0.72 0.65 	   0.21 0.33 0.27 	   0.47 % who forego investment once 0.11 0.22 0.11 0.15 	   0.17 0.13 0.15 	   0.15 % who forego investment more than once 0.33 0.11 0.17 0.20  0.63 0.54 0.58  0.38 
N subjects 18 18 18 54 	  	   24 24 48 	  	   102 
N independent subgroups 9 9 9 27 	  	   12 12 24 	  	   51 	  
Histograms of investment rates by subject are presented in Figure 4.3. Whereas at most a first 
mover chose to forego investment with the second mover 6 times in Experiment 1, the lowest rate of 
investment with the second mover in Experiment 2 was 0. That is, one participant exposed to social 
information reflecting dishonest behavior never chose to invest with the second mover. The behavior of 
this participant was extreme but not unique, 4 participants exposed to social information reflecting 
dishonest behavior in Experiment 2 chose to forego investment with the second mover at least 10 times 
(Kolmogorov Smirnov tests provide p<0.05 across experiments and within information treatment). 
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individual rate of investment with the second mover
 76 
Table 4.4: Marginal effects of probit regressions of first mover investment 
Dep. Var.: Invest with SM Experiment 1  
Experiment 2 
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 2 vs. 3 
 
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 2 vs. 3 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) 
HIT 0.002 -0.582 -0.460 
     (0.822) (0.582) (0.753)     DIT 1.000*** -0.999*** -1.000*** 
 
-0.299 -0.620*** -0.259 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
(0.108) (0.003) (0.421) 
perceived honesty SM 0.006 0.195** 0.026 
 
0.501*** 0.832*** -0.026 
 (0.645) (0.032) (0.334)  
(0.009) (0.003) (0.883) 
HIT X perceived honesty SM -0.006 -0.007 0.027 
     (0.642) (0.945) (0.431)     DIT X perceived honesty SM 0.054 -0.062 -0.106* 
 
-0.177 -0.395 
  (0.487) (0.511) (0.060)  
(0.392) (0.175) 
 % past investment 0.012 0.055 -0.014 
 
0.231* 0.26 -0.069 
 (0.630) (0.328) (0.367)  
(0.061) (0.298) (0.779) 
HIT X % past investment -0.000 0.054 0.013 
     (0.987) (0.573) (0.744)     DIT X % past investment -0.129 0.003 0.214 
 
0.345** 0.296 -0.187 
 (0.630) (0.960) (0.330)  
(0.044) (0.288) (0.477) 
period 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 
 
0.018*** 0.020** -0.007 
 (0.623) (0.006) (0.604)  





-0.014** 0.004 0.020** 
 (0.622)  
(0.312) 
 
(0.017) (0.690) (0.040) 
female 
               perceived honesty SM ph2 
 
-0.055 
   
-0.718 
   
(0.452) 
   
(0.112) 
 HIT X perceived honesty SM ph2 
 
-0.186 
       
(0.176) 
     DIT X perceived honesty SM ph2 
 
-0.010 
   
-0.111 
   
(0.918) 
   
(0.878) 
 % past investment 
 
0.046 
   
0.283 
   
(0.255) 
   
(0.135) 
 HIT X % past investment ph2 
 
0.122 
       
(0.525) 
     DIT X % past investment ph2 
 
0.322 
   
0.435* 
   
(0.160) 
   
(0.080) 
 N obs. 486 486 
  
432 432 864 
N clusters 54 27 
  
61.949 92.986 1233.176 
L -52.92 -82.60 
  
48 24 24 
Tests HIT vs. DIT: 
       treatment 0.000 0.468 
     perceived honesty SM 0.105 0.565 
     % past investment 0.987 0.838 
     perceived honesty SM ph2 
 
0.272 
     % past investment ph2 
 
0.497 
      
Note: P-values reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the marginal effects of probit regressions of investment on treatment that include 
history of play controls and clustered standard errors at the subgroup level. A lot of structure is imposed 
on the regression to control for the strategic considerations present in the experiment. Period 1 
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observations are excluded due to the nature of regressors; including them does not change results. The 
analysis is conducted separately for each phase because a phase constitutes a different finitely repeated 
game. Columns 1 and 2 show that social information reflecting dishonest behavior affects investment 
choices in Experiment 1. There is a level effect caused by exposure to social information reflecting 
dishonest behavior that makes participants more likely to invest with the second mover in Phase 2 but less 
likely to invest with the second mover in Phase 3. Level differences are statistically significant between 
the two information treatments in Phase 2 (p<0.01).  
 
First mover behavior does not seem to react to second mover behavior considerably. The 
coefficient on perceived honesty, which measures the probability that the number of high returns 
announced by the second mover so far in the game is true, is positive but only statistically significant in 
Phase 3. Treatment differences in the intensity with which first movers react to second mover behavior is 
captured by the interaction term between perceived honesty and treatment, which shows marginally 
statistically insignificant differences in Phase 2 (p=0.105). Column 3 tests differences in the coefficients 
of the regressors across phases. 
 
Regressions results for Experiment 2, shown in columns 4 and 5, show a negative level effect of 
the Dishonest Information Treatment that does not vary by phase. This indicates that first movers are less 
likely to invest with second movers when they are exposed to social information reflecting dishonest 
behavior in Experiment 2 (p=0.105 in Phase 2, p=0.003 in Phase3 and in the joint regression). The 
coefficient on perceived honesty is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that subjects react to 
second mover behavior. A bifurcation of types seems to be generated by exposure to dishonest behavior 
in Phase 2, which is captured by the coefficient of percent past investment. First movers are more likely to 
invest with the second mover the more they have invested in the past, and the intensity with which they 
do so is higher when they are exposed to social information reflecting dishonest behavior than when they 
are exposed to social information reflecting honest behavior. The size of the endowment decreases the 
likelihood that individuals invest in Phase 2 but has no effect on investment in Phase 3 of the experiment.  
 
 Overall, Table 4.4 shows that social information reflecting dishonest behavior does affect the 
likelihood that individuals invest with the second mover and thus punish dishonesty. Individuals become 
less likely to invest with the second mover (more likely to punish dishonesty) when they are exposed to 
exogenous social information reflecting dishonest behavior.  
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4.4.3 Second movers 
Table 4.5 provides detailed information about second mover behavior that differentiates announcements 
when return was high from announcements when return was low. The returns observed by second movers 
were randomly and independently drawn for each participant in each period of play in Experiment 1. The 
percentage of high returns observed by second movers thus varies across sessions, individuals, and 
rounds. Experiment 2 removed the unnecessary variation by choosing the random draws shown to 
participants ex-ante and keeping them constant across sessions.85 In particular, sequences of returns were 
chosen that showed a high return to second movers during the first period of play of each phase.  
 
Table 4.5: Second mover behavior by experiment and treatment 
  Experiment 1   Experiment 2   
Total   NIT HIT DIT All   CT HIT DIT All   
Aggregate behavior            
% returns observed high 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.76 
 
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
 
0.78 
% announced high 0.44 0.51 0.38 0.44 
 
0.02 0.22 0.25 0.18 
 
0.33 
% honest when return high 0.54 0.62 0.48 0.55 
 
0.01 0.26 0.30 0.20 
 
0.40 
% honest when return low 0.85 0.83 0.93 0.87 
 
0.94 0.91 0.94 0.93 
 
0.90 
Strategies employed          
% who play the SPE 0.06 0.06 0.39 0.17 
 
0.75 0.38 0.25 0.40 
 
0.29 
% always dishonest when return high 0.17 0.06 0.39 0.20 
 
0.92 0.38 0.29 0.45 
 
0.33 
% always honest when return low 0.50 0.39 0.72 0.54 
 
0.83 0.79 0.79 0.80 
 
0.68 
% always honest 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 
0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
 
0.06 
N returns observed 340 348 349 1,037   240 480 480 1,200   2,237 
N subjects 18 18 18 54 
 
12 24 24 60 
 
113 
N independent subgroups 9 9 9 27 
 
12 12 12 36 
 
63 
N sessions 3 3 3 9   1 4 4 8   18 
 
As Table 4.5 shows, second movers were not always honest when return was high or low. 
Participants were honest when return was high 55 percent of the time in Experiment 1 and 20 percent of 
the time in Experiment 2. They were honest when return was low 87 percent in Experiment 1 and 90 
percent of the time in Experiment 2. The lack of complete honesty when return was low suggests that 
second movers used announcements when return was low strategically. That is, to possibly maintain their 
perceived image of honesty or even to erase the consequences of past actions. Announcing high when 
return was low allowed second movers to undo the effect of having announced low when return was high 
and even gave them the opportunity to reward first mover investment. 
 
                                                
85 The percentage of high returns observed by second movers is higher than 0.75 because it is determined by 6 
randomly generated sequences of returns. 
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Only 17 percent of participants (n=9) played the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of never 
announcing a high return in Experiment 1. 20 percent of participants (n=11) were always dishonest when 
return was high, and 54 percent (n=29) were always honest when return was low. The fraction of subjects 
who played the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of never announcing a high return was significantly 
lower in the No Information and Honest Information Treatments than in the Dishonest Information 
Treatment (subgroup-level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests z=-2.015, p=0.044 in both cases). 
Exposure to dishonesty thus increased the likelihood that individuals never announced a low return on the 
investment in Experiment 1.  
Experiment 2 shows a larger fraction of subgame perfect equilibrium play across experiments and 
within treatment (subgroup-level test Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum z=-2.487, p=0.013 within each 
of the treatments). The fraction of subjects who never announce a high return varies across treatments in 
Experiment 2 (subgroup-level Kruskal-Wallis test Χ!=9.256, p=0.01). 75 percent of subjects (n=9) played 
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy in the Computer Treatment, 38 percent (n=9) did so in the 
Honest Information Treatment, and 25 percent (n=6) did so in the Dishonest Information Treatment. 
Differences are statistically significant between each of the Information Treatments and the Computer 
Treatment (subgroup-level Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank-sum test z=2.309, p=0.021 between CT and 
HIT and z=2.769, p=0.006 between CT and DIT) but not across Information Treatments. Deviations from 
subgame perfect play in the Computer Treatment are driven by a few high announcements made by 
subjects when return was low but are not statistically significant. 
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that exposure to dishonesty makes individuals more likely to play 
the sub-game perfect equilibrium of never announcing a high return. Are these differences present if we 
look at the individual decision to announce a high return? Table 4.6 presents the marginal effects of probit 
regressions of high announcements on treatment that control for the return observed by the second mover, 
for the history of play, and cluster standard errors at the subgroup level. Period 1 observations are 
excluded, due to the nature of the variables included in the regression. Columns 1 through 3 show the 
results of Experiment 1. Columns 4 through 6 show the results of Experiment 2. Social information has a 
level effect on the likelihood that individuals make high announcements in Experiment 1. Exposure to 
social information reflecting honest behavior (HIT) makes subjects more likely to announce high in Phase 
2, but less likely to announce high in Phase 3 relative to the control treatment of no information (NIT). 
Exposure to social information reflecting dishonest behavior (DIT), on the other hand, makes subjects 
less likely to announce high returns in Phases 2 and 3 the experiment. Differences in level effects are 
statistically significant across Information Treatments (p<0.01).  
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Table 4.6. Marginal effects of probit regressions of second mover announcements 
Dep. Var.: High announcement 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 2 vs. 3 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) 
return high 0.454*** 0.444*** 0.004 0.199*** 0.200*** -0.015 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.740) (0.000) (0.000) (0.832) 
HIT 0.783* -0.825** -0.780*** 
 
(0.052) (0.015) (0.000) 
   DIT -1.000*** -1.000*** 0.627*** 0.292 -0.089 -0.275 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.223) (0.825) (0.207) 
perceived honesty 1.385*** 0.790** -0.375 0.982*** 0.216 -0.788*** 
 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.303) (0.000) (0.261) (0.000) 
HIT X perceived honesty -0.484* -0.050 0.391 
 
(0.072) (0.895) (0.410) 
   DIT X perceived honesty 0.996*** 0.925* 0.139 -0.290 0.023 0.318 
 
(0.006) (0.061) (0.788) (0.108) (0.922) (0.256) 
% past investment FM 0.095 0.921* 0.969 0.466** -0.072 -0.546 
 
(0.913) (0.074) (0.128) (0.038) (0.793) (0.122) 
HIT X % past investment FM -0.811 -0.311 0.395 
 
(0.399) (0.642) (0.648) 
   DIT X % past investment FM 16.598*** -1.302* -16.895*** -0.268 0.126 0.396 
 
(0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.290) (0.707) (0.332) 
period 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.394*** 0.015* -0.008 -0.023** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.006) (0.056) (0.345) (0.015) 
endowment -0.002 0.011 0.014 0.003 -0.010 -0.013 
 
(0.889) (0.561) (0.514) (0.812) (0.537) (0.320) 
investment -0.010 -0.009 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.007 
 
(0.586) (0.662) (0.949) (0.627) (0.858) (0.699) 






 DIT X perceived honesty ph2 -0.377 -2.227*** 
 
(0.546) (0.000) 
% investment FM ph2 0.041 -0.026 
 
(0.925) (0.909) 
HIT X % investment FM ph2 1.823 
 
(0.126) 





 N obs. 472.000 458.000 930.000 432.000 432.000 864.000 
N clusters 54.000 27.000 27.000 48.000 24.000 24.000 
L -224.850 -166.918 -391.768 -185.278 -174.316 -359.595 
R squared 0.311 0.455 0.384 0.203 0.265 0.235 
Tests HIT vs. DIT:  
  treatment 0.000 0.000 
perceived honesty 0.000 0.023 
% investment FM 0.000 0.109 
perceived honesty ph2 0.101 
% investment FM ph2 0.000 
phase 3 X treatment 
phase 3 X perceived honesty 
phase 3 X % investment FM 
 Note: P-values reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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The variable perceived honesty controls for the history of high announcements made by second 
movers in previous rounds of the experiment. It is equal to the probability that the number of high 
announcements made by the second mover and observed by the first mover so far in the game is true. The 
positive coefficient on perceived honesty suggests that, on average, subjects do not behave strategically in 
the experiment. They are more likely to announce high when they have announced high returns. This may 
capture the fact that there are subject types who are more likely to announce high returns. Treatments 
seem to alter this division of types, which is weaker in the Honest Information Treatment than in the No 
Information Treatment, but stronger in the Dishonest Information Treatment than in the No Information 
Treatment. Differences in the coefficient of perceived honesty are statistically significant across 
Information Treatments (p<0.01 in Phase 2 and p=0.023 in Phase 3).  
 
Subjects do not react strategically to first mover behavior in the experiment. The coefficient on 
percent investment is positive in Phases 2 and 3 suggesting that second movers are more likely to 
announce a high return the more the first mover has invested. This could be due to reciprocity or to the 
existence of second mover types that are more likely to announce high returns and less likely to be 
punished by second movers. Exposure to social information reflecting dishonest behavior strengthens this 
relationship in Phase 2 and eliminates it in Phase 3. The total effect of percent past investment is negative 
in Phase 3 but not statistically significant.  
 
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 4.6 exclude observations where subjects play against the computer 
and show that in Experiment 2 social information has no aggregate effect on behavior. Subjects continue 
to be more likely to announce high when they observe a high return on the investment in Phases 2 and 3, 
but are not affected by the nature of the social information. The coefficients on perceived honesty and 
percent past investment are similar in sign to those documented in Experiment 1, but are only statistically 
significant in Phase 2 of Experiment 2. 
 
Does this suggest that the treatment effects captured in Experiment 1 are the result of learning to 
play Nash equilibrium? Not necessarily, due to three reasons. First, extreme punishers exist in the 
Dishonest Information Treatment in Experiment 2 so the behavior of some second movers may exhibit 
higher levels of honesty than if announcements were binding. Second, if priming dishonesty causes 
behavior to hit a lower bound in the rate of honesty that can be observed in Experiment 2, then exposure 
to dishonesty cannot push behavior any further. Third, the aggregate analysis presented so far masks the 
fact that subject types may exist who are affected by social information. The first explanation is ruled out 
by excluding second movers who were matched with extreme punishers from the analysis, which does not 
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change the estimated magnitude of treatment effects in the regressions. The third explanation can be 
investigated by examining individual heterogeneity in announcement decisions and classifying subjects 
into types. 
 
 Figure 4.4 shows histograms of the individual rate of high announcements by experiment and 
treatment. There is a large degree of heterogeneity in the rates of high announcements made by subjects 
within experiments and treatments. The maximum rate of high announcements is 100 percent in 
Experiment 1 and 85 percent in Experiment 2. Approximately 35 percent of subjects in Experiment 1 
(n=14) and 7 percent of participants in Experiment 2 (n=5) exhibit honesty and announce high at least 3/4 
of the time. The minimum rate of high announcements made by subjects in all experiments and treatments 
is 0, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Histogram of individual rates of high announcements 
 
The heterogeneity in second mover behavior suggests that there may be honest and dishonest 
types in the experiment who are not swayed by social information. Any treatment effects in Experiment 1 
must thus come from individuals who are affected by social information. Who are these participants? Can 
they be identified? Unfortunately, experimental procedures did not collect any information prior to 
treatment that could be used to generate an exogenous classification of subject types. An endogenous 
classification is therefore employed using the choices made by participants the first time they observed a 
high return. I define honest types as those who announced high honestly the first time they observed a 
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classified as honest types by this standard, 37 in Experiment 1 and 14 in Experiment 2.86 Appendix Table 
C.3 shows statistics by honest type category. Honest and dishonest types react to social information in 
Experiment 1, while only honest types react to social information in Experiment 2. Parametric analysis of 
the announcements made by honest types in Experiment 2, in fact, shows a robust and statistically 
significant negative level effect of exposure to social information reflecting dishonest behavior (see 
Appendix Table C.4). Honest types in Experiment 2 are less likely to announce high returns when they 
are exposed to social information reflecting dishonest behavior than when they are exposed to social 
information reflecting honest behavior. The effect of social information on honest types in Experiment 2 
cannot be explained by learning or confusion given the experimental procedures employed. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This study investigates whether dishonesty is contagious in a repeated setting in the laboratory. Strategic 
considerations are present that may enhance or counteract the direct effect that social information has on 
the likelihood that individuals engage in dishonesty. Treatments expose participants to honest and 
dishonest behavior using exogenous social information collected in a previous session of the experiment. 
Results show that exposure to dishonest others increases the likelihood that individuals engage in 
dishonesty and weakly decreases the likelihood that individuals tolerate dishonesty.  
 
The contributions of this paper are several. First, the study provides a strategic setting that can be 
used to investigate dishonesty in the laboratory. Second, the study extends the set of conditions under 
which dishonesty has been found to be contagious. Third, the study investigates for the first time the role 
that tolerance plays in halting or possibly facilitating the contagion of dishonesty. To the best of my 
knowledge, no study has ever examined the role of tolerance in fueling contagion.  
 
The findings of this paper have implications that extend beyond the two-person repeated game 
investigated in this paper. They suggest that a non-material strategic complementarity exists that makes 
dishonesty contagious. Including it in dynamic models of dishonesty could help explain why dishonesty 
and corruption are so prevalent in some cultures and not in others and why it is so difficult to curb this 
                                                
86 The classification of types is clean in Experiment 2, where all participants observed a high return during the first 
period of play. In Experiment 2 some subjects saw the first high return in periods 2 and 3 of Phase 2.  
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type of behavior. The study of tolerance suggests that tolerance does not fuel the downward spiral 
behavior. More research is needed to understand when tolerance can facilitate and when it can prevent the 
contagion of dishonest behavior.  
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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 2 
Table A.1: Household level selection into the study 
 
Eligible Invited Participated Diff. 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) – (1) 
Household head’s education 4.44 4.128 4.264 -0.176 
 
[3.679] [3.507] [3.564] (0.177) 
Household assets 2.05 1.941 1.972 -0.078 
 
[1.647] [1.570] [1.551] (0.078) 
Caring for environment is top value 0.386 0.385 0.395 0.009 
 
[0.487] [0.487] [0.489] (0.024) 
Participated in all OTB meetings this year 0.321 0.366 0.366 0.045* 
 
[0.467] [0.482] [0.482] (0.023) 
Participates in OTB projects 0.582 0.636 0.659 0.077*** 
 
[0.493] [0.482] [0.475] (0.024) 
Always agrees with community decisions 0.641 0.671 0.672 0.031 
 
[0.480] [0.470] [0.470] (0.023) 
Always trusts NGOs 0.394 0.404 0.407 0.013 
 
[0.489] [0.491] [0.492] (0.024) 
Held past leadership position in community 0.074 0.094 0.103 0.029** 
 
[0.263] [0.292] [0.305] (0.014) 
N 1438 673 580 
  
Notes: Columns 1-3 show means with standard deviations in brackets for sample of 
participants at each stage of the experiment. The column "Diff." shows the mean 
difference in between households that were eligible and those that participated, with 
estimated standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are for a two-sided t-test: 





Table A.2: Treatment non-compliance 
Binary dependent variable is: 
Switched out of   Switched in to 
AL RL NL  AL RL NL 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )   ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) 
Individual contribution decision 0.0019 -0.002 0.0015  -0.004 0.0041 0.0008 
 (0.0046) (0.0026) (0.0016)  (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0009) Female 0.1177* -0.019 -0.038  -0.016 0.0259 0.0325 
 (0.0641) (0.0284) (0.0385)  (0.0461) (0.0378) (0.0319) Years of education -0.005 -0.002 0.0071  0.0041 -0.0120* 0.0045 
 (0.0088) (0.0062) (0.0068)  (0.0083) (0.0068) (0.0045) Household assets 0.0058 -0.0350* 0.0408  -0.014 0.0169 -0.007 
 (0.0363) (0.0200) (0.0332)  (0.0340) (0.0310) (0.0075) Number of children attending local school 0.0316 -0.001 0.0046  0.0199 0.0117 -0.005 
 (0.0319) (0.0104) (0.0051)  (0.0222) (0.0188) (0.0052) Evaluated the teacher as good or excellent 0.000 0.0292 0.0061  0.0638 -0.056 0.027 
 (0.0625) (0.0618) (0.0086)  (0.0625) (0.0641) (0.0271) Caring for environment is top value -0.119 0.0134 -0.002  -0.007 -0.069 -0.045 
 (0.0878) (0.0729) (0.0054)  (0.0719) (0.0809) (0.0449) Participated in all OTB meetings this year 0.018 -0.013 -0.04  -0.037 -0.003 0.0057 
 (0.0721) (0.0598) (0.0401)  (0.0705) (0.0710) (0.0087) Participates in OTB projects -0.013 0.0364 -0.035  -0.009 1.272 -0.011 
 (0.0529) (0.0603) (0.0350)  (0.0722) (0.0519) (0.0128) Always agrees with community decisions -0.088 -0.019 -0.033  -0.016 -0.09 -0.033 
 (0.0574) (0.0637) (0.0329)  (0.0614) (0.0573) (0.0329) Always trusts NGOs 0.0401 0.0398 -0.001  0.0617 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.0518) (0.0581) (0.0047)  (0.0685) (0.0480) (0.0047) Held past leadership position in community 0.0307 -0.04 -0.029  -0.073 0.0277 0.032 
 (0.0863) (0.0593) (0.0293)  (0.0618) (0.0975) (0.0338) Experimenter indicator -0.107 -0.058 -0.053  -0.113 -0.043 -0.053 
 (0.1238) (0.1046) (0.0533)  (0.1139) (0.1136) (0.0533) Session size -0.161 0.1363* -0.054  0.0659 -0.104 -0.054 
 (0.1327) (0.0745) (0.0552)  (0.1082) (0.1236) (0.0552) Community size 0.0034 0.000 0.008  0.0072 0.0011 0.0019 
 (0.0062) (0.0018) (0.0056)  (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0024) Travel time to nearest market 0.000 0.0003 0.000  4.711 0.000 0.0003 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002)  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Pupils provide their own books 0.1295 -0.004 0.045  0.0638 0.051 0.045   (0.1174) (0.1140) (0.0449)   (0.1126) (0.1179) (0.0449) 
N 165 158 188  157 165 188 Number of individuals with dep var = 1 27 15 5  19 22 5 Number of communities with dep var = 1 6 3 1  4 5 1 
 
Notes: OLS regressions of binary treatment non-compliance on individual-level characteristics. Each cell is a 
separate regression. The sample in columns 1-3 are all sessions assigned to AL, RL and NL, respectively. The 
sample in columns 4-6 are all sessions that received AL, RL and NL, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 are 





Table A.3: Treatment balance among study participants 
 
NL mean (sd) RL - NL AL - NL AL - RL 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) 
Individual received information 0.527 0.001 0.007 0.007 
 
[0.501] (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Female 0.330 0.004 -0.120*** -0.124*** 
 
[0.471] (0.038) (0.043) (0.036) 
Years of education 4.500 0.241 0.453 0.212 
 
[3.352] (0.429) (0.399) (0.351) 
Household assets 1.676 0.359* 0.523** 0.164 
 
[1.302] (0.183) (0.198) (0.212) 
Number of children attending local school 0.601 0.086 0.027 -0.058 
 
[1.027] (0.116) (0.083) (0.107) 
Evaluated the teacher as good or excellent 0.548 0.104 0.070 -0.034 
 
[0.499] (0.070) (0.070) (0.065) 
Caring for environment is top value 0.415 -0.052 -0.007 0.045 
 
[0.494] (0.059) (0.053) (0.053) 
Participated in all OTB meetings this year 0.351 0.027 0.015 -0.012 
 
[0.479] (0.061) (0.069) (0.056) 
Participates in OTB projects 0.691 -0.080 -0.016 0.063 
 
[0.463] (0.054) (0.049) (0.041) 
Always agrees with community decisions 0.676 -0.029 0.021 0.050 
 
[0.469] (0.052) (0.050) (0.047) 
Always trusts NGOs 0.410 0.008 -0.017 -0.025 
 
[0.493] (0.057) (0.053) (0.051) 
Held past leadership position in community 0.096 0.009 0.014 0.005 
 
[0.295] (0.037) (0.032) (0.031) 
Experimenter indicator 0.505 -0.013 -0.008 0.005 
 
[0.501] (0.148) (0.150) (0.150) 
Session size 5.585 0.042 0.075 0.033 
 
[0.536] (0.119) (0.097) (0.106) 
Community size 23.931 4.457* 4.064 -0.393 
 
[9.908] (2.227) (2.539) (1.750) 
Travel time to nearest market 171.755 -5.760 7.669 13.429 
 
[138.141] (24.430) (20.011) (23.331) 
Pupils provide their own books 0.590 0.101 0.022 -0.079 
 
[0.493] (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) 
 
Notes: N = 580. Column 1 shows means with standard deviations in brackets. Columns 2 to 4 
show coefficients from linear regressions of each covariate on a binary treatment variable 
with standard errors clustered at the OTB level in parentheses. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 
***p<0.001. 
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Table A.4: Participant characteristics by leadership role 
Non-leaders RL - Non-leaders AL - Non-leaders AL - RL 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) 
Female 0.298 0.0264 -0.060*** -0.408*** 
 
[0.458] (0.0243) (0.0154) (0.1239) 
Years of education 4.547 0.0035 0.0122*** 0.0253* 
 
[3.339] (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0139) 
Household assets 1.896 0.0036 0.0284*** 0.0752*** 
 
[1.490] (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0270) 
Number of children attending local school 0.639 -0.006 0.0061 0.0591 
 
[1.084] (0.0069) (0.0099) (0.0444) 
Evaluated the teacher as good or excellent 0.598 0.0248 0.0119 -0.053 
 
[0.491] (0.0193) (0.0208) (0.1267) 
Caring for environment is top value 0.382 0.0161 0.0361 0.0849 
 
[0.486] (0.0219) (0.0231) (0.1281) 
Participated in all OTB meetings this year 0.351 0.0176 0.0452** 0.113 
 
[0.478] (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.1036) 
Participates in OTB projects 0.661 -0.0430* 0.0352* 0.3200*** 
 
[0.474] (0.0227) (0.0194) (0.1118) 
Always agrees with community decisions 0.676 -0.0630** 0.0481*** 0.4444*** 
 
[0.468] (0.0244) (0.0177) (0.1025) 
Always trusts NGOs 0.396 0.0052 0.0395* 0.1421 
 
[0.490] (0.0215) (0.0206) (0.1155) 
Held past leadership position in community 0.108 -0.034 -0.012 0.123 
 
[0.310] (0.0283) (0.0326) (0.1817) 
N 510 546 544 70 
Notes: Column 1 shows means with standard deviations in brackets for all subjects in NL and followers in RL 
and AL. Columns 2 to 4 show coefficients from univariate regressions of binary leadership role on each 
explanatory variable (each cell is a separate regression) with standard errors clustered at the OTB level shown 
in parentheses. *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. 
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Table A.5: Robustness checks – Total contributions 
Total Individual 
Continuous Continuous Ordered Logit ≥ 10 Bs. 
IV Limited Sample IV Limited Sample Limited Sample IV Limited Sample 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) 
RL 2.476 -4.231 0.085 -0.850 -0.134 0.126** 0.066 
 
(4.424) (5.503) (0.724) (0.816) (0.308) (0.054) (0.067) 
AL 17.663*** 10.470* 1.797** 0.949 0.426 0.219*** 0.167** 
(5.720) (5.265) (0.864) (0.841) (0.318) (0.073) (0.074) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 104 84 580 469 469 580 469 
Test: RL=AL (p-value) 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.139 0.119 
Dep. Variable mean, 
excluded category 42.947 43.968 7.767 7.965 7.784 0.378 0.377 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show OLS estimates of treatment effects on total session contributions. Columns 3-4 and 6-7 show OLS estimate of 
treatment effects on individual contributions. Column 5 shows log odds rations from an ordered logit regression (see text for details). IV 
indicates that 2SLS instrumental variable analysis was used. Limited sample indicates that the sample of observations is restricted to 
communities that complied with treatment assignment. All specifications include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at 




Table A.6: Robustness checks – Leader contributions 
  Continuous   Ordered Logit   ≥ 10 Bs. 
 IV Limited Sample  Limited Sample  IV Limited Sample   ( 1 ) ( 2 )   ( 3 )   ( 4 ) ( 5 ) 

































Controls Yes Yes   Yes   Yes Yes 
Dep. Variable Mean, No Leader treatment 7.751 7.955  7.855  0.372 0.369 
 
Tests (p-values) 





Authority private = public 0.070 0.113   0.343   0.144 0.221 
 
Note: The sample consists of individuals who led by example in RL and AL treatments and all subjects in the NL treatment. 
Authority refers OTB presidents in NL. Columns 1-2 and 4-5 present OLS estimates. Column 3 shows log odds ratios from 
an ordered logit regression (see text for details). IV indicates that 2SLS instrumental variable analysis was used. Limited 
sample indicates that the sample of observations is restricted to communities that complied with treatment assignment. All 
regressions include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set of 
individual- and session-level controls shown in the balance table. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Table A.7: Robustness checks – Follower contributions 
Continuous Ordered Logit ≥ 10 Bs. 
IV Limited Sample IV Limited Sample Limited Sample IV Limited Sample 
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) 
Random leader (RL) -0.364 -0.026 -1.209 -1.200 -0.601 -0.144 -0.089 
 
(2.357) (3.056) (1.248) (1.109) (0.585) (0.152) (0.135) 
Authority leader (AL) 0.352 0.082 0.666 -1.203 -1.064** 0.009 -0.162* 
 
(1.134) (1.456) (2.325) (1.161) (0.486) (0.211) (0.082) 
RL x leader contribution -0.034 -0.120 
 
(0.229) (0.310) 
AL x leader contribution -0.022 -0.006 
 
(0.082) (0.090) 
     RL x leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 0.695 0.053 0.423 0.259* 0.184 
 
(1.446) (1.197) (0.582) (0.152) (0.134) 
AL x leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. -0.110 1.323 1.285** 0.161 0.332*** 
(2.710) (1.613) (0.631) (0.241) (0.121) 
RL total effect: Leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. -0.515 -1.148 -0.179 0.115* 0.095 
 
(0.823) (0.952) (0.330) (0.064) (0.075) 
AL total effect: Leader contribution ≥ 10 Bs. 0.555 0.120 0.220 0.170** 0.170** 
(0.982) (1.047) (0.377) (0.077) (0.082) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 510 410 510 410 410 510 410 
Dep. Variable mean, NL treatment 7.767 7.965 7.767 7.965 
 
7.887 0.378 0.377 
 
Tests (p-values) 
RL=AL 0.791 0.975 0.553 0.999 0.557 0.632 0.669 
RL x leader contrib. = AL x leader contrib.  0.965 0.753 0.830 0.580 0.358 0.778 0.462 
RL total effect = AL total effect  0.357 0.225 0.213 0.516 0.308 
Notes: The sample consists of followers in the RL and AL treatments and all contributors in the NL treatment. Columns 1-4 and 6-7 show OLS 
estimates. Column 5 shows log odds ratios from an ordered logit regression with fixed effects (see text for details). IV indicates that 2SLS 
instrumental variable analysis was used. Limited sample indicates that the sample of observations is restricted to communities that complied with 
treatment assignment. All specifications include community fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the OTB level. Controls refer to the full set 
of individual- and session-level controls shown in the balance table. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 3 
Instructions [ Piece-wise linear VCM ] 
This is an experiment on decision making. The earnings you receive today will depend on the decisions 
made by you and by other participants in this room. Please do not talk or communicate with others in any 
way. If you have a question please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to where you are sitting 
to answer you in private.   
Earnings 
There will be two parts of the experiment. Only one of the two parts will count for payment. Once part 1 
and 2 are completed we will flip a coin to determine which part counts for payment. Your earnings in the 
experiment will be the sum of a $6 payment for showing up on time and your earnings from either part 1 
or part 2. We will first explain how earnings are determined in part 1. Once part 1 is completed we will 
explain how earnings in part 2 are determined. Decisions in part 1 only affect possible earnings in part 1, 
and decisions in part 2 only affect possible earnings in part 2. Your total earnings will be paid to you in 
cash and in private at the end of the experiment. 
Part 1 
In part 1 you will be matched in groups of four. That is the computer will randomly match you with three 
other participants. 
You will each have to make one decision, and earnings will depend on the decision made by you and the 
decisions made by other members of your group. Neither during nor after the experiment will you get to 
know who the other members of your group are or what decisions they make. Likewise, no one in your 
group will know who you are and what decision you make. 
You and each of the other group members will be given $10 and asked to make an investment decision. 
You may select to invest any dollar amount between $0 and $10 in a group account. Investments in the 
group account affect both your earnings and those of the other members of the group. That is, individual 
earnings depend on the individual investment in the group account and the investment by the other group 
members. 
Decision Screen 
Your investment decision will be made using a decision screen. You make a decision by entering the 
number of dollars you wish to invest in the group account in the area labeled: Dollars to invest in group 
account. Once you have made your investment decision, please click the red Finalize Decision button. 
You will not be able to modify your decision once your choice is finalized.  
A decision screen is shown below. The actual decision screen will include a payoff table with the earnings 
that result from the investments made by you and the three other group members. We will use the 
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screenshot below to demonstrate how to read the table. The first column shows all possible investments 
by you. The first row shows all possible average investments by the other group members. If the average 
investment by the other group members is say $2, then it may result from each investing $2, or from one 
member investing $0, another investing $2, and a third investing $4.  
Each cell reports the payoff you and the other group members receive given your investment and the 
average investment by the other group members. Your payoff will be depicted in blue and located in the 
upper left corner of each cell. The average payoff of the other group members will be depicted in black 
and located in the bottom right corner of each cell. To determine the payoffs from a specific combination 
of investments you look at the cell where the row of your investment crosses the column of the average 
investment by the other group members. In this cell you will see your payoff on the left (in blue) and the 
average payoff of the other group members on the right (in black). The average payoff for the other group 
members refers to the payoff they each get when they invest the same amount in the group account. 
Consider an example where you invest $1 and the average investment by the other group members is $4. 
Your earnings from this investment decision will be $A14, where the first number refers to your $1 
investment and the second to the $4 average investment by the other group members. Similarly the 
earnings of each of the three other group members will be $B14. If you were to increase your investment 
to $2 you move down one row to see that your earnings would become $A24 and the average earnings of 
the other group members would become $B24. Likewise if the average investment of the other group 
members increased by $1, such that you invest $2 and the other group members on average invest $5, you 
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move over one column to see that your earnings would become $A25 and the average payoff to the other 
group members would be $B25. Before we begin we will give you a tutorial on how to read the payoff 
table. 
Results Screen 
After everyone has made an investment decision you will see a results screen. The results screen will 
indicate the investments made by you and the other group members and will summarize the earnings you 
and the other group members receive if part 1 counts for payment. The average earnings for the other 
group members reported in the payoff table refer to the earnings that result when the three other group 
members make the same investment decision. In the event that they do not invest the same amount their 
actual average earnings may differ slightly from that reported in the table. Your own payoff from the 
listed investment combination will be precisely that listed in the payoff table.  
Instructions Part 2 
Part 2 is very similar to part 1. The only difference is that you now must make investment decisions over 
a sequence of ten rounds. At the beginning of each round you will be randomly matched with three other 
people to form a new group of four. You will never be matched with the same three people twice in a 
row. It is also unlikely that you will meet the same set of three other group members twice. You will not 
get to know who the other members of your group are nor will you be informed of their past investment. 
Likewise, no one will know who you are and what investments you made in the past.  
Just as for part 1 you will be presented with a decision screen which reports the earnings that you and the 
other group members get from the different investments. The decision screen will be the same in each 
round. That is, the earnings are the same for each of the ten rounds and are identical to those seen in part 
1. 
After each round is complete you will be shown a result screen which reports the investments made by 
you and the other group members in that round, as well as the earnings you and the other group members 
made in that round. 
If part 2 is selected for payment we will randomly select a number between one and ten. The earnings for 
the corresponding round will be paid to the participants along with the $6 show up fee. The part that 
counts for payment will be determined by the flip of a coin. The round that counts in part 2 will be 
determined by having a participant draw a number between 1 and 10. 
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Table B.1: Payoff table Low treatment 
Average investment made by the other group members 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 
10.00  10.75  11.50  12.25  13.00  13.75  14.50  15.25  16.00  16.75  17.50  
10.00  11.95 13.90  15.85  16.10 16.35  16.60  16.85  16.85  16.85  14.10 
1 















10.25  12.20 14.15  16.10  16.35 16.60  16.85  17.10 17.10  17.10 14.35 
2 
12.90  13.65  14.40  15.15  15.90  16.65  17.40  18.15  18.90  19.65  20.40  
10.50  12.45 14.40  16.35  16.60 16.85  17.10  17.35 17.35  17.35  14.60 
3 
14.35  15.10  15.85  16.60  17.35  18.10  18.85  19.60  20.35  21.10  21.85  
10.75  12.70 14.65  16.60  16.85 17.10  17.35  17.60  17.60  17.60  14.85 
4 
14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.85 18.60 19.35  20.10 20.85  21.60  
11.00  12.95 14.90  16.85  17.10 17.35  17.60  17.85 17.85  17.85 15.10 
5 
13.85  14.60  15.35  16.10  16.85  17.60  18.35  19.10  19.85  20.60  21.35  
11.25  13.20 15.15  17.10  17.35 17.60  17.85  18.10 18.10  18.10 15.35 
6 
13.60  14.35  15.10  15.85  16.60  17.35  18.10  18.85  19.60  20.35  21.10  
11.50  13.45 15.40  17.35  17.60 17.85  18.10  18.35  18.35  18.35  15.60 
7 
13.35 14.10 14.85 15.60 16.35 17.10 17.85 18.60  19.35 20.10  20.85  
11.75  13.70 15.65  17.60  17.85 18.10  18.35  18.60 18.60  18.60 15.85 
8 
12.85  13.60  14.35  15.10  15.85  16.60  17.35  18.10  18.85  19.60  20.35  
12.00  13.95 15.90  17.85  18.10 18.35  18.60  18.85 18.85  18.85 16.10 
9 
12.35  13.10  13.85  14.60  15.35  16.10  16.85  17.60  18.35  19.10  19.85  
12.25  14.20 16.15  18.10  18.35 18.60  18.85  19.10  19.10  19.10  16.35 
10 
9.10 9.85 10.60 11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35  15.10 15.85  16.60  
12.50  14.45 16.40  18.35  18.60 18.85  19.10  19.35  19.35  19.35  16.60 
              The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number of the right is 
the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed. 
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Table B.2: Payoff table High treatment 
Average investment made by the other group members 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
0 
10.00  10.75  11.50  12.25  13.00  13.75  14.50  15.25  16.00  16.75  17.50  
10.00 10.62  11.23  11.85 12.60  13.35  14.10 14.85  14.85  14.85  14.10 
1 















10.25 10.87  11.48  12.10 12.85  13.60  14.35 15.10 15.10  15.10 14.35 
2 
10.23  10.98  11.73  12.48  13.23  13.98  14.73  15.48  16.23  16.98  17.73  
10.50 11.12  11.73  12.35 13.10  13.85  14.60 15.35 15.35  15.35  14.60 
3 
10.35  11.10  11.85  12.60  13.35  14.10  14.85  15.60  16.35  17.10  17.85  
10.75 11.37  11.98  12.60 13.35  14.10  14.85 15.60  15.60  15.60  14.85 
4 
10.60 11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85  16.60 17.35  18.10  
11.00 11.62  12.23  12.85 13.60  14.35  15.10 15.85 15.85  15.85 15.10 
5 
10.85  11.60  12.35  13.10  13.85  14.60  15.35  16.10  16.85  17.60  18.35  
11.25 11.87  12.48  13.10 13.85  14.60  15.35 16.10 16.10  16.10 15.35 
6 
11.10  11.85  12.60  13.35  14.10  14.85  15.60  16.35  17.10  17.85  18.60  
11.50 12.12  12.73  13.35 14.10  14.85  15.60 16.35  16.35  16.35  15.60 
7 
11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35 15.10 15.85 16.60  17.35 18.10  18.85  
11.75 12.37  12.98  13.60 14.35  15.10  15.85 16.60 16.60  16.60 15.85 
8 
10.85  11.60  12.35  13.10  13.85  14.60  15.35  16.10  16.85  17.60  18.35  
12.00 12.62  13.23  13.85 14.60  15.35  16.10 16.85 16.85  16.85 16.10 
9 
10.35  11.10  11.85  12.60  13.35  14.10  14.85  15.60  16.35  17.10  17.85  
12.25 12.87  13.48  14.10 14.85  15.60  16.35 17.10  17.10  17.10  16.35 
10 
9.10 9.85 10.60 11.35 12.10 12.85 13.60 14.35  15.10 15.85  16.60  
12.50 13.12  13.73  14.35 15.10  15.85  16.60 17.35  17.35  17.35  16.60 
              The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number of the right is 
the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed. 
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Table B.3: Tobit regression of contribution, Part 1 
Dep. Var.: Contribution to group account 
Treatments 
Low  High  All 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
Response time -0.021** 0.015** -0.021*** 
 




   
(0.759) 
High x response time 
  
0.035*** 
   
(0.001) 
Constant 6.190*** 5.970*** 6.180*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total effect response time: High     0.015** 
   
(0.046) 
N 80 80 160 
 




Table B.4: OLS regression of response time and contribution, Part 1 
OLS, Dependent Variable: 
response time (seconds) 
 
contribution to group account 
Low  High All 
 
Low High All 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) 
response time 
    
-0.018** 0.011* -0.018** 
     
(0.031) (0.098) (0.018) 
% tutorial correct 22.121 30.526 22.121 
 
-0.756 3.504*** -0.756 
 
(0.328) (0.165) (0.331) 
 
(0.639) (0.008) (0.610) 
experiments -0.824 -0.948 -0.824 
 
-0.021 0.003 -0.021 
 
(0.125) (0.148) (0.126) 
 
(0.587) (0.935) (0.554) 
econ courses 1.175 5.763*** 1.175 
 
-0.105 0.038 -0.105 
 
(0.396) (0.004) (0.398) 
 
(0.288) (0.750) (0.247) 
age 2.353 2.094 2.353 
 
0.091 0.256 0.091 
 
(0.448) (0.524) (0.451) 
 
(0.682) (0.185) (0.655) 
female -13.854* 5.358 -13.854* 
 
0.034 0.423 0.034 
 
(0.075) (0.501) (0.075) 
 




   
-7.571 
   
(0.779) 
   
(0.193) 
High x response time 
      
0.029*** 
       
(0.006) 
High x % tutorial correct 
  
8.404 
   
4.260** 
   
(0.789) 
   
(0.039) 
High x experiments 
  
-0.123 
   
0.024 
   
(0.883) 
   
(0.663) 
High x econ courses 
  
4.588* 
   
0.143 
   
(0.055) 
   
(0.372) 
High x age 
  
-0.259 
   
0.165 
   
(0.954) 
   
(0.574) 
High x female 
  
19.212* 
   
0.389 
   
(0.083) 
   
(0.591) 
Constant -2.218 -27.280 -2.218 
 
5.234 -2.337 5.234 
  (0.972) (0.667) (0.972) 
 
(0.248) (0.527) (0.207) 
Total effect response time: High 
      
0.011 
       
(0.131) 
Total effect % tutorial correct: High 
  
30.526 
   
3.504** 
   
(0.159) 
   
(0.015) 
Total effect experiments: High 
  
-0.948 
   
0.003 
   
(0.142) 
   
(0.941) 
Total effect econ courses: High 
  
5.763*** 
   
0.038 
   
(0.003) 
   
(0.772) 
Total effect age: High 
  
2.094 
   
0.256 
   
(0.520) 
   
(0.228) 
Total effect female: High 
  
5.358 
   
0.423 
   
(0.496) 
   
(0.408) 
N 80 80 160 
 
80 80 160 
 
Note: P-values reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
 99 
Table B.5: OLS regression of response time and contribution, Part 2 
Dependent Variable: response time (seconds)  
contribution to group account 
Low High All 
 
Low High All 
response time 
    
0.013 0.016 0.011 
     
(0.145) (0.242) (0.141) 
period -1.564*** -1.249** -1.573*** 
 
-0.037 0.016 -0.052** 
 
(0.004) (0.021) (0.000) 
 
(0.112) (0.261) (0.017) 
% past equilibrium play 1.422 3.377* 1.835** 
 
-1.494*** 0.873 -0.889* 
 
(0.213) (0.075) (0.020) 
 
(0.004) (0.127) (0.055) 
mean contribution others -0.130 0.353 -0.135 
 
0.019 0.240*** 0.012 
 
(0.843) (0.215) (0.816) 
 
(0.810) (0.004) (0.864) 
% tutorial correct -1.546 1.838 -1.547 
 
-0.586* 0.283 -0.590*** 
 
(0.703) (0.511) (0.661) 
 
(0.055) (0.534) (0.005) 
experiments -0.268** -0.136** -0.274*** 
 
-0.008* 0.000 -0.017** 
 
(0.031) (0.045) (0.005) 
 
(0.068) (0.986) (0.035) 
econ courses 0.087 0.542 0.072 
 
-0.009 -0.063 -0.031 
 
(0.641) (0.367) (0.668) 
 
(0.690) (0.352) (0.235) 
age 0.419 0.065 0.423 
 
-0.004 0.158 0.003 
 
(0.244) (0.824) (0.157) 
 
(0.935) (0.495) (0.952) 
female -1.901 0.752 -1.865 
 
-0.225 -0.202 -0.176 
 
(0.278) (0.629) (0.207) 
 




   
-4.489 
   
(0.599) 
   
(0.285) 
High x response time 
      
0.007 
       
(0.624) 
High x period 
  
0.322 
   
0.072*** 
   
(0.338) 
   
(0.008) 
High x % past equilibrium play 
  
1.142 
   
1.165** 
   
(0.330) 
   
(0.014) 
High x mean contribution others 
  
0.484 
   
0.231** 
   
(0.439) 
   
(0.011) 
High x % tutorial correct 
  
3.515 
   
1.035** 
   
(0.414) 
   
(0.034) 
High x experiments 
  
0.142 
   
0.023 
   
(0.114) 
   
(0.202) 
High x econ courses 
  
0.502 
   
0.010 
   
(0.332) 
   
(0.853) 
High x age 
  
-0.342 
   
0.179 
   
(0.370) 
   
(0.384) 
High x female 
  
2.630 
   
-0.015 
   
(0.203) 
   
(0.949) 
Constant 15.762 9.532 15.639 
 
5.277*** 1.247 5.119*** 
  (0.178) (0.394) (0.100) 
 
(0.008) (0.792) (0.000) 
Total effect response time: High 
      
0.018 
       
(0.134) 
Total effect period: High 
  
-1.251*** 
   
0.020 
   
(0.002) 
   
(0.131) 
Total effect % past equil. play: High 
  
2.284 
   
2.330** 
   
(0.330) 
   
(0.014) 
Total effect mean contrib. others: High 
  
0.349 
   
0.243*** 
   
(0.115) 
   
(0.000) 
Total effect % tutorial correct: High 
  
1.969 
   
0.445 
   
(0.410) 
   
(0.259) 
Total effect experiments: High 
  
-0.132** 
   
0.006 
   
(0.011) 
   
(0.682) 
Total effect econ courses: High 
  
0.574 
   
-0.021 
   
(0.247) 
   
(0.701) 
Total effect age: High 
  
0.082 
   
0.182 
   
(0.744) 
   
(0.366) 
Total effect female: High 
  
0.765 





   
(0.248) 
N 800 800 1600 
 
800 800 1600 
Note: P-values reported in parentheses. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Instructions [ Linear VCM ] 
 
This is an experiment on decision making. The earnings you receive today will depend on the decisions 
made by you and by other participants in this room. Please do not talk or communicate with others in any 
way. If you have a question please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to where you are sitting 




There will be two parts of the experiment. Only one of the two parts will count for payment. Once part 1 
and 2 are completed we will flip a coin to determine which part counts for payment. Your earnings in the 
experiment will be the sum of a $6 payment for showing up on time and your earnings from either part 1 
or part 2. We will first explain how earnings are determined in part 1. Once part 1 is completed we will 
explain how earnings in part 2 are determined. Decisions in part 1 only affect possible earnings in part 1, 
and decisions in part 2 only affect possible earnings in part 2. Your total earnings will be paid to you in 




In part 1 you will be matched in groups of four. That is, the computer will randomly match you with three 
other participants. 
 
You will each have to make one decision, and earnings will depend on the decision made by you and the 
decisions made by other members of your group. Neither during nor after the experiment will you get to 
know who the other members of your group are or what decisions they make. Likewise, no one in your 
group will know who you are and what decision you make. 
 
You and each of the other group members will be given $8 and asked to make an investment decision. 
You may select to invest any dollar amount between $0 and $8 in a group account. Investments in the 
group account affect both your earnings and those of the other members of the group. That is, individual 





Your investment decision will be made using a decision screen. You make a decision by entering the 
number of dollars you wish to invest in the group account in the area labeled: Dollars to invest in group 
account. Once you have made your investment decision, please click the red Finalize Decision button. 
You will not be able to modify your decision once your choice is finalized.  
 
A decision screen is shown below. The actual decision screen will include a description of the 
earnings you and the other group members receive from investing in the group account. Your total 
earnings will equal the number of dollars you do not invest in the group account ($8 – your investment) 
plus your earnings from investments in the group account. Earnings from the group account depend on 







After everyone has made an investment decision you will see a results screen. The results screen will 
indicate the investments made by you and the other group members and will summarize the earnings you 
and the other group members receive if part 1 counts for payment.  
 
 
Instructions Part 2 
 
 
Part 2 is very similar to part 1. The only difference is that you now must make investment decisions over 
a sequence of ten rounds. At the beginning of each round you will be randomly matched with three other 
people to form a new group of four. You will never be matched with the same three people twice in a 
row. It is also unlikely that you will meet the same set of three other group members twice. You will not 
get to know who the other members of your group are nor will you be informed of their past investment. 
Likewise, no one will know who you are and what investments you made in the past.  
 
Just as for part 1 you will be presented with a decision screen, which reports the earnings that you and the 
other group members get from investing in the group account. The decision screen will be the same in 
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each round. That is, the earnings are the same for each of the ten rounds and are identical to those seen in 
part 1. 
 
After each round is complete you will be shown a result screen which reports the investments made by 
you and the other group members in that round, as well as the earnings you and the other group members 
made in that round. 
 
If part 2 is selected for payment we will randomly select a number between one and ten. The earnings for 
the corresponding round will be paid to the participants along with the $6 show up fee. The part that 
counts for payment will be determined by the flip of a coin. The round that counts in part 2 will be 
determined by having a participant draw a number between 1 and 10. 
 
 





“Every dollar invested in the group account by you or any other member of your group will secure the 
group a payoff of $2 which is divided equally between you and the three other group members. Thus, for 
every dollar any group member invests in the group account you and each of the other group members 
will receive 50 cents.” 
 
High-VCM 1 treatment: 
 
Same as Low-VCM + “In addition, you will get a bonus of 60 cents for every dollar you personally invest 
in the group account.” 
 
High-VCM 2 treatment: 
 





Table B.6: Payoff table New-Low treatment 
  
 
Average investment made by the other group members 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
0 
10.00  10.75  11.50  12.25  13.00  13.75  14.50  15.25  16.00  16.75  16.30  



























16.70  17.45 
 
18.20  17.75  
   10.25   12.20   14.15   16.10   16.35   16.60   16.85   17.10 
 





12.90  13.65  14.40  15.15  15.90  16.65  17.40  18.15  18.90  19.65  19.20  
   10.50   12.45   14.40   16.35   16.60   16.85   17.10   17.35 
 
17.35   17.35  14.80 
 
3 
14.35  15.10  15.85  16.60  17.35  18.10  18.85  19.60  20.35  21.10  20.65  













19.35  20.10 
 
20.85  20.40  
   11.00   12.95   14.90  16.85   17.10   17.35   17.60   17.85 
 
17.85   17.85 
 
15.30 
 5 13.85  14.60  15.35  
16.10  16.85  17.60  18.35  19.10  19.85  20.60  20.15  
   11.25   13.20   15.15   17.10   17.35   17.60   17.85   18.10 
 





13.60  14.35  15.10  15.85  16.60  17.35  18.10  18.85  19.60  20.35  19.90  













18.60  19.35 
 
20.10  19.65  
   11.75   13.70   15.65   17.60   17.85   18.10   18.35   18.60 
 
18.60   18.60 
 
16.05 
 8 12.85  13.60  14.35  
15.10  15.85  16.60  17.35  18.10  18.85  19.60  19.15  
   12.00   13.95   15.90   17.85   18.10   18.35   18.60   18.85 
 





12.35  13.10  13.85  14.60  15.35  16.10  16.85  17.60  18.35  19.10  18.65  













15.35  16.10 
 
16.85  16.40  
    12.10   14.05   16.00   17.95   18.20   18.45   18.70   18.95  18.95   18.95  16.40 
  
                         The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number of the right is 




Table B.7: Payoff table New-High treatment 
  
 
Average investment made by the other group members 
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
0 
10.00  10.75  11.50  12.25  13.00  13.75  14.50  15.25  16.00  16.75  16.30  
































15.37  16.12 
 
16.87  16.42  
   10.25   10.87   11.48   12.10   12.85   13.60   14.35   15.10 
 





10.23  10.98  11.73  12.48  13.23  13.98  14.73  15.48  16.23  16.98  16.53  
   10.50   11.12   11.73   12.35   13.10   13.85   14.60   15.35 
 
15.35   15.35   14.80 
 
3 
10.35  11.10  11.85  12.60  13.35  14.10  14.85  15.60  16.35  17.10  16.65  

















15.85  16.60 
 
17.35  16.90  
   11.00   11.62   12.23   12.85   13.60   14.35   15.10   15.85 
 





10.85  11.60  12.35  13.10  13.85  14.60  15.35  16.10  16.85  17.60  17.15  
   11.25   11.87   12.48   13.10   13.85   14.60   15.35   16.10 
 





11.10  11.85  12.60  13.35  14.10  14.85  15.60  16.35  17.10  17.85  17.40  
   11.50   12.12   12.73   13.35   14.10   14.85   15.60   16.35   16.35   16.35   15.80 
 
7 
11.35  12.10  12.85  13.60  14.35  15.10  15.85  16.60  17.35  18.10  17.65  
   11.75   12.37   12.98   13.60   14.35   15.10   15.85   16.60   16.60   16.60   16.05 
 8 10.85  11.60  12.35  13.10  13.85  14.60  15.35  16.10  16.85  17.60  17.15     12.00   12.62   13.23   13.85   14.60   15.35   16.10   16.85 
 





10.35  11.10  11.85  12.60  13.35  14.10  14.85  15.60  16.35  17.10  16.65  

















15.35  16.10 
 
16.85  16.40  
    12.10   12.72   13.33   13.95   14.70   15.45   16.20   16.95   16.95   16.95   16.40 
  
                         The BLUE number on the left is your payoff. The BLACK number of the right is 
  the payoff of each of the other group members when they each invest the amount listed. 
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 4 




This is an experiment about decision making and economic interaction. The experiment will consist of 
three phases. In phase 1 you will perform individually to secure earnings for later phases. In phases 2 and 
3 you will be paired in groups of two people and will have to make decisions using the earnings you 
secured in phase 1. 
 
The money you make in today’s experiment will depend on your performance in phase 1 and on one of 
the decisions you [ INFORMATION TREATMENTS - and the person you are matched ] with make 
during the two subsequent phases. In addition you will receive $5.00 for showing up to the experiment. 
Your earnings in today’s experiment will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session.  
 
The instructions for phase 1 are listed below. The instructions for phases 2 and 3 will be distributed once 
we have completed phase 1. 
 
No talking is allowed in today’s experiment. If you have a question, please raise your hand and wait for 




In phase 1 of today’s session you will be asked to perform a task. The task is to add as many sets of five 
two-digit numbers as you can in five minutes. Your performance on this task will determine your 
endowment in phases 2 and 3 [ EXPERIMENT 1 - and will affect the money you can make in the 
experiment ]. Your endowment in phases 2 and 3 will equal $2.00 plus $0.50 times your performance in 
phase 1. For example, if you solve 10 problems correctly your endowment will equal $2.00 + $0.50 × 10 
= $7.00. If you solve 20 problems correctly your endowment will equal $2.00 + $0.50 × 20 = $12.00. 
 
Each problem presented to you will appear as follows: 
 
23 14 57 78 90 
 
The five two-digit numbers displayed will be selected at random. For each new problem you have to 
provide an answer in the blank cell on the right. You may use paper and pencil to solve the problems, but 
the answer must be recorded in the blank cell. You must click the “OK” button to submit your answer and 
proceed to the next problem. Every time a new problem is presented, you will receive feedback on your 
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performance. You will find out if the last answer you submitted was correct and will be notified of the 
number of problems you have solved correctly and incorrectly up until that point. 
 
You will not be able to skip a problem and come back to it later. If you skip a problem by clicking “OK” 
when the right cell is left blank you will have spent time providing an incorrect answer. Once the five 
minutes are over no additional problems will be presented to you. A screen will indicate the number of 
problems you solved correctly in phase 1. 
 
We are now ready to perform the task. Are there any questions before we begin? 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS [PHASES 2 AND 3 – EXPERIMENT 1] 
 
PHASES 2 & 3 
 
Phases 2 and 3 will each consist of 10 rounds. Your endowment in each round equals $2.00 plus $0.50 
times your performance in phase 1. For example, if you solved 16 problems correctly in phase 1 you 
will have a $2.00 + $0.50 × 16 = $10.00 endowment. 
 
At the beginning of phase 2 you will be randomly assigned the role of first mover or second mover. Your 
role will be the same in phases 2 and 3 of the experiment. Half of the people in this room will be assigned 
the role of first mover and half will be assigned the role of second mover. 
 
In both phases you will be randomly matched with a person of the opposite role. For the ten rounds of 
phase 2 you will be matched with one person and for the ten rounds of phase 3 you will be matched with 
another person. You will not know the identity of the person you are matched with and he or she will not 
know who you are. 
 
Phases 2 and 3 consist of a total of 20 rounds. At the end of the experiment we will have one participant 
randomly select one of the 20 rounds to count for payment. Your payment will equal your earnings from 




In every round you will be matched with a person and the two of you will participate in an investment 
decision. 
 
The round proceeds as follows. The first mover first decides whether or not to invest his or her 
endowment with the second mover. The second mover then learns the first mover’s investment decision, 
observes the return on the investment, and informs the first mover of his or her earnings.  
 
The return on the investment can be either HIGH or LOW. When the return is HIGH the return on the 
investment is 200%, when the return is LOW the return on the investment is 100%. For example, if a first 
mover with an endowment of $10.00 decides to invest and the return is HIGH, then the return on the 
investment is 200% × $10.00 = $20.00. If the return is LOW, then the return on the investment is 100% × 
$10.00 = $10.00. The chance that the return is HIGH is 3/4 and the chance that the return is low is 1/4. 
The computer will randomly determine whether the return is HIGH or LOW. We call the return selected 
by the computer the actual investment return. 
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The second mover learns whether the first mover invested and finds out whether the actual investment 
return is HIGH or LOW. The second mover then announces a HIGH or LOW return on the investment to 
the first mover. We call this the announced investment return. The first mover only learns the announced 
investment return.  
 
The total earnings the movers receive equals their initial endowment plus a share of the investment return. 
The first mover receives half of the investment return announced by the second mover. The second mover 
receives a share equal to the actual investment return that was not paid to the first mover. 
 
The first mover’s total earnings, when he or she invests, are thus equal to the invested endowment plus 
half of the announced investment return. For example, if the announced investment return is LOW, then 
the first mover’s total earnings are his or her invested endowment ($10.00) plus half of the announced 
investment return (50% × $10.00 = $5.00), which equals $15.00. When the first mover decides not to 
invest, his or her total earnings from the round are simply equal to the initial endowment. 
 
The second mover’s total earnings, when the first mover invests, are equal to the second mover’s initial 
endowment plus the actual investment return that was not paid to the first mover. For example, if the first 
mover’s invested endowment is $10.00, the second mover’s endowment is $9.00, and the actual and 
announced investment return is LOW, then the second mover’s total earnings are equal to his or her 
endowment ($9.00) plus the actual investment return that was not paid to the first mover ($10.00 − $5.00 
= $5.00), which equals $14.00. When the first mover does not invest, the second mover’s total earnings 
are equal to his or her initial endowment. 
 
When announcing the return on the investment the second mover knows the size of the investment and 
the share of the actual investment return that the first mover receives. For example, if the endowment 
invested by the first mover is $10.00 and the actual investment return is low, then the second mover sees 





[ INFORMATION TREATMENTS – 
 
At the beginning of phase 2 you will see the sequence of returns announced by four second movers in one 
phase of a previous session of the experiment. Announcements of high returns are denoted by H and 
announcements of low returns are denoted by L. ] 
 
Now I ask that you answer some questions to check your understanding. We will go over the correct 
responses before phase 2 begins. 
 
 
CHECKING YOUR UNDERSTANDING [ PHASES 2 AND 3 - EXPERIMENT 1] 
 




2. In any given round, what is your endowment if you solved 6 problems correctly in phase 1? 
 
$2.00 + $0.50 × 6 = $5.00 
 
3. Suppose you are the FIRST MOVER and your endowment equals $5.00. 
 




b. What are your total earnings if you invest and the return announced by the second mover is HIGH? 
 
2 × $5.00 = $10.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Announced investment return        200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
First mover’s share of the return         50% × $10.00 = $5.00 
(half of the announced investment return) 
First mover’s total earnings       $5.00 + $5.00 = $10.00 
 
c. What are your total earnings if you invest and the return announced by the second mover is LOW? 
 
1.5 × $5.00 = $7.50  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Announced investment return        100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
First mover’s share of the return          50% × $5.00 = $2.50 
(half of the announced investment return) 
First mover’s total earnings             $5.00 + $2.50 = $7.50 
 
4. Suppose you are the SECOND MOVER matched with the first mover described above. Your 
endowment equals $4.00. 
 





b. What are your total earnings if the return you observe and announce to the first mover is HIGH? 
 
$4.00 + $5.00 = $9.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Actual investment return      200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
Announced investment return     200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
Return paid to the first mover       50% × $10.00 = $5.00 
(half of the announced investment return) 
Remaining actual investment return    $10.00 − $5.00 = $5.00 
Second mover’s total earnings       $4.00 + $5.00 = $9.00 
 
c. What are your total earnings if the return you observe and announce to the first mover is LOW? 
 
$4.00 + $2.50 = $6.50  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Actual investment return        100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
Announced investment return       100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
Return paid to the first mover         50% × $5.00 = $2.50 
(half of the announced investment return) 
Remaining actual investment return       $5.00 − $2.50 = $2.50 




[PHASES 2 AND 3 – EXPERIMENT 2] 
 
PHASES 2 & 3 
 
Phases 2 and 3 will each consist of 10 rounds. Your endowment in each round equals $2.00 plus $0.50 
times your performance in phase 1. For example, if you solved 8 problems correctly in phase 1 you will 
have a $2.00 + $0.50 × 8 = $6.00 endowment. 
 
[ INFORMATION TREATMENTS – 
 
At the beginning of phase 2 you will be randomly assigned the role of first mover or second mover. Your 
role will be the same in phases 2 and 3 of the experiment. Half of the people in this room will be assigned 
the role of first mover and half will be assigned the role of second mover. 
 
In both phases you will be randomly matched with a person of the opposite role. For the ten rounds of 
phase 2 you will be matched with one person and for the ten rounds of phase 3 you will be matched with 
another person. You will not know the identity of the person you are matched with and he or she will not 
know who you are. At the beginning of phase 2 everyone in this room will be randomly assigned an 
identification number. The identification number of the person you are matched with will be displayed on 
your screen every round. ] 
 
[ COMPUTER TREATMENT – 
 
In every round you will have to make a decision. Your decision will determine the earnings that you 
secure for the round. ] 
 
Phases 2 and 3 consist of a total of 20 rounds. At the end of the experiment we will have one participant 
randomly select one of the 20 rounds to count for payment. Your payment will equal your earnings from 





[ INFORMATION TREATMENTS – 
 
In every round you will be matched with one person and the two of you will participate in an investment 
decision. ] 
 
[ COMPUTER TREATMENT – 
 
In every round a first and a second mover will participate in an investment decision. ] 
 
The round proceeds as follows. The first mover first decides whether to invest his or her endowment in 
Option A or B.  
 
Investment in Option A generates a 40% return. This return is kept entirely by the first mover. For 
example, if a first mover with a $6.00 endowment invests in Option A his or her earnings for the round 
equal $8.40; the invested endowment ($6.00) plus the entire investment return (40% × $6.00 = $2.40). 
The second mover gets nothing from the first mover’s investment in Option A. The second mover’s 
earnings for the round equal his or her initial endowment. 
 
Investment in Option B can generate either a LOW or a HIGH return. This return is shared between the 
first and second mover. When the first mover invests in Option B, the second mover observes the actual 
return on the investment and announces a return to the first mover. The first mover learns the investment 
return announced by the second mover, but does not observe the actual return on the investment. The first 
mover receives half of the investment return announced by the second mover. The second mover keeps 
the investment return that is not paid to the first mover. The total earnings that each mover receives equal 
their initial endowment plus a share of the investment return.  
 
The return from Option B, to be shared between the first and second mover, is 100% when the return is 
LOW and 200% when the return is HIGH. For example if a first mover with a $6.00 endowment invests 
in Option B, the total return on the investment is 100% × $6.00 = $6.00 when the return is LOW and 
200% × $6.00 = $12.00 when the return is HIGH. The chance that the return is LOW is 1/4 and the 
chance that the return is HIGH is 3/4. The computer randomly determines whether the return is LOW or 
HIGH. The return selected by the computer is what we refer to as the actual investment return. 
 




When the first mover invests in Option B, the second mover learns the actual return on the investment and 
announces a return to the first mover. Consider the example where a first mover invests a $6.00 
endowment in Option B and the actual investment return is LOW. In this case, the second mover sees the 





The announcement decision determines the share of the actual investment return (in this case $6.00) that 
each mover receives. If the second mover announces a LOW return, the first mover’s earnings for the 
round equal $9.00; the invested endowment ($6.00) plus half of the announced investment return (1/2 × 
$6.00 = $3.00). If the second mover announces a HIGH return, the first mover’s earnings for the round 
equal $12.00; the invested endowment ($6.00) plus half of the announced investment return (1/2 × $12.00 
= $6.00). 
 
The second mover keeps the investment return not paid to the first mover. In the above example if the 
second mover has a $5.00 endowment and he or she announces a LOW return, then the second mover’s 
earnings for the round equal $8.00; the initial endowment ($5.00) plus the actual investment return that 
was not paid to the first mover ($6.00 − 1/2 × $6.00 = $3.00). If instead the second mover announces a 
HIGH return, then his or her earnings for the round equal $5.00; the initial endowment ($5.00) plus the 
actual investment return that was not paid to the first mover ($6.00 − 1/2 × $12.00 = $0.00). 
 
[ INFORMATION TREATMENTS  – 
 
Although choices are effectively made in sequence, the second mover will be asked to decide which 
return to announce before knowing the first mover’s investment choice. The second mover’s 
announcement becomes relevant and is learned by the first mover only when the first mover invests in 
Option B. 
 
In each round the actual investment return is independently and randomly determined for each second 
mover. The actual investment returns observed by second movers therefore differ across participants and 
rounds. 
 
At the beginning of phase 2 you will see the sequence of investment returns announced by four second 
movers in one phase of a previous session of the experiment. Announcements of high returns will be 
denoted by H and announcements of low returns will be denoted by L. ] 
 
[ COMPUTER TREATMENT –  
 
IN TODAY’S EXPERIMENT EVERYONE IN THIS ROOM WILL BE ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF 
SECOND MOVER. THE COMPUTER WILL MAKE FIRST MOVER CHOICES IN EVERY ROUND. 
 
In every round of phases 2 and 3 the computer is programmed to have an $8.00 endowment and to invest 
in Option B. The decisions that you make as second mover will therefore have NO impact on the 
investment option selected by the computer. 
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The earnings secured by the computer will NOT be paid to a subject. Your decisions will only affect 
YOUR payoff. They will NOT affect the payment that any other participant receives today. ] 
 
Before proceeding I ask that you answer some questions to check your understanding. We will go over 
the correct responses before phase 2 begins. 
 
 
CHECKING YOUR UNDERSTANDING   
[INFORMATION TREATMENTS - EXPERMENT 2] 
 




2. Suppose you are the FIRST MOVER and your endowment equals $5.00. 
 
a. What are your total earnings if you invest in Option A? 
 
1.4 × $5.00 = $7.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Investment return           40% × $5.00 = $2.00 
First mover’s total earnings        $5.00 + $2.00 = $7.00 
 
b. What are your total earnings if you invest in Option B and the return announced by the second mover 
is LOW? 
 
1.5 × $5.00 = $7.50  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Announced investment return       100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
First mover’s share of the return           1/2 × $5.00 = $2.50 
First mover’s total earnings        $5.00 + $2.50 = $7.50 
 
c. What are your total earnings if you invest in Option B and the return announced by the second mover 
is HIGH? 
 
2 × $5.00 = $10.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Announced investment return     200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
First mover’s share of the return         1/2 × $10.00 = $5.00 
First	  mover’s	  total	  earnings	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  $5.00	  +	  $5.00	  =	  $10.00 
 
3. Suppose you are the SECOND MOVER matched with the first mover described above. Your 
endowment equals $4.00. 
 
a. What are your total earnings if the first mover invests in Option A?     $4.00 
 
b. What are your total earnings if the first mover invests in Option B, the return you observe is LOW, 
and you announce a LOW return to the first mover? 
 
$4.00 + $2.50 = $6.50  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Actual investment return       100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
Announced investment return       100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
Return paid to the first mover           1/2 × $5.00 = $2.50 
Remaining actual investment return      $5.00 − $2.50 = $2.50 
Second mover0s total earnings      $4.00 + $2.50 = $6.50 
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c. What are your total earnings if the first mover invests in Option B, the return you observe is LOW, 
and you announce a HIGH return to the first mover? 
 
$4.00 + $0.00 = $4.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Actual investment return        100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
Announced investment return     200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
Return paid to the first mover         1/2 × $10.00 = $5.00 
Remaining actual investment return       $5.00 − $5.00 = $0.00 
Second move’0s total earnings       $4.00 + $0.00 = $4.00 
 
d. What are your total earnings if the first mover invests in Option B, the return you observe is HIGH, 
and you announce a HIGH return to the first mover?  
 
$4.00 + $5.00 = $9.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Actual investment return      200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
Announced investment return     200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
Return paid to the first mover         1/2 × $10.00 = $5.00 
Remaining actual investment return     $10.00 − $5.00 = $5.00 
Second mover’s total earnings       $4.00 + $5.00 = $9.00 
 
e. What are your total earnings if the first mover invests in Option B, the return you observe is HIGH, 
and you announce a LOW return to the first mover? 
 
$4.00 + $7.50 = $11.50  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $5.00 
Actual investment return      200% × $5.00 = $10.00 
Announced investment return       100% × $5.00 = $5.00 
Return paid to the first mover           1/2 × $5.00 = $2.50 
Remaining actual investment return     $10.00 − $2.50 = $7.50 
Second mover’s total earnings    $4.00 + $7.50 = $11.50 
 
 
CHECKING YOUR UNDERSTANDING 
 [COMPUTER TREATMENT – EXPERIMENT 2] 
 
1. What role will you be assigned at the beginning of phase 2? 
 
Everyone in this room will be assigned the role of second mover. The computer will make first mover choices in every 
round. 
 
2. What is the endowment that the first mover will have in every round? 
 
The computer is programmed to have an endowment of $8.00 in every round. 
 
3. Will the decisions that you make affect the behavior of the mover you are matched with? 
 
NO, the computer is programmed to ALWAY S invest in Option B. 
 
4. Will the decisions that you make today affect the payoff of another participant? 
 
No, the payment secured by the computer will NOT be paid to another subject. Your decisions will only affect the payment 
that YOU receive today. 
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5. Suppose you are the SECOND MOVER, your endowment equals $4.00, and the first mover invests in 
Option B. 
 
a. What are your total earnings if the return you observe is LOW and you announce a LOW return to the 
first mover? 
 
$4.00 + $4.00 = $8.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $8.00 
Actual investment return        100% × $8.00 = $8.00 
Announced investment return       100% × $8.00 = $8.00 
Return paid to the first mover           1/2 × $8.00 = $4.00 
Remaining actual investment return       $8.00 − $4.00 = $4.00 
Second mover’s total earnings       $4.00 + $4.00 = $8.00 
 
b. What are your total earnings if the return you observe is LOW and you announce a HIGH return to 
the first mover? 
 
$4.00 + $0.00 = $4.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment    $8.00 
Actual investment return        100% × $8.00 = $8.00 
Announced investment return     200% × $8.00 = $16.00 
Return paid to the first mover         1/2 × $16.00 = $8.00 
Remaining actual investment return       $8.00 − $8.00 = $0.00 
Second mover’s total earnings       $5.00 + $0.00 = $5.00 
 
c. What are your total earnings if the return you observe is HIGH and you announce a HIGH return to 
the first mover? 
 
$4.00 + $8.00 = $12.00  because   First mover’s invested endowment     $8.00 
Actual investment return      200% × $8.00 = $16.00 
Announced investment return     200% × $8.00 = $16.00 
Return paid to the first mover         1/2 × $16.00 = $8.00 
Remaining actual investment return     $16.00 − $8.00 = $8.00 
Second mover’s total earnings     $4.00 + $8.00 = $12.00 
 
d. What are your total earnings if the return you observe is HIGH and you announce a LOW return to 
the first mover? 
 
$4.00 + $12.00 = $16.00  because  First mover’s invested endowment     $8.00 
Actual investment return      200% × $8.00 = $16.00 
Announced investment return       100% × $8.00 = $8.00 
Return paid to the first mover           1/2 × $8.00 = $4.00 
Remaining actual investment return   $16.00 − $4.00 = $12.00 
Second mover’s total earnings  $4.00 + $12.00 = $16.00 
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Table C. 1: Social information - Honest Information Treatment (HIT) 
The table below shows the investment returns announced by four second movers in one phase of a previous 
session of the experiment. H represents HIGH and L represents LOW.  
 
  Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10 
Second Mover 1 H H L H H H H H H L 
Second Mover 2 H H H H H H H H H H 
Second Mover 3 H H H H L L H H H H 
Second Mover 4 H L H H H L H H H L 
 
 
Table C. 2: Social information - Dishonest Information Treatment (DIT) 
The table below shows the investment returns announced by four second movers in one phase of a previous 
session of the experiment. H represents HIGH and L represents LOW.  
 
  Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 Round 6 Round 7 Round 8 Round 9 Round 10 
Second Mover 1 H L H L L L L H L L 
Second Mover 2 L L L L L L L L L L 
Second Mover 3 L H L L L L H L L L 




Table C. 3: Second mover behavior by honest type category 
Experiment 1 
Dishonest   Honest 
NIT HIT DIT All   NIT HIT DIT All 
Aggregate behavior 
         % returns observed high 0.82 0.78 0.74 0.77 
 
0.72 0.76 0.77 0.75 
% announced high 0.25 0.29 0.03 0.14 
 
0.50 0.55 0.71 0.57 
% honest announcements when return high 0.29 0.31 0.04 0.16 
 
0.62 0.67 0.89 0.70 
% honest announcements when return low 0.88 0.93 1.00 0.95 
 
0.86 0.79 0.84 0.83 
Strategies employed 
         % who play the SPE 0.20 0.33 0.78 0.53 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% always dishonest when return high 0.60 0.33 0.78 0.65 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
% always honest when return low 0.60 0.67 1.00 0.82 
 
0.46 0.33 0.44 0.41 
% always honest 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.06 
 
0.08 0.13 0.22 0.14 
N returns observed 100 60 180 340   260 300 180 740 
N subjects 5 3 9 17   13 15 9 37 
Experiment 2 
Dishonest   Honest 
  HIT DIT All     HIT DIT All 
Aggregate behavior 
         % returns observed high 
 
0.80 0.80 0.80 
  
0.80 0.80 0.80 
% announced high 
 
0.08 0.14 0.11 
  
0.66 0.48 0.55 
% honest announcements when return high 
 
0.07 0.16 0.11 
  
0.80 0.58 0.67 
% honest announcements when return low 
 
0.90 0.94 0.92 
  
0.92 0.94 0.93 
Strategies employed                  
% who play the SPE 
 
0.50 0.38 0.44 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
% always dishonest when return high 
 
0.50 0.44 0.47 
  
0.00 0.00 0.00 
% always honest when return low 
 
0.83 0.81 0.82 
  
0.67 0.75 0.71 
% always honest  0.00 0.00 0.00     0.00 0.13 0.07 
N returns observed 
 
360 320 680 
  
120 160 280 




Table C. 4: Marginal effects of probit regressions of announcements - Honest types, Experiment 2 
 
Dep. Var.: High announcement Honest types 
Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 2 vs. 3 
 ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 
return high 0.684*** 0.591*** -0.169 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.584) 
DIT -0.796*** -1.000*** -1.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
perceived honesty 0.169 0.024 -0.146 
 
(0.715) (0.958) (0.824) 
DIT X perceived honesty 0.627 0.613 -0.017 
 
(0.243) (0.261) (0.984) 
% past investment FM -0.144 -15.229*** -15.094*** 
 
(0.382) (0.000) (0.000) 
DIT X % past investment FM 0.467 15.540*** 15.081*** 
 
(0.266) (0.000) (0.000) 
period -0.017 -0.034 -0.017 
 
(0.547) (0.128) (0.546) 
endowment 0.077 0.060 -0.018 
 
(0.207) (0.311) (0.833) 
investment 0.028 0.008 -0.019 
 
(0.407) (0.878) (0.742) 
























 N obs. 126 126 252 
N clusters 14 13 13 
L -53.668 -54.342 -108.01 
R squared 0.385 0.378 0.381 
 
Note: P-values reported in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the 
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